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DELINKING DISPROPORTIONALITY FROM
DISCRIMINATION:
Procedural Burdens as Proxy for
Substantive Visions
MAXWELL 0. CHIBUNDU*
A belief that the difficult issues of our society can best be resolved
by adherence to some defined process drives much of contemporary
western intellectual thought.' The consequence is a pronounced preference
for focusing on "means" and not on "ends." When we find the system
failing to attain a desired objective, the primary inquiry into the failure
revolves around the correct structure and alignment of the means. This
approach raises the question of whether such an inquiry can be confined
to the use of procedural tools crafted to avoid the sort of predetermined
outcome that the "means" approach aims to achieve.
This question is at the core of much of the recent debate over the
appropriate means for correcting observed statistical differences in the
make-up of the American workforce. The United States Supreme Court's
construction of the procedural requirements of Title VII litigation in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. A toni02 exemplifies one dominant response
to the question. The answer, the Wards Cove Court asserted, lies in the
atomized dissection of the procedural mechanism and the application of
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McCalpin for administrative and library support, and to Larry Gibson, Dean Michael Kelly, Mike
Millemann, John Payton, the University of Maryland Law School Summer Research fund, and the
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piece. I dedicate the article with untempered gratitude to the forty-plus undergraduate students
enrolled at Harvard/Radcliffe and Tufts universities between 1980 and 1984 without whose absolutely
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1. See, e.g., STUART HAMPHSIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE (1989). This "process" orientation
for defining the "good" operates in varied spheres, ranging from first-order concerns such as the
resolution of political conflicts within a "democratic" system, to secondary and tertiary matters,
as in eligibility for participation in sporting events or exclusion from dining clubs. It finds expression
within the economic arena in the strong adherence to the position that the only legitimate organizing
principle is that of "voluntary exchange" or "the market." See ROBERT E. LANE, THE MARKET
EXPERIENCE (1991). Nowhere, however, is the vitality of the yardstick more luminescent than in
the legal sphere. Here, "process" is a deity synonymous with justice. Cf. JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1979). The recent confusion over whether to equate
the nature of the presumption to which a presidential nominee for the Supreme Court who seeks
senatorial confirmation is entitled when accused of wrongdoing in that essentially political setting
with the distribution of the "burden of proof" in a judicial proceeding is only a specific application
of the more general phenomenon.
2. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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routinized formulae to the process. 3 By crafting well-calibrated neutral
procedural instruments, and applying these to discrete elements of the
process regime, it is possible to derive right conclusions without putting
one's own imprimatur on the proper end that should be realized. 4 But
this answer, and the polarized reaction it has generated in the polity at
large, reveals the extent to which core substantive terms such as the
meaning of discrimination remain undefined. 5
Twenty years ago the Supreme Court, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,6
embraced a conception of discrimination based on statistical disparities
in the racial composition of an employer's workforce. The underlying
theory, subsequently termed "disparate impact," contended that in order
to demonstrate the existence of discrimination in the workplace, an
employee from an underrepresented group need not show a conscious
decision by the employer to treat her differently from others. Sweeping
language employed by the Court equated the absence of discrimination
with the existence of parity-at least in the employment setting. 7 By
contrast, the Court, applying the same disparate impact theory in Wards
Cove, insisted that discrimination can be established only by pointing to
some specific conduct of the employer directly responsible for the statistical
imbalance in the employer's workforce.'

3. See discussion infra part II(B).
4. Cf. Justice White's summary of the controlling principle in Wards Cove:
[Tihe question here is not whether we 'approve' of petitioners' employment practices
or the society that exists at the canneries, but, rather, whether respondents have
properly established that these practices violate Title VII.
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 649 n.4. Compare Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), where, in a
challenge by white firefighters to a consent decree requiring affirmative steps to promote blacks
within the city of Birmingham's fire department, the Court framed the issue in terms of the relevance
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24 and 19 to truncate the right of the white firefighters to
have their day in court. For Justice Stevens, however, the issue, rather than being access to the
Courts, was the proper disposition on the merits of a collateral challenge to a consent decree where
there was no contention of fraud, collusion, transparent invalidity, or lack of jurisdiction to enter
the decree. Martin, 490 U.S. at 769-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
For a recent study documenting significant differences between whites and blacks in their perception
of the prevalence of discrimination, see NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, THE
UNFINISHED AGENDA ON RACE IN AMERICA (1989).
5. At one level, discrimination may be said to arise whenever there is an "asymmetrical"
treatment of individuals. This definition, however, has virtually no utility in a modern (and perhaps
any) society. In a real sense, the fundamental issue yet unresolved is what forms of asymmetrical
treatment are permissible or, more specifically, what criteria shall society employ to determine when
asymmetrical treatment should be viewed as unacceptable.
Traditional exploration of these issues have tended to focus on the role of the state in perpetrating
or sanctioning the conduct giving rise to the asymmetry. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Discriminatory
Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of
Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1989); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). Focusing as they have on governmental conduct,
these analyses have tended to explore discrimination in terms of the appropriateness of such
rationalizing factors as motivation, intent, purpose, stereotyping, animus, prejudice, and subjugation.
But see David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The
Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L. J. 1619, 1621-22 (1991) (recognizing two types of
discrimination - "taste for discrimination" and "statistical discrimination" - that are determined
by economic rather than legal choices).
6. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
7. See discussion infra part IIA(l).
8. See discussion infra part IIA(4).
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Disagreeing with the Wards Cove decision, Congress has attempted to
enshrine the Griggs decision not by adopting the substantive definition
of discrimination embodied in Griggs, but by rewriting the procedural

mechanics of Wards Cove.9 Thus, in a reversal of conventional juris-

prudential roles,' 0 Congress has espoused for the political branches the
credo that a substantively correct outcome can and should be produced
by adherence to a rigid structure of procedural rules." It has endorsed
the claim that the efficacy of remedial legislation directed at removing
the impact of discrimination in the workplace can be confined to and
12
made dependent on the definition and allotment of the burden of proof.
Although the Executive Branch initially responded to Wards Cove by
taking the position that no legislation was needed since the ruling was
"technical" in character, 3 it subsequently checked congressional action
9. See discussion infra part III.
10. Traditionally, judicial insistence on strict legislative adherence to process has been restricted
to a very narrow sphere: those with significant impact on "suspect classes" or the exercise of
"fundamental rights." See, e.g., San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1972).
In the absence of these considerations, it is generally sufficient that legislative action can be explained
as serving some "legitimate" purpose. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
11. Thus, even as Congress by large margins sought both to realign and to redefine the distribution
of the burdens of proof embraced by the Court in Wards Cove, it expressly rejected the suggestion
that the purpose or effect of the revisions is to create substantive rights. The most prominent
example of this disclaimer was contained in section 5 of the House Bill (HRI of 1991) which stated
that the legislation shall not be construed to "require, permit or encourage" the use of quotas.
Similarly, determined to emphasize the limited procedural scope of the legislation, Congressional
proponents went out of their way to "disavow" the use of "race-norming"-a practice embraced
even by the conservative Reagan-Bush Department of Labor-to "correct" for disparities in the
scores of blacks and whites on general aptitude tests. See, e.g., Holly K. Hacker, Adjusted Federal
Employment Tests Stir Controversy, L.A. TimEs, June 6, 1991, at A5. The current statutory provision
is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l) (West Supp. 1992). Race-norming is the practice of rating the
scores of members of one group against other members of that group, rather than rating all testtakers together. Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 940 F.2d 1394, 1396 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing
instance of race-norming).
12. Proponents of legislative action regularly asserted the purpose of the legislation to be the
reversal of the Supreme Court's distribution and definition of the burden of proof in Wards Cove
by restoring the Court's purported pre-existing definition in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971).
This narrow framing of the legislative enterprise resulted in quite a few striking ironies. In a
division reminiscent of that on the Court, the disagreements within the political branches, at. least
on the surface, go to issues of ascertaining the scope of the pre-existing Griggs standard, and giving
content to an idea that, at best, was embryonic in Griggs. Since the Griggs standard-whatever its
definition-is not self-executing, the battle has been over the appropriate technical calibration of
the relevant yardsticks. Both Congress and the President appeared to agree on the broad outlines
of the distribution of the burden of proof, but differed on the definition of the burden. See
discussion infra part III. However, as a political columnist has pointed out, it is a remarkable
statement of the depths to which the use of racially polarized political symbolism has sunk when
the focus of legislation revolves around the uncompromising adherence by politicians to such terms
as "significant," "manifest," or "substantial" in defining a procedural burden. See Michael Kinsley,
Hortonism Redux; Bush's Pseudo-Racism in Opposing New Civil Rights Law, THE NEw REPUBLIC,
June 24, 1991. The reality, of course, is that the disagreements relate to substantive concerns that
inhere with the acceptance of "disparate impact" (i.e., statistical disproportionality) as a sufficient
basis for governmental action. See discussion infra part IV.
13. See President's News Conference, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 982 (June 27, 1989). President
Bush stated:
The Justice Department has told me that the decisions reflects [sic] interpretation
of the civil rights laws by the Court on technical subjects, and we're talking about
burdens of proof and statutes of limitations. But that is the advice I am getting
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In this latter guise,

it forthrightly disputed the "neutrality" of the effects of burden allocation.
To the contrary, it argued vigorously for a substantive vision of society

that insists on an undifferentiated symmetrical consideration of claims

to societal protection. 5 According to the Bush Administration, the choice
between the adoption of its procedural rules and those put forward by
the Congress was tantamount to a choice between the allocation of social
basis of "merit" and of allocation under
and economic resources on the
16
a "racial spoilage" system.
The adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 199111 after over two years
of acrimonious debate on the appropriate allocation of the burden of
proof, far from resolving the issue, returned it back to the courts, with
confusing instructions that allowed each side to declare victory. 8 The
exchanges are thus bound to continue to bring to the forefront a long
submerged problem: the utility of relying on arcane procedural and
evidentiary rules to tackle systemic policy disagreements. In particular,
they raise the questions as to whether economic disparities correlatable
along well-defined social cleavages such as race or gender are relevant
as elements of the discharge of burden allocations, or whether these
disparities constitute substantive impairments to the body politic meriting
the sort of direct ends-oriented confrontation that can be brought about
only by changes in the substantive law regime.
The core claim of this paper is that although only recently brought
to the front burner by the Wards Cove decision,' 9 the masking of

14. See discussion infra part Ill.
15. The charade that justice lies in the undifferentiated treatment of all alike without regard of
prior history or contemporary position is often referred to as "color-blindness." See, e.g., William
B. Reynolds, An Equal Opportunity Scorecard, 21 GA. L. REV. 1007 (1987); Reynolds, Individualism
vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 YAE L.J. 995 (1984). As contended in part IV below,
a color-blind society may just as easily be said to exist when it is impossible to predict with any
degree of accuracy on the basis of one's color one's position or economic well-being in society.
Color-blindness, then, need not be defined in terms of the race-neutrality of the process, but the
racial indistinctness of the end-product.
16. The Bush Administration routinely denounced congressional proposals on the ground that
they would foster allocation of jobs by quotas. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REc. S16418 (daily ed. Oct.
22, 1990) (veto message of Pres. Bush). Yet, as commentators regularly pointed out, it was unclear
how the differences contained in the Administration's alternative procedures were less likely to result
in hiring by the numbers. See, e.g., Michael Kingsley, Hortonism Isn't Racism, But It is a Great
Lie, L.A. TiMEs, June 6, 1991, at 7; cf. Bush's 'Quota' Politics, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
June 3, 1991, at 20 ("If the [Civil Rights] [Bill originated to fight exclusionary employment practices,
a traditional civil rights issue, it has turned into a focal point for the national debate over those
inclusionary employment practices known as affirmative action .... ").
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; see also discussion infra part 11I.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; see also discussion infra part III.
19. Although ostensibly a case about the allocation of evidentiary burdens in a Title VII disparate
impact case, and although no member of the Court challenged the continuing viability of disparate
impact as a basis for litigating a Title VII claim, it was evident that the procedural devices invoked
by members of the Court and on which so much of the opinions turned barely masked substantive
disagreements. As both the majority and the dissent recognized, procedural formulae are themselves
statements of substantive goals. Justice White explained the Court's rejection of prior decisions that
did not concur with his formulation of the burden of proof by arguing that adoption of those
other approaches would result in mandating the use of proportional representation in the workplace,
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differences by resort to burden allocation rules and manipulation of the
probative value of statistical disparities has been essential to the development of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of "equal opportunities"
in the economic sphere over quite a considerable period of time. The
disagreements on the Court, while couched in terms of how to prove
"disparate impact" (or similar procedurally-based theories for relief), go
to the substantive definition of "discrimination" and, therefore, to the
reach of the "antidiscrimination" principle. 20 Further, the paper argues

that this focus, in turn, necessarily directs attention to the broader
prescriptive view of the structure of contemporary society, and the normative vision for the community of the future. Specifically, the distribution
of burdens of proof 2' in this area over the last twenty years has spoken
directly to the Court's perception of the prevalence of discrimination,
and what can and ought to be done about it. In large measure, the
debate has not been about doing right in the particular case, but doing22
right about the structure of economic distributions in the community.
The meaning and relevance of burden allocation and statistical disparities
relate directly to the mediating role judicially crafted norms play in
translating the Court's vision of the community to the disposition of the

individual case, and the function of these norms in transmitting the
consequences of the particular case back to our vision of the structure
of the community. 23 These devices pose the issue of the extent to which

an objective he said Title VII precluded. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-61.
By contrast, in what surely must be one of the more provocative statements from the Supreme
Court bench in recent years, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority's evidentiary rules constituted
a direct attack on the antidiscrimination norm itself, a norm surely at the core of Title VII.
Today a bare majority of the Court takes three major strides backwards in the
battle against race discrimination . . . . Sadly, this comes as no surprise. One wonders
whether the majority still believes that race discrimination-or, more accurately,
race discrimination against nonwhites-is a problem in our society, or even remembers
that it ever was.
Id. at 661-62 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Highlighting this departure from the nominally procedural context of the issues in question was
Justice Stevens's complaint that Title VII cases should be treated like any other case. Id. at 673
(Stevens, J.,dissenting).
20. For discussion of the antidiscrimination principle, see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PIL. & PuB. AFF. 107 (1976); Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition, School
Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728 (1986).
21. See discussion infra part II.
22. Despite the large number of blacks who have become members of the ubiquitous American
middle-class over the last three decades, it remains the case that categorical statements can be made
with justification that correlate economic welfare with race, so that a black drawn at random is
twice as likely to be unemployed as a white, three times as likely to be below the poverty line,
and infinitely less likely to be the chief executive of a large american corporation as her white
counterpart. See generally David Swinton, The Economic Status of African Americans: Limited
Ownership and Persistent Inequality, in THE STATE OF BLACK AtERICA 1992, at 61 (1992); Thomas
F. Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L.
REV. 673 (1984-85).
23. The following two statements from two prevailing opinions of the Court perhaps best articulate
the relevance of statistics to perception, and its translation into dominant judicial doctrine over
time:
[Aibsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring
practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial
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procedural rules developed primarily in the context of relatively stable
routinized adjudication of private (or quasi-private) relationships gone
awry can be assigned meaningful dispositive roles in the polarized sub24
stantive-policy-laden domain of Title VII (and similar civil rights) law.
In exploring the uses of burden allocation (and the related issue of
the probativeness of statistical disparities) as proxy for the generation of
substantive antidiscrimination economic law, the paper elaborates on four
contentions. First, despite judicial rhetoric suggesting the function of
25
"burden allocation" in Title VII and related "Equal Protection" litigation
as the traditional procedural device of assuring "an orderly presentation
of evidence," ' 26 burden allocation has consistently been employed to define
and shape the substantive contours of the cost the judicial system has
been willing to impose on societal institutions as the price for greater
participation by blacks 27 in the mainstream activities of the national
economy.

and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which employees
are hired. Evidence of longlasting and gross disparity between the composition of
a work force and that of the general population thus may be significant even though
Section 7030) makes clear that Title VII imposes no requirement that a work force
mirror the general population .... In many cases the only available avenue of
proof is the use of racial statistics to uncover clandestine and covert discrimination
by the employer or union involved.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1976) (citation
omitted).
The 30% quota cannot be said to be narrowly tailored to any goal, except perhaps
outright racial balancing. It rests upon the 'completely unrealistic' assumption that
minorities will choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their representation
in the local population. See Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 494
(1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[l]t is completely
unrealistic to assume that individuals of one race will gravitate with mathematical
exactitude to each employer or union absent unlawful discrimination").
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-08 (1989).
24. As Professor Patricia Williams has observed:
The reflexive referral of all but the most privatized controversies to the legislature
obscures the fact that even the narrowest contract or property dispute is never
really as private as theory would have it. Courts always have to consider social
ramifications that are rarely limited to the named parties, whether that consideration
is of 'policy'-the contemporaneous society of those similarly situated-or whether
the controversy is funnelled into issues of 'precedent'-the prior subsequent society
of others.
Patricia J. Williams, Comment, Metro-BroadcastingCo. v. F.C.C.: Regrouping in Singular Times,
104 HARV. L. REV. 525, 539 (1990).
25. Title VII, focusing as it does on employment practices, is paradigmatic of economicallybased claims, but it is not the exclusive source of judicial decisions on the interplay of race,
economics, and the law. Essentially similar issues are presented in other areas, such as the letting
of contracts, which may be covered either by the Equal Protection provisions of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of United States Constitution (where the defendants are public actors), or
by provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Such claims may be advanced either by those who have been traditionally underrepresented in
gainful economic activity (e.g., blacks and women), or by persons affected by affirmative efforts
to correct such underrepresentation. Actions brought by persons in the former group may be referred
to as "direct discrimination" cases; those in the latter class are sometimes termed "reverse discrimination" or "affirmative action" cases.
26. Cf. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Furnco Constr.
Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
27. To the extent that specificity of group identification is important for the discussion expounded
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Second, this understanding highlights the inadequacy of the procedurally-based distinctions between the various theories of Title VII litigation,
such as "disparate impact," "disparate treatment," "mixed motives,"
and "pattern and practice." Rather than reflecting internally consistent
and justifiable procedural approaches to factual settings, each reformulation of the applicable procedural rules was bound up with positions
as to the appropriateness of substantive law demands.2 8 Procedural formulations thus functioned as readily accessible means for the reinterpretation of substantive antidiscrimination doctrines.2 9
Third, employing procedural devices as substitutes for the explicit
articulation of substantive principles has significant shortcomings. Rhetorical or not, the Court's expressed reliance on procedural devices shifts
the focus of attention from the substantive concerns of Title VII (and
like proceedings) to the narrow and ultimately much less useful issue of
the proper delineation and accurate calibration of the procedural mechanisms.3 0 Such change in focus undercuts Title VII's integrity in three

on in this paper-and it frequently is-I rely on the position of black citizens because the black
experience has been central to the development of civil rights law. Blacks do form the archetypal
"protected group" for whose "especial benefit" the positive laws in force (notably the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) were
enacted. Even in those cases involving the enforcement of these laws where none of the parties is
black, the Supreme Court has gone out of its way to emphasize the applicability of the concepts
to black litigants, while the reverse has not always been the case. Cf. Johnson v. Transportation
Agency of Santa Clara, 480 U.S. 616 (1986). Similarly, despite efforts to promote the enactment
of civil rights legislation by emphasizing its beneficial effects on others such as women, see, e.g.
Democrats Offer Compromise on Contentious Bias Bill, 49 CONG. QUART. 1286 (May 18, 1991),
the dominant and controlling perception is that the primary beneficiary is the Black citizen.
28. Thus, as more fully explained below, courts have drawn distinctions between disparate impact
and disparate treatment, Title VII and equal protection, and voluntary affirmative action and
judicially mandated remedies. For each of these legal categories, the Court starts out attempting
to formulate some distinctive rule. In each case, despite an auspicious start-i.e., either a unanimous
or super-majority vote-no consistent substantive theory emerges, and again and again the Court
is forced to discard previous formulations and to borrow the language and procedural formulation
of cases that supposedly tackled a different class of cases to explain internal contradictions among
the precedents. For one exploration of the difficulties of the undertaking in reconciliation, see
George Rutherglenn & Daniel R. Ortiz, Affirmative Action Under the Constitution and Title VII:
From Confusion to Convergence, 35 UCLA L. REv. 467 (1988).
29. Each new theory was usually embraced by a good number of the members of the Court
because it appeared initially as offering some principled way to resolve the vexing problem of the
correlation of economic inequality to race without having to adopt some overarching substantive
view that would demand radical steps to restructure a society many of whose practices most professed
as unpalatable. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), traditionally acclaimed to have
been the basis for disparate impact theory, received the unanimous support of the Court. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981), the "twin pillars" of disparate treatment, were virtually unanimous opinions.
In each of these cases, the Court adroitly used procedural rules to craft significant substantive
rights and norms. The initial consensus broke down as attempts to refine the procedure further
revealed the tension between the presentation of process as a neutral mechanical instrument of
adjudication, and its actual operation as a tool for the generation and entrenchment of substantive
norms. See discussion infra part II.
30. Procedural rules embodied in burden allocation and the use of statistics in Title VII have
often been presented as though these rules possess definite and constant forms that can dispose of
claims with little regard to prevailing social and economic concerns. Justice White could thus assert
"the question here is not whether we 'approve' of petitioners' employment practices or the society
that exists at the canneries, but, rather, whether respondents have properly established that these
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ways. First, it creates uncertainty as to the place and role of procedure
in the antidiscrimination realm. Second, the resulting efforts to restore
coherence to the procedural doctrine by the regularized incantation of
ritualized formulae compounds the uncertainty and promotes obscurantism
in civil rights law. Third, by focusing on procedural definitions, the
judicial system and society risk avoiding the need to come candidly to3
grips with the actual substantive value differences that genuinely exist. '
Old substantive assumptions-although having lost their virility-are neither re-examined nor jettisoned. New substantive conceptions are left
unexplored.
Finally, the quagmire into which legislative efforts to correct Wards
Cove have sunk should be evaluated in this context of the appropriateness
of employing procedural devices to resolve substantive policy disagree-

ments. This approach is flawed because the legislature, unlike the courts,
need not resort to the subterfuge of process to validate prescriptive norms.
This is particularly the case where, as demonstrated below, the effect of
procedural subterfuge has been to obfuscate substantive norms. The resort
to burden allocation by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, far
sociofrom giving guidance to the courts, leaves unresolved fundamental
32
economic issues related to the definition of discrimination.
These issues are explored in this essay as follows:
Part I puts forward three contending perspectives on the role of antidiscrimination law in current society. This understanding provides context
for the substantive relevance of burden allocation in civil rights law.
Part II disentangles the various uses to which burden allocation and
statistical disparities have been put in the judicial construction of the
antidiscrimination laws. 3 The part argues that from 1971-1977, a majority
practices violate Title VII." Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 649 n.4; see also, Robert Belton, Burdens
of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of ProceduralJustice, 34 VAND.
L. REv. 1205 (1981). But see Marshall Walthew, Comment, Affirmative Action and the Remedial
Scope of Title VII: ProceduralAnswers to Substantive Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (1987);
see also discussion infra part IV.
31. For example, the basic question in Title VII of whether the statute mandates economic
equality bottomed on the adoption of measures to ensure proportionate economic participation in
the mainstream of the economy, see, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); United
Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), or whether it requires no more than the removal of
explicit impediments to black participation in the economy, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
424 U.S. 747 (1976); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), are substantive
issues that remain unresolved. As demonstrated in part II infra, the structure and procedural
delimitations of disparate impact analysis has embodied and lent credence to both substantive views.
32. Thus, as elaborated on in part III infra, neither proponents of nor detractors from the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 discussed or evaluated statistical disparities in terms of what they tell us on
their own merits about hitherto sacrosanct beliefs and institutions such as the concept of racial,
ethnic, gender and like "equality," "merit," or the efficacy of aptitude tests. Rather, the focus
was entirely on the appropriate use of such disparities to meet the finely calibrated procedural
edifice that has been erected around the disparate impact theory.
33. Although current dissatisfaction over the use of statistics in Title VII is directed primarily
to its role in making out the prima facie showing under disparate impact analysis, statistical evidence
has by no means been limited to this stage. The Court has suggested that statistics may be relevant
under disparate treatment, at both the rebuttal and pretext stages of the discharge of the burden
of proof. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (disparate treatment);
Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978) (rebuttal); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (pretext).
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of the Supreme Court viewed statistical disparities as emblematic of a
divided society that could not live in harmony until the inequalities
symbolized by the disparities had been removed. Because, traditionally,
judicial ability to intervene is constrained by the insistence that relief is
available only to those who can demonstrate causal linkage between their
injury and wrongful conduct by the defendant, the Court faced a dilemma:
reconciling the provision of relief designed to ameliorate disparities with
adherence to traditional rules of causation. While the individual cases
before the Court could have been disposed of on narrow legal grounds,
the Court foresaw the very limited consequences of such an approach.
As an alternative answer, the Court refashioned the procedural device
of allocating burdens of proof into a distinctive tool that put the status
quo on the defensive, and challenged society to reform itself. By 1979,
the wisdom of a judicial policy that focused on the removal of disparities
was under siege. The resulting shift in substantive views was characterized
by a different approach to the symbolic value the Court found in statistical
disparities. The Court, while seemingly retaining the prior structure of
burden allocation, engaged in a reinterpretation which disclosed significantly different substantive concerns. Economic cost rather than social
harmony underlay judicial choices. The Court sought to fit the old
structure into this new concern by articulating a highly formalistic construction of the burden rules to be applied in ascertaining the level of
credence to be accorded statistical disparities.
Part III discusses congressional efforts to reverse the Court's change
in philosophy by legislating specific rules on burdens of proof. The
analysis contends that this is an ineffectual means of resolving the substantive concerns inherent in Title VII.
Part IV explores alternatives to a procedurally-based approach to statistical disparities. In particular, it suggests reexamination of the "faultbased" view of antidiscrimination law, and the insistence on "causationin-fact" as a prerequisite for providing relief to members of underrepresented groups.
I.

CONTENDING PERSPECTIVES ON THE REMEDIAL
FUNCTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS

Despite the ferocity of the debate on the relevance of race to the
distribution of economic goods, there is remarkable consensus that any
mandated interference with proprietary decisions that favor members of
over others must be limited to the
a particular racial or ethnic '3 group
"correction of past wrongs." 4 This consensus is in most minds summed

34. The discussion of this point has generally been framed and is most widely understood as
a constitutional problem rather than a statutory one. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency
of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 620 n.2 (1986). For a discussion of the utility of this
dichotomy, see Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 876
F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd sub nom, Metro-Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
Although the inclusionary approach described below may at first inspection appear to fall outside
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up by one phrase: "equal opportunity."" Differences thus are couched
in terms of the extent to which contemporary laws and practices can be
harmonized with the principle. At one end of the spectrum, the argument
is that equal opportunity must necessarily take into account background
conditions. 36 According to this view, the current status of blacks vis-avis whites renders unworkable a doctrine of equal opportunity that excludes affirmative allocation of resources to blacks when necessary to
enable them to compete effectively.
The argument at the other end of the spectrum asserts that the society's
commitment is to "equal opportunity," not to "equal outcome" or
"equal results." According to this view, genuine commitment to equal
opportunity requires the government to eschew any race-based intrusion
into, or manipulation of, economic forces. It requires acceptance of the
efficacy of traditional economic institutions to reward the industrious
and to discourage sloth. 37 The government's obligation must be the
unwavering commitment to treat all individuals as individuals without
regard to their group identity, or to the group's collective past history.
In between these polar ends, a variety of positions exist. For example,
one may subscribe to the belief that equal opportunity demands the taking
into account of background conditions, and yet argue that society ought
to reject the allocation of resources on a group basis, preferring instead
to support individualized evaluation and treatment of disadvantaged persons. 3s The concern ought to be "equalization of 'life chances,"' not
of this retrospectively-driven regime, the approach's frequent resort to history to explain (if not to
justify) correcting structural defects brings it squarely within this "corrective" consensus. While the
approach's prescriptions do emphasize avoidance of a purely backward-looking "fault-based" justification for remedial measures, its proponents do advance past wrongs as the basis for presumptively
favoring blacks as a group. See, e.g., Kathleen Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's
Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HAiv. L. REV. 78 (1986); WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DIsADVANTAGED 141,

147 (1987).

But see JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE FAMILY

(1983) (advocating a purely forward-looking "equalization of life chances," and denouncing any
form of retrospective compensation of a group-at least in the absence of unequivocal proof that
the individual beneficiary had been specifically wronged).
35. Notably, the concern is not with equity or fairness. Rather, as Professor Jim Fishkin has
succinctly phrased the presumption, "[eiqual opportunity is the central doctrine in modern liberalism
for legitimating the distribution of goods in society .... Rather than being concerned with equality
of outcomes, liberalism, in both theory and practice, has been concerned with the rationing of
opportunities for people to become unequal." JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND
THE FAMILY 1 (1983).

The discussion in this paper is primarily of judicial and legislative action, and is limited to
orthodox "liberal" points of view as manifested in the current historical setting.
36. This view is perhaps most graphically portrayed in President Lyndon B. Johnson's frequently
quoted Howard University address of 1965:
You do not take a man who, for years, has been hobbled by chains, liberate him,
bring him to the starting line of the race saying: "you are free to compete with
all of the others," and still justly believe you have been completely fair. Thus, it
is not enough to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must have the
ability to walk through those gates. This is the next and more profound stage of
the battle for civil rights.
President's Address to Howard University, 21 PUB. PAPERS 635, 640 (1965).
37. See, e.g., JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE FAMILY 147-51 (1983);
Morris B. Abrams Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HAsv. L. REV. 1312
(1986).
38. Such disadvantage may be predicated on social (i.e., cultural, educational, or linguistic)
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the creation of preferences or exemptions from obligations on the basis
of race.3 9 Alternatively, one may posit that even if "equal opportunity"
requires the state and society to ignore background conditions and to
act without regard to the racial or ethnic identity of citizens, the principle
is not relevant in two important situations: where the conduct is private;
or where, regardless of current conditions, unfettered competition would
likely result in the exclusion of members of a group from the benefits
of societal intercourse. 40 Because the desires of private actors cannot be
easily presumed to be controlled by the neutral workings of economic
laws, and because resulting exclusions both denigrate the excluded persons
for an improper reason, and deny to society the benefits of diversity, 4'
some forms of intervention may be proper. For example, preferential
allocation of resources to such persons may be permissible if it serves
to promote not individualized or narrowly based group interests, but
overall societal welfare.
No consensus currently exists on these conceptions of the ultimate goal,
nor of the relevance of the state or of the law in their promotion.
Nonetheless, by relating articulated cause to prescribed cure, one can
identify three competing categories or visions of the role of law in shaping
societal responses to issues of the substantial disparity of group participation in the national economy*. The first locates current black underrepresentation centrally in terms of the history of blacks in American
society. That history, epitomized by the arrival of the black in bondage
and strewn with nefarious discriminatory treatment, has resulted in relative
economic inequality for blacks. That history imposes an obligation on
American society to rectify the state of inequality by compensating for
shortcomings, economic disadvantage, physical or mental handicap, or other disabilities that prevent
an individual subject to the condition from taking full advantage of resources otherwise available
to the general population. This has been the predicate for the so-called "Disadvantaged Business
Enterprise" programs. See, e.g., Small Business Administration Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 637 (1990);
The Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-17, 101
Stat. 132 (1987); see also Tennessee Asphalt Co. v. Farris, 942 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991); Milwaukee
Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991); see
also infra part IV.
39. JAMES S. FIsHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE FAMILY 147-51 (1983). However,
establishing the boundaries between "equalization of life chances" for the disadvantaged, and "giving
preferences" to those disadvantaged groups is no easy undertaking. The claim often is made that
certain forms of education, such as "secondary" or "vocational" education (presumably as distinguished from postgraduate or professional education), are so basic that assuring them to all regardless
of competitive performance is permissible, but employment is not. Aside from the uncertainty (indeed
impossibility) of knowing where to draw the line, as professor Ely convincingly noted almost twenty
years ago, the most that can be said for the approach is that it seems intuitively correct; however,
it may be no less arbitrary or indefensible for that reason. See John Ely, The Constitutionality of
Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CMI. L. REV. 723 (1974). The recent outcry over the award
of scholarships to black students already admitted to colleges where until not too long ago they
were excluded or received inferior education exemplifies the caprice of the distinction. Compare
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992).
40. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). The theoretical underpinnings
of such a nonemotive basis for engaging in discriminatory conduct and the correlative purely
instrumentalist response (i.e., one not grounded on human passions) has led to the articulation of
two forms of discrimination that are not grounded in an intent to hurt or demean the person being
excluded. See, e.g., David Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment:
The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEo. L. J. 1619 (1991).
41. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3001 (1990).
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past wrongs. 42 Relevant policies must both root out the effects of such
past discrimination through compensatory measures, and assure through
laws and policies that there is no return to racial bias-as occurred during
the post-Reconstruction era. 43 This approach calls, therefore, not only

for the adoption of race-neutral legislation prohibiting decision-making
on account of race, but requires the adoption and enforcement of laws
that affirmatively promote the removal of obstacles to black participation
in the economy. Such affirmative measures may require the granting' 4of
preferences." This approach may be termed the "broadly remedial. 1
Interestingly, the hurdle to judicial (as opposed to legislative) embrace
of this approach lies more in the historical basis of the proposition rather

than in its prescription.46 As a historical claim, its factual validity can
hardly be contested. The difficulty exists, however, in the logistics of its

verification as an empirically relevant consideration in the context of a
specific claim by
One can rely on
link. Taking this
would place the

an individual or class of persons in the litigation forum.
what appears to be self-evident, and presume the causal
approach, a proponent of the broadly remedial approach
burden of proving otherwise on those who dispute the

causal link. Alternatively, one can insist that those who seek the benefit
of the assumption prove its validity. As demonstrated in part II, much
of the law on the relevance of statistics concerning black participation
in the national economy has focused on determining the appropriate
presumption of the linkage of racial bias and black under-representation
in the economy. Explicit appreciation of this nature of the disagreement,

however, did not rise to the surface of discourse until the 1980s. When
it did, it became evident that the concern was not so much in proving

42. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHM. & Pun. AFF. 107, 142-46
(1976).
43. Id.
44. Justice Blackmun's statement in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1979), that "[i]n order to get beyond racism . . . [aind in order to treat some persons equally,
we must treat them differently," is the most succinct and eloquent reconciliation of the two aspects
of this approach. Id. at 406 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion).
45. I use this term to distinguish the approach from the narrowly remedial, which only accepts
rectification of specifically identified instances of racial discrimination.
46. Judicial rejection of a broadly remedial approach today is frequently framed substantively
in terms of the purported injury to innocent nonminorities. See, e.g., Firefighters v. Stotts, 467
U.S. 561, 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 276 (Powell,
J., plurality opinion); Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616,
657 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 478 (1980) (Burger,
C.J., plurality opinion); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
For an evaluation and critique of this focus on "injury to innocent victims," see David Chang,
Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action and Innocent Victims, Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices, 1991 COLUm. L. Rav. 790. Remarkably, however, the discussion of the appropriate 0
relief usually provides an alternate (not the primary) ground for the disposition of the case. See,
e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In
only one instance, Franks v. Bowman Transp. Corp., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), has the Court, following
a judicial determination of liability in favor of the plaintiff, nonetheless invalidated the grant of
relief on the ground that it was too broad or not narrowly tailored. Cf. Firefighters v. Stotts, 467
U.S. 561 (1984) (invalidating negotiated remedy sanctioned by a judicial decree).
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to accept
the factual assertion, but in the judicial system's unwillingness
47
the consequences of the remedies that had evolved.
The second approach proceeds from the premise that the significance
of past racial discrimination on the contemporary situation of blacks is
48
either unknowable or irrelevant to black representation in the economy.
What is relevant is the right of each and every individual in today's
society not to be denied full participation in the economy on account
of race. To the extent the history of past racial discrimination has any
relevance for the present, it is entirely instructional: the state should
adopt and enforce only those laws that apply evenhandedly to all. This
"color blind" approach permits only those race-based state intrusions
that remedy proved cases of current discrimination. Of necessity, then,
race-conscious laws that seek to correct past discrimination are unacceptable because they imply state-sanctioned discrimination against nonblacks- "reverse discrimination." In short, the national commitment to
eradicate racial discrimination is satisfied by penalizing those who are
proved to have violated specific antidiscrimination laws. Where the violation is established, this antisocial behavior may be sanctioned by
providing compensatory relief (including exemplary damages) to the specific individuals who make out a case that their protected individual
rights have been infringed. 49 This approach may be termed the "narrow
antidiscrimination" principle. 0

47. See discussion infra part 11.
48. Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 513
(1987).
49. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment); Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 580-82 (1984). But see Sheet Metal Workers
v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (rejecting the idea
that only actual victims of past discrimination are entitled to relief under the Equal Protection
Clause); cf. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 362-71 (1977).
Senator Hatch is a primary proponent of this conception of the antidiscrimination laws, and its
ascendancy is reflected in section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981A). The depth of the commitment of the proponents of the narrow antidiscriminatory approach
to the use of antidiscrimination laws as full and effective deterrence to discriminatory conduct
appears belied by the strict limitation (or capping) of available damages. See id.
50. Proponents of the narrow antidiscrimination principle in recent years appear willing to accept
a less doctrinaire formulation of the "color blind" norm. They claim that practices which disproportionately favor blacks are not necessarily in conflict with the principle provided that some rationale
other than race is advanced for their use. Thus, a state may, for example, establish preferences
favoring residents of the inner city, and such preferences would be constitutionally valid. See, e.g.,
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring). Since the
Supreme Court has not confronted such a situation, the scope and details of such programs are
at best speculative. Language in court of appeals opinions intimate the limited practicability of this
concession. E.g., Milwaukee County Pavers Assoc. v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419, 422 (7th Cir. 1991).
Thus, in a recent decision, applying the City of Richmond decision, a district court struck down
a preference favoring the physically handicapped. See Contractors' Ass'n of E. Pennsylvania v.
City of Philadelphia, 735 F. Supp. 1274 (E.D. Pa. 1990). However, to the extent that the articulated
reason for the validity of such a program is the recognition that correcting class-based structural
impediments demand a different level of scrutiny (and therefore deference) from the courts, these
narrow antidiscrimination adherents have edged closer to the position taken by the proponents of
the "inclusionary" principle.
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A basic criticism of this conception of the role of law in dealing with
racially correlatable economic inequality is that it purveys a construction
of "formal equality" that is ahistorical. Consciously avoiding the past,
it seeks to create a harmonious present by positing the existence of
individuals devoid of roots, and existing in a spatial and temporal world
5
removed from what our common-sense observations tell us. 1
A third approach, while acknowledging the possible continuing effects
of past discrimination, does not accept that such effects alone explain
the current position of blacks in the economy.1 2 Whatever the significance
of past discrimination, the important focus ought not to be on the
consequences of past discrimination, but on identification of current
policies that foster relative black economic inequality." That inquiry, in
the view of proponents, would disclose that current black under-performance is attributable to predominantly "class-based" structural factors
that create and amplify incidents of poverty among those born into
already disadvantaged settings. 5 4 The prescription offered by this approach-which may be referred to as "inclusionary"-is the tackling of
the structural impediments to full participation by the disadvantaged
without regard to their race. 5
Judicial adoption of this approach would constitute a departure from
the traditional legitimating principle that a "remedy" is available only
after liability for wrongful conduct has been established. In the absence
of the linkage between specific "wrongdoing" and "remedy," the judicial
system would have to develop alternative conceptions of "liability" to
serve this purpose. Specifically, the system would be faced with the need
to identify factors that would circumscribe the application of the inclusionary principle.16 Proportionality-a reasonable relationship between
group participation in the economy and its composition in a defined pool
(e.g. the national population)-might be one such factor.17 It is a viable

51. See generally, Michael Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive
Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1989).
This criticism is particularly telling since most of the proponents of the narrow antidiscrimination
principle are "conservatives," and as one scholar has forcefully argued, a sense of connection to
the past is central to authentic conservative philosophy. See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and
Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990).
52. See WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 10, 12 (1990).
53. Id. at 118 (discussing concept of "life chances"); cf. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 149 (discussing the role of exclusion in shaping group
identification). See generally Kathleen Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative
Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 78 (1986).
54. See generally, WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1990).
55. Cf. Kathleen Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100
HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986).
Both Justices O'Connor and Scalia's opinions in Croson appear to make bows in this direction.
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 469; id. at 520 (Scalia, J. concurring).
56. This appears to be a contemporary problem in other areas of tort law. See discussion infra
part IV.
57. Proportionality, as used here, should be distinguished from statistical parity. The assumption
here is that proportionality is the substantive end sought to be achieved; that is, it is "a good"
in and of itself. By contrast, statistical parity, as explained in part 11 infra, is simply an element
of the procedural burden; that is, a "means" to some other end.
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one, however, only if one postulates either that parity-and the other

values it symbolizes5 8-is

a good in and of itself (a position for which

very few have seriously argued) or by relating the absence of proportionality to past wrongful conduct, making the approach essentially indistinguishable from the broadly remedial.5 9 As a result, the inclusionary
approach has tended to be quite unstable, finding shifting support both
from advocates of the broadly remedial and the narrowly antidiscriminatory. 60 Removal of the straightjacket of procedure may encourage
serious examination of the interesting issues this approach raises. 6 '
The attitude and pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court
have been central to the hegemony (and, indeed, viability) of these
contending approaches both as theoretical and as practical organizing
concepts. 62 For close to a half century, and certainly during the last
twenty years, the Court has been the final arbiter both as to claims
brought by blacks alleging individual or systemic unfairness to them in
the economic arena, and claims by whites challenging programs that take
race into account in defining access to economic opportunities. In resolving
these claims, the Court's role has not been limited to that of disposing
of the cases on the narrowest ground available. Rather, because of the
Court's prior role as the conscience of the nation in matters of race, its
pronouncements have garnered oracular 6 3quality for the private person,
the public official, and society at large.
Strikingly, in the economic sphere, the Court has discharged this role
primarily by resort to discrete adjudicatory rule-making, rather than the

58. Such values might include creation of an integrated work-force, doing away with racial
stereotyping, diversity in the work-place, and economic empowerment for all citizens.
59. The more recent articulation of the approach focuses on the argument for the correction
of economic imbalances without regard to race. See discussion infra part IV. The difficulty with
this argument, like the difficulty identified in the text, is prescribing the relevant criteria for
determining who is included and who is excluded. This determination is essential if the resulting
prescription is not to go askew by benefiting the undeserving without correcting the perceived
problem.
But see David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment:
The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEo. L. J. 1619, 1647 (1991) (advocating a statistical approach
circumscribed by the requirement that an employer's hiring, promotion, and compensation practices
must "benefit minority employees according to their proportions in the relevant labor pool, unless
the employer can show that it would be very costly to do so.") (emphasis added).
60. Acceptance of the inclusionary approach by advocates of the broadly remedial approach is
not difficult to explain. To the extent the focus is on the end-result, the inclusionary approach
complements the historical justification approach of the broadly remedial. Acceptance of the inclusionary approach by those subscribing to the narrowly antidiscriminatory is of more recent vintage,
and is very much in flux. A key consideration appears to be the criteria for "inclusion." These
issues are explored in some detail in part IV infra.
61. See discussion infra part IV.
62. As contended infra, part 1I, the special role of the Court in shaping national law and
morality on the issue of racial equality has been no less pronounced in the area of statutory
interpretation than in constitutional adjudication. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971) with Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
63. This has been the case whether the problem seeking judicial resolution is deemed to arise
under statutory or constitutional law.
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explicit embrace of substantive norms. 64 Because the Court's application
of such rules has exemplified substantive policy choices, the Court's

failure explicitly to own up to its continuing function as a law-maker
has had systemic costs, not the least of which has been the failure of
branches to recognize properly and respond to the judicial
the political
6
role. 1
While the themes underlying these approaches have received their fullest
articulation in judicial opinions, their practical applications are easily
seen in the practices of the political branches.6 Usually unshackled by
such traditional judicial constraints as the philosophical commitment to
"neutrality" in the abstract, and to a regime of "precedent," the political
branches-municipal, state, and federal-react to the practical demands
of the political and economic environment.
When the nation turned from the promotion of civil and political
equality to the eradication of economic disparities, the primary question
was not-as it had been in the socio-political arena-which steps to take
to correct the disparities, but instead was a more pristine query: whether
society, and more particularly the government, has an obligation to correct

such disparities .67
Although the courts were not squarely forced to confront these issues
until the late 1960s and early 1970s, 68 the questions were, by the mid1960s, placed before the political branches of government at the federal,
state, and local levels. Their responses are instructive. Invariably, they
began with policies that easily fall into the "narrow antidiscrimination"
approach. With experience, these policies appeared inadequate, and these
institutions in their practice (if not their explicit statement of policy)
moved on to the broadly remedial approach.

64. By this term, I mean the creation of categories of cases that should be subjected to like
rules or principles. Examples would be the classification of cases into "Title VII" as opposed to
"equal protection," "disparate treatment" rather than "disparate impact," and "benign" rather
than "invidious" discrimination.
65. A significant feature of the development of civil rights laws has been that the Supreme
Court's construction of these laws has been out of sync with the conception of the political branches.
Thus, the Court started out with acceptance of past historical treatment as a basis for race-conscious
remedies. It retreated from this position to the adoption of the "narrow antidiscrimination" principle.
By contrast, the political branches started out with the narrow antidiscrimination principle, and
adopted affirmative action in part as a response to the Court's lead. Current debate is a direct
product of this asynchronous understanding of how to resolve issues raised by the obvious disparity
in the representation of blacks in the national economy.
66. Additionally, this point should not be lost sight of because of the detailed discussion, in
the next section, of the use of judicially created procedure as a substitute for substantive lawmaking.
67. See, e.g., HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL
POLICY 1960-1972, 100-21 (1990).
68. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Many of these issues were first raised
in the context of challenges to a federal Executive Order (11,246) requiring contractors on federal
construction projects to take affirmative action to seek out and employ blacks in those construction
jobs. See, e.g., Ass'n of Contractors of E. Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3rd
Cir. 1971).
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Thus, although the federal Executive Branch today stands-as it did

for much of the 1980s-as the embodiment of opposition to affirmative
action and to a broadly remedial conception of Title VII, it was very

much in the forefront of the initial move from a narrow to a broad
conception of the meaning of racial equality. Motivated by a combination

of moral concern over the relative inequality of blacks, belief in societal
compensation for discrimination, the potential political power of increasingly enfranchised blacks, and administrative convenience, the executive

branch of the federal government led the way in the unabashed enunciation
of a policy committing the government to take affirmative steps to assure
full integration of and participation by blacks in the economy. 69 The

executive branch, in a series of steps, demonstrated that fair treatment
required not a facially neutral or passive administration of the antidiscrimination laws, but affirmative steps to bring blacks into participation

in government employment and contracting opportunities. 70 In essence,
the executive branch, starting out from the narrow antidiscrimination

principle, moved gradually but steadfastly to embrace the broadly re-

medial .7,
State and local government experiences were not very different. By the
mid-1960s, states, through "unfair employment" laws, had a network
of antidiscrimination laws that emphasized the narrow antidiscrimination
principle. 72 Despite occasional attempts by administrative or executive
69. For an exhaustive treatment of the role of the federal executive in promoting affirmative
action programs, see generally HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE Civa RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
OF NATIONAL POLICY

1960-1972 (1990).

Although the starting point was a policy statement that simply required "fair treatment" (defined
as the avoidance of discriminatory acts against blacks), it became evident to the executive branch
that given the background inequalities, a policy of "nondiscrimination" was by itself insufficient
to assure representative black participation in taking advantage of employment and contract opportunities.
70. While concerted executive action has been traced to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1941
Fair Employment Executive Order 8802, the watershed executive action is generally acknowledged
to be the promulgation of Executive Order 11,246 by President Kennedy in 1963. See id. at 11415. These initial executive orders easily fit within the narrow antidiscrimination principle. By 1969,
when the Minority Business Development Agency was created in the Department of Commerce, the
policy had matured from mere avoidance of discriminatory policies to affirmative steps to assure
participation to blacks.
71. By the 1980s, the executive's commitment was no longer to a broadly remedial, but was
instead a wavering commitment to the narrow antidiscrimination principle mingled with occasional
articulation of the inclusionary approach. The ambiguities that occasionally crept into the policies
of the Executive Branch were best demonstrated in the August 25, 1985, ABC News This Week
With David Brinkley interview given by then-Attorney General Edward Meese IIl on the occasion
of the passage of six months since his confirmation in that position. As succinctly summarized by
a Reuters dispatch on the interview, Mr. Meese took the position that "although the administration
has long opposed setting hiring quotas or goals to bring more minorities into the work-force, [it]
favors a broad requirement that government contractors engage in affirmative action hiring ."
Reuters, Ltd., Aug. 25,

1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Archives File; see also Tom

Morganthaw & Diane Weathers, Black Voters: A Move to the GOP?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 27, 1986,
at 18.
72. For the discussion of some examples of such laws, see Landis, The Economics of State Fair
Employment Laws, 76 J. POL. ECON. 507 (1968); Arnold N. Sutin, The Experience of State Fair
Employment Commissions: A Comparative Study, 18 VAND. L. REv. 965 (1965); Robert A. Girard
& Louis L. Jaffe, Some General Observations on Administration of State Fair Employment Practice
Laws, 14 BUFF. L. REV. 114 (1964); Herbert Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice
Commissions: A Critical Analysis with Recommendations, 14 BUFF. L. REV. 22 (1964).
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branch agencies in the states to give these statutes broadly remedial
reading," the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the provisions
for coordination of enforcement of the statute by the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission and state agencies, overshadowed many of the
state laws and enforcement practices. Many claims became subsumed
under the federal statute. However, after the Supreme Court sanctioned
Congress's explicit adoption of preference programs, 74 local governments,
doubtless reacting to political pressures," followed suit in significant
77
numbers 76 and explicitly endorsed the broadly remedial approach.
Motivated by moral and political concerns, and with executive action
as an indicator of the feasible, 7 the Congress followed a route similar
to local governments. Beginning with the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Congress in 1972 put its imprimatur on the Supreme Court's quite broad
interpretation of that statute. 79 In 1977, Congress went significantly further. It adopted policies that expressly authorized preferential treatment
of blacks in access to government contracting opportunities.8 0 These
policies were expanded in subsequent legislations.8"
These policies of the political branches were often out of step with
the judicial approach. In particular, the political branches and those
institutions that confront on a daily basis the practical effects of economic
disparities moved from a narrow antidiscrimination perspective to embrace
the broadly remedial conception. 82 By contrast, as will be demonstrated

73. One such example (in Illinois) was cited to by the Court in the Griggs decision. See Griggs,
401 U.S. at 434 n.10.
74. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
75. Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983); Drew Days, 111, Fullilove,
96 YALE L. J. 453 (1986).
76. According to the mass media, at least two hundred political jurisdictions had strong affirmative
action programs-in the nature of set-asides and like preferences-in existence in 1989.
77. Thus, both the National League of Cities and other organizations representing state and
local governments, as well as individual political jurisdictions, filed briefs as amici in support of
the broadly remedial approach that characterized the City of Richmond's affirmative action program.
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 470 (1989).
78. See e.g., statement of Parren Mitchell in enacting the Public Works Employment Act of
1977, quoted in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 458 (1980).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
80. Public Works Employment Act, § 105(f), 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f) (1977). The constitutionality
of this provision was resolved in Fulilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
81. See, e.g., The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 105(F),
96 Stat. 2097, 2100 (1982); The Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-17, § 106(c), 101 Stat. 132 (1987); Business Opportunity Reform Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-656 (1988). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 637(a), (d) (1988).
More recently, the framing of these preferences has been in terms of "disadvantaged" persons,
rather than "minorities," with the "rebuttable presumption" that members of groups classified as
"minorities" are disadvantaged. See, e.g., The Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation
Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 105(F), 96 Stat. 2097, 2100 (1982).
82. The reactions of the private sector of the national economy, particularly the larger business
entities, suggest a similar recognition through experience of the value of moving from a narrow
antidiscrimination perspective of their obligations under the law to a broadly remedial approach to
the composition of their work-force. Thus, comparisons of the recent affirmative steps taken by
companies such as AT&T, Xerox Corporation and others, see, e.g., BusINEss WEEK July 8, 1991,
contrast vividly with the recalcitrance of large companies evident in cases such as Griggs and
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1974), discussed below. This move by America's
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in part II, the judicial progression has been the reverse, moving from
an essentially broadly remedial vision of antidiscrimination laws to the
currently dominant narrow approach. The next section explores the relationship between the Supreme Court's use of burden allocation and its
substantive move from a broadly remedial conception of Title VII to a
much narrower reading of the antidiscrimination laws.
II.

SUBSTANCE MASQUERADING AS PROCEDURE: FROM
GRIGGS TO WARDS COVE

This part examines the Supreme Court's reliance on burden allocation
as an essential tool in the evaluation of claims of discrimination. It posits
as a distinctive feature of these cases the lack of consistency in the
content of the standard applied through the Court's statement of the
burden of proof and the statistical inquiry demanded of the parties. It
contends that substantive concerns such as skepticism over the asserted
"objectivity" of traditional yardsticks, rather than the search for procedural fairness (e.g., assigning the burden for production of information
on the party with the better access to the information), provide more
comprehensible explanations for the Court's allocation and definition of
the burdens of proof. Further, because the weight and nature of the
substantive issues masked by the Court's dispositive use of procedure are
best understood in the context of the dynamic changes in the judicial
conception of the role of antidiscrimination laws in shaping the structure
of society, a chronological rather than a thematic exploration of the cases
is warranted.
Subpart A examines the Court's statement and implementation of
burden allocation as an element of the causation requirement in "direct
discrimination" cases; that is, where black plaintiffs challenge the status
quo. Subpart B explores the transposition of the causation test to claims
by white plaintiffs challenging affirmative action programs. In both instances, the causation standards enunciated and applied by the Court
were demonstrably inconsistent, and reflected more the prevailing substantive policy choice dominant on the Court than any principled attempt
to give effect to procedure as an organizing tool.
A.

DisproportionalRepresentation and Discrimination
Suits brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196483 have
provided the vehicle for the most elaborate articulation by the Supreme

large companies towards a broadly remedial conception of the principle of antidiscrimination is
perhaps most glaringly illustrated by the position of the Business Roundtable (an organization of
the country's largest 200 business companies) with regard to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991. See Arthur A. Fletcher, Racism is Sapping Our Energies and Squandering Our Resources,
U.S.A. TODAY, May 21, 1991, at 12a. Indeed, it was stated that it would have made virtually no
difference for the employment of blacks or women by the private sector which version of the
competing civil rights bills became law since their provisions all fell short of current practices in
the work-places of the large corporations. See BusINEss WEEK, July 8, 1991, at 60.
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
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Court of the relevance of statistical disparities to the legal rights of black
Americans in the economic arena. For eighteen years, much of the Court's
discussion was framed in procedural terms. The relevance of statistics
and their effect on the discharge of the burden of proof were presented
as housekeeping elements of litigation in the particular case, and presented
with minimal explicit reference to broader societal concerns.14 This subpart
traces the development of this proceduralist approach to its current
formulation.
The journey proceeds in four stages. Subpart (1) examines the four
cases85 employed by the Court to erect the structure of the procedural
approach. The exploration shows that in these building block cases, the
invocation of the allocation of burden of proof was not viewed as critical
to the disposition of the particular case. Rather, the allocation of burdens
embodied a broad conception of the relevance of antidiscrimination lawsuits to the structure of a broadly inclusive society. Reliance on statistical
disparities in these cases reflected both skepticism as to the efficient and
no-bias properties claimed for neutral selection criteria, as well as the
vision for a society in which one's status could not be readily predicted
by racial or ethnic ancestry.
Subpart (2) discusses the application of the burden of proof analysis
to the so-called "pattern and practice" cases. The exploration exposes
an incipient dichotomy between continuing judicial skepticism in the case
of private employers, and judicial deference to selection criteria employed
by governmental bodies.
Subpart (3) discusses cases decided by the Court between 1978 and
1983. The reasoning of these cases unmistakably make them precursors
to the more controversial decisions of 1988-1989. The subpart also demonstrates that while these cases are often classified as "disparate treatment," the effort to distinguish them from the earlier cases on this
ground is of no consequence. What is significant about these cases is
not their dissimilarity to prior cases, but the flexibility the relatively
unexplored "disparate treatment" approach appeared to provide a court
in search of a consensus formula to camouflage a reversal of substantive
86
visions.

84. In its 1988 and 1989 decisions, the Court abandoned this purely procedural approach, and
made it plain that the use of the shifting of burdens was the product not of a "neutral principle"
of adjudication, but of a substantive policy objective defined and limited by one's view of Title
VII as a distributive principle. E.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988)
("We agree that the inevitable focus on statistics in disparate impact cases could put undue pressure
on employers to adopt inappropriate prophylactic measures. It is completely unrealistic to assume
that unlawful discrimination is the sole cause of people failing to gravitate to jobs and employers
in accord with the laws of chance ....
It would be equally unrealistic to suppose that employers
can eliminate, or discover and explain, the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical
imbalances in the composition of their work forces."); see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642, 652 (1989).
85. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973); Albemarle Paper v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324 (1977).
86. See discussion infra part A(3).
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Finally, subpart (4) discusses the Court's decisions in 1988-1989, seeking
to relate the role of the allocation and definition of the burdens of proof
as articulated by the Court to the precedents discussed in subparts (1)
through (3).
1. Disproportionality as Discrimination
The problem of black under-representation in mainstream economic
activity and its relationship to the country's history of discrimination was
first squarely faced by the modern Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
of the case illustrates its approach
Power Co. 7 The Court's disposition
8
in the "broadly remedial" phase.
Griggs came out of North Carolina. A group of black employees of
the Duke Power Company ("Company") sued it under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 196489 on the ground that the Company's practice
of requiring a high school diploma and success on standardized general
intelligence tests as a condition for promotion into certain departments
of the Company was in violation of the law because blacks were disproportionately affected by the requirement. 90 Although the facts of the
case were sufficiently egregious so that a finding in favor of the plaintiffs
could have been made on the ground that the Company had engaged
in discrimination against the thirteen individual plaintiffs before the Court, 91

87. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
88. The phase was dominant in the Court's jurisprudence roughly between 1971-77.
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 to 2000e-17 (1988).
90. 401 U.S. at 425-26. Specifically, the action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), which
provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
91. For example, prior to July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title VII, Duke Power explicitly
discriminated against its black employees by restricting them to the lowest rung of a hierarchically
structured workforce, where the highest pay received by the black employees was less than the
lowest pay in the next rung from which blacks were totally excluded. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427.
Even assuming that Title VII did not apply retroactively to penalize such conduct, the Griggs opinion
could still have been written as a "disparate treatment" or "intentional discrimination" case by
grounding the Court's ruling on the Company's post-Title VII conduct of imposing academic
qualification requirements for transfers and promotions from and within departments on pre-Title
VII black employees. As against such employees, the requirement could be viewed as a subterfuge
or "pretext" for discrimination. Limiting the reach of Griggs to this narrow basis would also have
been supported by other evidence on the record. For example, that the first black was promoted
to an "operating department" only after the filing of a complaint with the EEOC, and despite the
fact that the candidate, an employee since 1953, had a high school diploma the lack of which, at
least until 1965 was not, even theoretically, a bar to the promotion of whites; that the institution
of a high school diploma as a prerequisite for transfers from the lowest rung department into any
of the other four departments came into effect concurrently with the abolition of open discrimination
against blacks; that whites without high school diploma continued to receive promotions within the
operating departments; and that despite the institution of success on the aptitude tests as a prerequisite
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Griggs is striking because the Court did not take this narrow approach.
Instead, using broad language, the Court indicated that Title VII was
not only aimed at providing relief to the individual black plaintiff who

can prove that she was the victim of discrimination. The law, it said,
had the broader purpose of removing "employment procedures or testing
for minority groups and
mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds'
'92
are unrelated to measuring job capability.
In its ruling, the Griggs Court was writing on a clean slate. It had
never previously focused on the permissibility and scope of measures
aimed at integrating blacks into the mainstream of the national economy.93

Moreover, the action was brought under a statute of recent vintage with

expansive prohibitory language. 94 But it was nonetheless a statute, and
subject to the traditional rules of statutory construction." While the literal
wording of the statute did not appear squarely to prohibit Duke Power
Company's ("the Company") employment practice,9 the Court fashioned
from the statute's "promise of equal opportunity," and the differential
success rates of blacks and whites on the aptitude test, a violation of
97
Title VII.

for transfers within the operating departments following the abolition of formal discrimination,
whites who had directly benefitted from such discrimination had their benefit grandfathered by
being exempted from the test requirement. Id. at 427-28. As discussed in the text, however, the
Court's holding was much broader.
92. Id. at 432. Determining whether a particular procedure or mechanism measures "job capability" is, as demonstrated by the opinion itself, a thorny question that takes the inquirer into
the thicket of job validation and the arcane discipline of industrial psychology. For an attempt at
an administrative solution, see the EEOC Guidelines on "Employee Selection Procedures." 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1607.1 to 1607.8 (1992).
93. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1983) (summarizing
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The Court's reliance in Griggs on section 703(a)(2) was without
explanation. Subsequent cases were to explain that the operative phrase on which the Court anchored
the "disparate impact" doctrine was the prohibition of employment practices that "limit" or
"classify" employees "in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities .... Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982).
95. The conventional claim is that in matters of statutory interpretation, the Court's primary
function is to give the legislated words their commonly understood meaning, and if uncertainty
remained, to look to the legislative history to ascertain the purpose, intent or policy of the enactment
and give effect to such. See generally, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). But see Jett v. Dallas
Indep. School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738-39 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring) (questioning resort to
legislative history).
96. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426. Duke Power argued that its practice was specifically authorized
by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), which states that:
[njotwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be ... an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results
of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration
or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
97. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30. As the Court put it:
[tihe objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is ... to achieve equality
of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past
to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees. Under the
Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms
of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices.
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The Court expressly rejected the argument that disproportionalities that
arise from a "neutral" working of economic forces cannot be said to
deny anyone "equal opportunity." Rather, the Court stated that differences in impact along racial lines, at least where such differences can
be foretold ahead of the administration of the selection criteria, constituted
a violation of Title VII. 9s
The recognition that attainment of "equality of opportunities" may
and often does demand consideration of effects-because what is the
outcome in one instance is often the input in another99-was further
reflected in the Court's disposition of the Company's alternative argument
that the effects of the use of aptitude tests (and similar "objective"
selection criteria) were specifically exempted from the reach of Title VII. 10o
In a statement that both embodies the premise of the broadly remedial
approach and captures the prescription of the inclusionary approach, it
stated its skepticism for "tests" and other such "neutral" measures of

98. Id. at 430. The Court held that:
on the record in the present case, 'whites register far better on the Company's
This consequence would appear to be
alternative requirements' than negroes ....
directly traceable to race. Basic intelligence must have the means of articulation to
manifest itself fairly in a testing process. Because they are negroes, petitioners have
long received inferior education in segregated schools ....
Id.
The Court found the statistical evidence probative because of general societal inequalities such
as the fact that whites were three times as likely as blacks to possess high school diplomas, and
that one study by the EEOC showed that while 58% of whites passed a battery of standardized
tests including the two at issue in Griggs, only 6% of blacks did. Id. at 430 n.6. It was this sort
of evidence that subsequent decisions were to reject. See, e.g., Hazellwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), discussed infra at notes 184 to 194.
The Court accepted as objective facts (1) that blacks underperformed in the standardized tests;
(2) that such underperformance could be correlated to race; (3) that blacks were just as intelligent
as whites; (4) that segregated black schools were inferior to segregated white schools. See Griggs,
401 U.S. at 430-32. Left unclear in the Court's analysis was whether the standardized tests were
objective measures of intelligence, and whether the use of objective measures of intelligence were
permissible selection criteria under Title VII. The Court declined to resolve these issues by relying
on the societal evil of compelling blacks to attend inferior segregated schools.
99. As the Court phrased it:
Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment or promotion may
not provide equality of opportunity merely in the sense of the fabled offer of milk
to the stork and the fox. On the contrary, Congress has now required that the
posture and the condition of the job-seeker be taken into account. It has-to resort
again to the fable-provided that the vessel in which the milk is proffered be one
all seekers can use. The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in impact.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
100. The Company argued that its practice was expressly insulated by the provision in Section
703(h) (the "Tower Amendment") exempting the use of any "professionally developed ability test"
that is not "designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(h).
The Court's direct response was that the EEOC-the administering agency-had read this provision
to mean that only those "tests" success in which could be correlated to job performance were
insulated from challenge under Title VII. The EEOC's interpretation was owed deference, and since
Duke Power Company had not shown its tests-let alone its requirement of high school diplomasto be job related, it could not successfully rely on the Tower Amendment.
Thus, the defense of "job relatedness" was, in Griggs, discussed not as a general defense to a
demonstration of statistical imbalance, but merely as a specialized defense under section 703(h),
relating to "professionally developed ability tests."
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qualification. That skepticism led the Court to condemn in quite sweeping

terms testing mechanisms with disparate impact.' 0

Having rejected the claimed efficacy and neutrality of the operation
of venerable selection yardsticks, the Court was faced with the need to
provide
alternative limiting criteria faithful to its interpretation of Title
VII.10 2 Although rarely acknowledged, 0 3 Griggs left entirely open both
the method and substance of how Title VII litigation would proceed
within the broad scope of the ruling.' °4
One answer would have been to provide substantive requirements for
employers. Liability would thus have been predicated on an employer's
failure to satisfy the specified substantive objective. Substantive law developments could then have taken the form of articulating and developing
what constitutes, as a substantive matter, disparate impact and the requirements of "job-relatedness." Under such an approach, the focal point
of inquiry would be defining the meaning of differential effects and of
job-relatedness, not on the procedural nicety of who ought to carry the
burden of demonstrating their existence.'0 5 The corollary remedy would
also be substantive: the removal of the disparate impact and/or use of
practices found not to be job-related. This approach would have raised
the question of whether the primary concern ought to be removing
disproportionate effects, or simply using practices, procedures, or tests
deemed to be job-related.
The subsequent development of Title VII litigation, however, took a
distinctly different approach. It relied on the essentially procedural and

101. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433. The Court stated that:
[tihe facts of this case demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and general testing
devices as well as the infirmity of using diplomas or degrees as fixed measures of
capability. History is filled with examples of men and women who rendered highly
effective performance without the conventional badges of accomplishment in terms
of certificates, diplomas, or degrees. Diplomas and tests are useful servants, but
Congress has mandated the commonsense proposition that they are not to become
masters of reality.
Id.
102. Id. Given the Court's holding, a perfectly plausible construction would have been to adopt
the admittedly radical reading of the Act as mandating proportionality-at least in employment.
The Court rejected this approach by making the non sequitur claim that "Congress did not intend
by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job to every person regardless of qualifications," and by
asserting without explanation that the Act does not "command that any person be hired simply
because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority
group." Id. at 430-31.
103. See, however, the discussion in part III infra, concerning whether Griggs' "business necessity"
defense requires the employer to show that its selection criteria are "job-related" because they
measure (or are predictive of) performance on the job, or whether they are "job-related" because
they have a "manifest relationship" to the business needs of the employer.
104. This issue may be viewed as the precursor to what subsequently has become known as the
"quota conundrum"; that is, to what extent would a strict application of the disparate impact
theory result in hiring by numbers as employers seek to avoid the invalidation of their selection
practices and procedures? See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 652 (1989); cf.
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1983) (rejecting one potential solution, the so-called "bottom
line" defense); see also discussion infra part A(4).
105. Such an approach would not have rendered entirely irrelevant the distribution of burdens,
but it would have shifted the focus of debate to substantive rather than procedural disagreements.
See part IV, below.
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seemingly content-neutral device of burden allocation. This approach was
neither compelled by the logic of Griggs nor the wording of Title VII.
The procedure, however, afforded the Court an opportunity to embrace
a broadly remedial substantive vision without engaging in the sort of
potentially divisive discussion that adoption of the alternative substantive
approaches would have entailed. This was possible because the concept
of burden of proof, while giving the appearance of arcane traditionalism,
is highly elastic and malleable.' °0
The second Title VII case faced by the Court demonstrated the potential
of procedure to provide a seemingly coherent means of reconciling the
narrowly antidiscriminatory language of Title VII with the dominant
broadly remedial vision of the Court. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green1° presented the Title VII problem in a trying factual setting for
the enunciation and application of the broadly remedial vision. If the
black plaintiffs in Griggs presented a compellingly sympathetic class for
relief, the case of the plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas was less so.
Green, a black activist employee of McDonnell Douglas, lost his em08
ployment as part of a general reduction in the company's workforce.

106. Ordinarily, the allocation of the burden of proof is both a statement of the order in which
evidence is to be presented, and the quantum or weight of the evidence required to be presented.
The burden is a corollary of that of pleading which is itself highly subject to manipulation. See,
e.g., Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L.
REv. 5 (1959). The initial burden falls on the plaintiff, who is required to present evidence indicating
that some recognized legal rights of hers is in jeopardy. She does so by showing that some demonstrable
facts (i.e., other than her mere allegations) exist that threaten such rights. If such demonstrable
facts satisfy the substantive elements of the claim, she is said to have made out a prima facie case.
See generally, CHARLES T. McCoRmcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 337 (Edward W.
Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984). The burden now shifts to the defendant to respond to the prima facie
case. See infra notes 120-21.
The quantum of evidence a party may be required to adduce in support of an element of a
claim or defense may be obviated by the creation of a legal presumption; that is, the demonstration
of certain "basic facts" compels the drawing of a legal conclusion that an as yet unproved ultimate
fact must be found. When presumptions ought to be created, who ought to create them, and their
effect in reallocating the quantum or weight of evidence that must be produced by the other side
in order to rebut the presumption-i.e., that of production or of persuasion on the disputed pointhave been grounds for extensive and not infrequent metaphysical writings by academics. For more
recent attempts at clarification, see Kenneth Broun, The Unfulfillable Promise of One Rule for All
Presumptions, 62 N.C. L. REv. 697 (1984); Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 IOWA L. REv. 843 (1981); Neil S. Hecht & William M. Pinzler, Rebutting Presumptions:
Order Out of Chaos, 58 B.U. L. REv. 527 (1978). Three of the early writings that framed the
terms of the debate are JAMEs THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1898);
Francis H. Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof, 68
U. PA. L. REV. 307 (1920); Edwin M. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44
HARv. L. REV. 906 (1931).
Three justifications are generally advanced for the creation of presumptions. First, factual probabilities favor the presumption because past experience indicates that in the absence of unusual
circumstances, the presumed occurrence would have followed from the established basic facts. Second,
the creation of the presumption is seen to be fair because the party against whom the presumption
operates is in a better position to acquire information with which to rebut the presumption than
the party in whose favor it operates is to acquire information dispositive of the presumed fact.
Third, an explicit societal policy would be furthered by the creation of such a presumption. See
generally, CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 342-44 (Edward W.
Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
107. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
108. Id.at 794.
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Claiming his discharge and McDonnell Douglas's hiring practices to be
racially tainted, Green and others engaged in a series of disruptive protest
measures directed against McDonnell Douglas.'09 Arrested, Green pleaded
guilty to charges of traffic violation, and, having paid the fines, instituted
a number of racial discrimination claims against McDonnell Douglas." 0
Sometime after these activities, McDonnell Douglas advertized employment openings in a field in which Green possessed some experience.
Green's application was turned down on the basis of his participation
in protest activities. Green filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission ("EEOC") alleging both a violation of section
703 (prohibiting discrimination in employment) and section 704(a) (prohibiting retaliatory conduct against those protesting or seeking correction
of discriminatory conditions of employment).
While the EEOC made no ruling as to the section 703 claim, it found
that reasonable cause existed for a possible violation of section 704(a).
Green sued McDonnell Douglas pursuant to a "right to sue" letter.",
The Supreme Court stated that the issue presented to it for review
was "the proper order and nature of proof in actions under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."'112 This framing of the issue was explained
in part by the district court's denial of Green's request for discovery of
statistical evidence relating to the composition of McDonnell Douglas's
workforce," 3 and in part by the court of appeals's application to the
14
case of the allocation of the burdens of proof it derived from Griggs.
Accepting the decision in Griggs as providing the appropriate starting
point, the Supreme Court explained the Griggs holding as embodying
the need to balance two considerations. On the one hand, Griggs recognized that the plain purpose of Title VII was to ensure equality of
employment opportunities through the elimination of "those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job
environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens."" 5 On the other
hand, "[als noted in Griggs, 'Congress did not intend by Title VII ...
to guarantee a job to every person regardless of qualifications'." 6 According to the McDonnell Douglas Court, Griggs reconciled this conflict

109. Id. at 794-95. Notably, Green participated in a "stall-in" involving the use of cars to block
an access road into a McDonnell Douglas facility, and a "lock-in" during the course of which
some unidentified person locked from the outside a room in which McDonnell Douglas employees
were conducting a meeting.
110. Id. at 794 n.2. He filed "formal complaints" with the Civil Rights Commission, the
Departments of Justice, Defense and the Navy, and with the Missouri Commission on Human
Rights.
Ill. Id. at 797. The lower courts held that McDonnell Douglas' conduct was not in violation
of section 704(a). Green did not contest this holding before the Supreme Court.
112. Id. at 793-94. Subsequently, the issue was rephrased as concerning "the order and allocation
of proof in a private, non-class action challenging employment discrimination." Id. at 800.
113. Id. at 800 n.10.
114. Id. at 801 n.12 (citing Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 352-53 (8th Cir.
1972)).
115. Id. at 800 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971)).
116. Id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971)).
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by authorizing a limited interference with the privately ordered selection
of employees by an employer to promote a broad societal interest "shared
by employer, employee, and consumer, [in] efficient and trustworthy
workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment and
personnel decisions. ' 11 7 Remarkably, however, the McDonnell Douglas
Court articulated a purely structural mechanism-the judicial assignment
and supervision of the burdens of proof-as the means of realizing this
lofty substantive goal.
Viewed in the abstract, this is a rather conservative interpretation of
(if not retrenchment from) Griggs. Looked at in context, however, both
the resort to the allocation of the burdens of proof and, more particularly,
the definition of those burdens in the context of the individual claim at
issue in McDonnell Douglas represented a strong reemphasis of Griggs's
skepticism of the claimed neutrality of employment decision-making.
Starting with the traditional rule that a complaining party ought to
carry the burden of showing that it is entitled to relief, the Court stated
that the hurdle is scaled at the outset by a plaintiff's ability to make
out a prima facie case. The Court then defined this hurdle." 8 The plaintiff
simply has to show: (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv)
that after his rejection, the employment remained open, and the employer
continued to seek candidates of the applicant's qualifications." 9
Assuming that this burden is satisfied, 20 it is then up to the employer
"to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [applicant's] rejection.' 12' Unlike the prima facie element, the Court did not
spell out with any specificity the minimum threshold that the defendant
must satisfy in order to discharge this evidentiary burden. The Court

117. Id. at 801.
118. Id. at 802; see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (describing
the burden as "non-onerous").
119. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Under traditional rules, this is tantamount to a
statemeni that the elements of the claim consist of these four items. Such a holding is a far cry
from the subsequent conclusion that disparate treatment analysis, of which McDonnell Douglas is
frequently cited as the progenitor, requires a showing of the intent to discriminate.
As a general statement of the prima facie case, this formulation is remarkably geared to the
claims of a black applicant for a job opening, as contrasted, for example, to the Title VII claims
of a white dispatcher passed over for promotion because of the implementation of an affirmative
action program. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). Thus,
elements of the test speak in terms of establishing membership in a minority group or protected
class. Moreover, the Court has never presented a convincing explanation of why the plaintiff should
show that the vacancy remained open, and that the employer continued to look for others of the
applicant's qualification. But cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 279 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
120. The Court held that the plaintiff had satisfied this prima facie standard. Although the Court
noted that this formulation is not necessarily applicable in every respect to different factual situations,
it has repeated this formulation in all of its disparate treatment cases, and has never indicated in
what way one might, consistent with disparate treatment analysis, depart from it. McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
121. Id.
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fairly could be
simply noted that it need not "detail every matter which
' 122
recognized as a reasonable basis for a refusal to hire.
While this facet of the burden has attracted the most scrutiny, 2 and,
at least until 1989, presented the decisive inquiry in Title VII actions,
24
its resolution in McDonnell Douglas was simple and uncontroversial.
The defendant's satisfaction of the rebuttal burden, however, was not
sufficient to dispose of the case. Perhaps in the clearest statement of
the broadly remedial approach and the attendant skepticism of the neutral
application of even widely accepted norms, the Court introduced yet a
third tier of burden-shifting, one uncommon to traditional common25 law
litigation and whose meaning and usefulness has been questioned.
The addition is the so-called "pretext" tier. Assuming that a defendant
satisfies the rebuttal burden, the presentation of evidence does not terminate at this stage. Rather, the plaintiff "must . . . be afforded a fair
opportunity to show that [the defendant's] stated reason for [plaintiff's]
rejection was in fact pretext.' 1 26 The Court explained the need for this

122. Id. at 802-03.
123. See generally Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust 487 U.S. 977, 1011 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). At the core of the debate is whether the burden is merely one of advancing a plausible
legitimate reason for the employer's rejection of the plaintiff (the so-called burden of production),
or whether the employer is required to persuade the factfinder that not only is the legitimate reason
a plausible explanation for its conduct, but that the employer's conduct was actuated by it (the
"burden of persuasion"). As the discussion below explains, the Court has vacillated between both
approaches. For an explicit recognition of this vacillation, see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989). One means of reconciling these approaches-embraced by the liberal
members of the Court-has been to read the employer's burden as that of "production" in disparate
treatment cases, and that of "persuasion" in disparate impact cases. Id. at 667-70 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
An alternate perspective views the discussion in terms under which challenges to a plaintiff's
prima facie case may be considered under one of two rubrics: a "rebuttal" burden and an "affirmative
defense." The former challenge ordinarily takes the form of a frontal attack on the factual aspects
of the evidence, while the latter involves a "collateral" challenge in which the defendant concedes
the stated facts, but interposes additional reasons to explain why the plaintiff is not entitled to
relief. Because the rebuttal response does not concede, but rather directly challenges the basis of
the plaintiff's prima facie case, the fact-finder's task is that of resolving a conflict as between two
submissions. At least in theory, then, the stronger the prima facie case, the stronger the rebuttal
evidence needed to undermine it, and vice-versa. The role of the judge in such a situation is to
weigh evidence adduced by the parties.
By contrast, the defendant, in an affirmative defense situation, concedes the facts constituting
the plaintiff's prima facie case but then asserts that an independent set of facts or laws disinvests
the plaintiff of her claim to relief. Here, the judge is not simply being asked to weigh contradictory
evidence, but to engage in the quasi-legislative function of choosing from among competing claims
that which ought to be preferred. Cf. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 286-95 (1989)
(Kennedy, J. dissenting).
124. After noting that McDonnell Douglas "assigned" the unlawful protest activities as its reason
for rejecting Green's application, the Court stated that "[wle think that this suffices to discharge
[McDonnell Douglas'] burden of proof at this stage and to meet [Green's] prima facie case of
discrimination." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
The Court elaborated on this point by examining Green's role in the protests, and by pointing
out that his section 704(a) claim had been dismissed.
125. See, e.g., Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward
a Theory of ProceduralJustice, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1205 (1981); George Rutherglen, DisparateImpact
Under Title VII: An Objective Theory Of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REv. 1297 (1987).
126. McDonell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. Thus, success at the defendant's rebuttal is a legal
issue that creates a presumption of rightful conduct by the defendant.
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new tier simply by observing that while Title VII does not compel the
hiring of persons who have engaged in unlawful protest activities, neither
does it permit the use of such activities as a coverup for the sort of
discrimination prohibited by Title VII. Indicating how a plaintiff might
discharge the pretext burden, the Court, while focusing on the facts of
the specific employment decision,' 27 strongly2 suggested that the plaintiff
can rely on generalized statistical evidence. 1
The resulting structure, then, was not the straightforward transposition
of settled concepts of burden allocation to Title VII litigation. Rather,
it involved the creation of a definitive process embodying substantive
norms and concerns. Under the rubric of engaging in a narrowly personalized inquiry, the Court actually articulated concepts that embraced
as an instrument for fashioning
a broadly remedial conception of litigation
29

a community of interrelated interests.
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 30 a case whose facts are remarkably
similar to those in Griggs, readily fits into this pattern of cases that,
animated by a broadly remedial substantive vision, adopted a structural
framework favoring the imposition of a quite light burden on a plaintiff's
ability to demonstrate causal link between injury to a group of which
she is a member and her right to obtain relief. Until 1964, the employer

127. The Court suggests that of significant relevance to the pretext case is whether white employees
involved in unlawful acts similar to those of the plaintiff were treated less harshly or whether there
is other evidence that the plaintiff was being retaliated against for engaging in permissible civil
rights activities. Id. at 804.
128. According to the Court, "statistics as to [McDonnell Douglas'] employment policy and
practice may be helpful to a determination of whether [the] refusal to rehire . . . conformed to a
general pattern of discrimination against blacks." Id. at 805 (citation omitted). Similarly, the Court
indicated that it is permissible for the district court to conclude on the basis of statistical evidence
that the racial composition of the work force was reflective of restrictive or exclusionary practices
by the employer. Id. at 805 n.19 (citing Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MrcHi. L. REv. 59, 92 (1972)).
The Court further suggested that Green could successfully discharge the pretext burden by relying
on statistical disparities in the composition of McDonnell Douglas' work force. See McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805.
In this sense, one may question how the evidence here differs from that used to establish a prima
facie case under the disparate impact theory. In short, the role of statistics here undercuts the
argument that disparate treatment constitutes a separate line of cases because the critical inquiry
is into motivation or intent, rather than effects. See, generally, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
129. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Thus, the burden placed on the plaintiff
to make out a prima facie case is a light one. That burden is defined in terms of injury to a class,
not to the individual plaintiff.
Because the formulation of the elements of the prima facie case is so closely interwoven with
the facts of McDonnell Douglas-an individual non-class action suit-this observation is not immediately apparent. The application of the test in subsequent cases makes plain that the inquiry
as to the generalized treatment accorded members of the plaintiff's class is not necessarily the
specific treatment received by the complaining plaintiff.
Similarly, it is only after the defendant has successfully rebutted the claim of group-based
discrimination that the individual is then required to demonstrate that she has been harmed by the
defendant's use of a prohibited consideration in evaluating her individual capacity for employment.
But even here, the plaintiff's case is not restricted to factual evidence in her individual case; rather,
she may use evidence of group-based disparities to support such an individual claim.
130. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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in Albemarle Paper had operated an overtly discriminatory employment
system in which jobs were explicitly segregated on the basis of race.
Black employees were restricted to the unskilled and lower paying jobs. 3 '
Thereafter, cessation of outright segregation of the workforce was accomplished simply by superimposing departments on one another. Unsurprisingly, the departments hitherto staffed by blacks ended up at the
bottom of the new structure.
The Title VII claims arose out of the procedure used by the paper
company to determine promotions within the newly merged lines. Promotions from the unskilled into the skilled positions now required possession of a high school diploma and success in two aptitude tests. 3 2
The disproportionate impact on blacks of these requirements flowed not
from a higher failure rate by blacks-there is, remarkably, no discussion
of this point in the Court's opinion-but from the fact that the tests
were used for promotions into the skilled lines. Given prior employment
patterns that relegated blacks to unskilled positions, the tests were more
apt to be taken by blacks seeking transfer to skilled positions than whites
to pass
who, already ensconced in the skilled lines, were not required
33
the tests in order to retain their jobs or promotion rights.
The district court rejected the black employees' Title VII challenge
because it found that the paper company had, whatever the definition
and scope of the plaintiff's burden, carried the rebuttal burden by "proving that these tests are 'necessary for the safe and efficient operation of

the business'

.

'...,134

In affirming the court of appeals' reversal of the district court, the
Supreme Court characterized the issue squarely in terms of the discharge
of the burden of proof.135 In particular, viewing Griggs and McDonnell
Douglas as essentially indistinguishable parts of the same whole, the Court
restated and adopted the procedural approach it had embraced in
McDonnell Douglas. In so doing, the Court drew no distinction in the
burden allocations between disparate impact and disparate
definition of
36
treatment.

131. Id. at 409.
132. Id. at 428-29. The tests were the Wonderlic (which purportedly measured verbal intelligence,
and on which Duke Power Co. had also relied), and the Beta Test.
133. Id. at 429.
134. Id. at 411. That proof consisted of a "validation" study conducted just before trial and
probably in response to the decision in Griggs. The validation study consisted of an industrial
psychologist retained by Albemarle Paper comparing the scores of some employees on the Beta and
Wonderlic tests with the judgments of their supervisors as to the competence of the employees.
The employees were drawn from ten job groupings selected from the middle or top of the plant's
skilled workers. The expert found a statistically significant correlation of test scores to supervisorial
ratings in three job groupings for the Beta test, in seven job groupings for the Wonderlic Test,
and in two job groupings for the required combination of the Beta and Wonderlic tests. Id.
135. The Court's reliance on Griggs in this context was at most perfunctory. See id. at 425
(quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
136. First, the defendant's burden "arises, of course, only after the complaining party or class
has made out a prima facie case of discrimination, i.e., has shown that the tests in question select
applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool
of applicants." Id. at 425 (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 811 (1973)). This
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As an elaboration of what has come to be known as the "disparate
impact" standard, Albemarle Paper is significant for several reasons.
First, it confirmed that a prima facie case of Title VII violation could
be made out solely on the basis .of statistical disparity without regard
to the discriminatory intent of the employer.' Second, the Albemarle
Paper Court borrowed from McDonnell Douglas the tripartite distribution
of burdens. Although the "pretext" burden had been justified in McDonnell
Douglas as an effort to avoid the use of an otherwise legitimate disciplinary
decision as a coverup for discrimination, the Albemarle Paper Court
shifted the emphasis from the concern about possible hidden subjective
motivations to an empirical inquiry into the objective exclusionary consequences of the employer's decision. The emphasis here was not on the
plaintiff's ability to demonstrate, in this third tier, the possible insincerity
of the employer, but on the availability of alternative selection criteria
with less disproportionate effects on members of the plaintiff's class. As
an evidentiary matter, this approach appeared less onerous on the plaintiff,
and thus in accord with a broadly remedial conception of Title VII.

was a conflation of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie requirement into the Griggs effects test.
The Court's use of the term "pattern" suggested that successful discharge of the prima facie burden
hinged on no more than a showing of racial disproportionality in the selection process.
Next, if an employer meets the burden of "proving that its tests are job-related, it remains open
to the complaining party to show that other tests or selection devices without a similarly undesirable
racial effect would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship.' " Id. at 425 (quoting McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 821 (1973)). According
to the Court, "[s]uch a showing would be evidence that the employer was using its tests merely
as a 'pretext' for discrimination." Id. at 425.
In outlining these standards, the Court provided no reason for this alignment of burdens, nor
did it explain why, assuming that a defendant successfully rebuts the prima facie case, a plaintiff
should have a second chance to prove that the defendant's explanation was pretextual. Yet, the
meaning and significance of the "pretext" phase is not self-evident, but instead has been the source
of much puzzled commentary. See, e.g., George Ruthergien, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An
Objective Theory of Discrimination,73 VA. L. REv. 1297 (1987); Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading
and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VmAD. L. REV.
1205 (1982)). Its relevance is particularly obscure in such cases as Griggs, Albemarle Paper, and
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), where the facts indicate that an employer took some
affirmative steps to ameliorate the disparate effects of its recruitment or promotion procedures.
Since such evidence is irrelevant to the discharge of the defendant's "business necessity" burden,
the adversarial system's procedure for assuring fair-play-giving each side the opportunity to contradict
the other's position-would seem to require yet a fourth tier, in which a defendant would respond
to the plaintiff's "pretext" argument. Yet, the formulaic approach taken by the Court has consistently
chimed the tripartite breakup of burdens under Title VII and it has never indicated that such a
fourth tier exists.
137. At first inspection, this standard would appear to differ from the more personalized inquiry
required for the plaintiff's discharge of her prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas standard.
That is, under Albemarle Paper, there was no demand that the plaintiff demonstrate that she was
personally qualified for the job (or promotion), and that the employer continued to seek others
with her qualification after her rejection. This seeming difference is, however, quite less substantial
than it appears on the surface. As already suggested, the formulation of the pretext element of the
McDonnell Douglas standard which permits the plaintiff to prevail on a showing of statistical
disparities undercuts the distinction. It should be noted, however, that in Albemarle Paper, as in
Griggs, abundant evidence of pre-Act discriminatory motivation existed on the record, and the
possible effect, conscious or subconscious, of such evidence on the disposition of the case should
not be discounted.
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Any doubt on this score was removed by Albemarle Paper's most
substantial contribution to Title VII jurisprudence: the definition of the
defendant's rebuttal burden, and, in particular, the relevance of statistical
evidence to its discharge.
Two aspects of the Court's definition of the burden are noteworthy.
The first is the Court's use of the EEOC guidelines as the standard for
establishing the sufficiency of an employer's validation study, and particularly the strict application of the guidelines to the facts of the case.'
The second is the Court's insistence that the validation has to be "of
the job," not of the employer's procedure. As the Court stated:
[elven if the study were otherwise reliable, this odd patchwork of
results would not entitle Albemarle to impose its testing program
under the Guidelines. A test may be used in jobs other than those
for which it has been professionally validated only if there are "no
significant differences" between the studied and unstudied jobs. 39
Taken together, these aspects suggested the willingness of the Court
to engage in finely tuned statistical analysis, at least where the statistical
evidence was put forward by the defendant, 140 and to impose on the
defendant a substantial burden of showing that the defense must bear
a direct relationship to the skills needed for performance on the particular
job at issue, rather than to some other generalized interest of the business
entity. The Court's failure to provide an explanation for strict adherence

138. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. 405. The Court's reference to the EEOC guidelines is particularly
striking because, for the first time, the Court attempted to flesh-out the hitherto cryptic reference
to statistics as a relevant tool. It did so not in the context of the plaintiff's prima facie burden
but, rather, that of the defendant's rebuttal burden. Thus, it was the defendant, not the plaintiff,
who had the duty of establishing a nondiscriminatory work-force by showing that the statistical
effects of the selection criteria were not at odds with EEOC administrative guidelines.
"Measured against the Guidelines," the Court found the validation study falling below its
requirements for several reasons. See generally id. at 431-35. First, the methodology of the study
rendered its result unreliable because it sought to correlate test scores to selected supervisorial ratings
without demonstrating that those ratings are themselves accurate measures of job-performance. Thus,
unlike the unskilled employees who were required to take the tests, participants in the validation
study were drawn from the middle and top ranks of the skilled lines of progression. Id. at 411.
Second, the conduct of the validation study rendered its results suspect and unacceptable. According
to the Court, the questionnaire used to obtain the supervisorial ratings were "vague and fatally
open to divergent interpretations." Id. at 433. Third, the results of the validation study were used
to prove too much. The study showed significant correlation for the Beta Examination in only
three of the eight lines for which correlation was tested, in seven job groupings for the Wonderlic,
and in only two job groupings for both the Wonderlic and the Beta examinations. Id. at 411.
Moreover, although two forms of the Wonderlic were administered, and although they were each
purportedly designed to test the same verbal proficiency, significant correlations for one form but
not for the other were obtained in four job groupings. Id. at 431-32.
139. Id. at 432 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)(2)).
140. It is quite possible to read Albemarle Paper simply as holding that the party seeking to use
statistical evidence has the burden of proving its probative value. So understood, it might be squared
with the reading taken by the Supreme Court in Wards Cove that the plaintiff who relies on
statistical evidence to make out a prima facie case must identify the link between the challenged
employer's practice and the claimed statistical disparity. Such a reading, however, would reduce
disparate impact analysis to no more than an administratively convenient tool for proving intentional
discrimination. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 431 U.S. 321 (1977), and the belief that disparate impact
analysis applies to unintended discrimination render such an interpretation of disparate impact
untenable.
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to the statistical yardsticks of the EEOC guidelines left the door open
either for manipulation of those guidelines, or for an unquestioned
Pavlovian adherence to them.' 4' This was precisely what happened.
The Court's reliance on the EEOC guidelines (which the Court readily
acknowledged constituted no more than an agency's interpretation of the
statute) 142 to the exclusion of the district court's holding raises procedural
core of the traditional understanding of the uses
questions that go to the
143
of burdens of proof.
The choice the Court faced was whether the district court's ruling was
one of fact or law, and, therefore, what deference was due the finding.
If the burden was straightforwardly one of factual proof-i.e., sufficiency
of evidence adduced to rebut a presumption-then the factfinder's conclusions were owed deference, and should have been reversed only if
clearly erroneous. Alternatively, if the burden imposed on the defendant
was one of law requiring it to sustain an affirmative defense-i.e., pleading
and proving a confession and avoidance-the Supreme Court owed no
deference to the trial court's findings.
The Supreme Court did not address its review in either of these terms.
Avoiding statement of the standard of review in traditionally familiar
terms, it engaged in a factual review that could support either a theory
that the district court had clearly erred in its factual findings, or that
the burden the defendant carried was that of establishing an affirmative
defense.
The Court could thus have explained that application of the clearly
erroneous standard to the district court's findings' 44 was proper because
the district court had not adequately taken account of the continuing
prevalence of discrimination, nor of the recalcitrance of societal institutions in abandoning their old ways. 45 Such an explanation would have
provided a delimiter for the rigorous use of statistical evidence to instances
where the evidence was invoked in defense of the status quo. This would
have resulted in avoidance of the subsequent development of a statistical
shell game in which the probative value of the statistical evidence is
examined first in the context of the plaintiff's prima facie case, re-

141. As already demonstrated, the backbone of the evidence was statistical. Thus were sowed the
seeds of finely calibrated statistical proof as the sine qua non of Title VII actions. Yet, as explored
below, the derivation of statistical evidence is frequently presented with the sort of scientific objectivity
and therefore demanding of the same sort of mystical respect that the scientific process has come
to receive. See Lawrence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics, 82 HAv. L. REV. 1329 (1971). The unfortunate
consequence is that the approach to statistical evidence tends to lack that skepticism of mind which
is the hallmark of the fact-finder in analyzing anecdotal evidence. Seduced by the false presumption
of the impersonal character of statistical evidence, the fact-finder more often than not ignores that
statistical evidence is equally tainted by the dominant human proclivity to present information in
the light most self-serving to the presenter.
142. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 431.
143. The Court concluded, on the basis of the application of its construction of the Guidelines,
that Albemarle had failed to prove "the job relatedness of its testing program." Id. at 436.
144. Cf. id. at 445 (Rehnquist J., concurring in part.)
145. Cf. Green v. School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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examined as part of the defendant's rebuttal, and then tested again at
the pretext stage.
Because the Court did not take this step, two trends emerged. First,
there was an attempt to re-define procedurally the defendant's burden
by derogating from the requirement that the defendant "prove" jobrelatedness, substituting in its place the suggestion that mere "articulation"
of some "job-related rationale" would suffice to discharge the defendant's
burden.'46 Second, since the Court's de novo review was presented in
procedural terms, it left open the issue of whether the rationale could
against the weight of statistical evidence prebe just as readily invoked
47
sented by a plaintiff.

The final building block of the broadly remedial conception of Title
VII was provided by the Court in its disposition of Teamsters v. United
States. 14 The Court, in this so-called "pattern and practice" case, explained the burden-shifting methodology as embodying the representative
character of both the injury sustained by individual plaintiffs and of
society's pronounced interest in removing the cause of those injuries. 4 9
The facts in Teamsters parallel those that had led the Court to adopt
statistical disparity as a sufficient prima facie showing of racial discrimination. 150 The United States alleged Title VII violations against a private
employer and its union in the hiring and promotion of blacks and Spanishsurnamed Americans. 5' Although the United States prosecuted the action
on a theory of disparate treatment, 5 2 and although the Supreme Court
took some pains to distinguish between disparate treatment and disparate
impact,'53 neither the analysis employed nor the end result fits any more
readily into McDonnell Douglas than Griggs.5 4 Despite the Supreme
146. E.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); see discussion infra part A(2).
147. See discussion infra part A(2).
148. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
149. Teamsters, more than any other case, illustrates the artificiality of the line-drawing between
disparate impact and disparate treatment. Id. at 335-36 n.15. The case properly portrays the key
concern as being class treatment, and the case, more than most, is candid about both the endresult and the motivating concerns for the methodology adopted to reach that end-result. It does
so by highlighting the tensions between the substantive goals at stake-common law type narrowlybased problem-solving, and broader societal rectification of ills through the judicial system-and
the inadequacy of the procedural device of the burdens of proof to the task. Id.
By employing the language of the balancing of competing but equally legitimate interests, Justice
Powell masterfully attempted to paper over the tension, and the Teamsters decision, as a consequence,
has provided ammunition to all sides in the subsequent fray. Compare Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
and Trust 487 U.S. 977, 1002 (Blackmun, J. concurring); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642, 651 (1989); id. at 665 (Stevens, J., dissenting); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S.
469, 501 (1989).
150. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975).
151. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 328.
152. Id. at 335-36 n.15.
153. Id. According to the Court, under disparate treatment theory the employer simply treats
some persons less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical to such claims. Under disparate impact, employment
practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups, but that in fact fall more
harshly on one group than another, and cannot be justified by business necessity, are condemned.
Proof of discriminatory motive is not required under this theory. Id.
154. The United States, as the plaintiff, had the initial burden of making out the prima facie
case. Id. at 336.
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Court's assertion that the applicable theory of disparate treatment imposed
on the government the obligation to prove the intent to discriminate by
the employer, and that the discharge of the obligation could not be
sustained by the "mere occurrence of isolated or accidental or sporadic
discriminatory acts," the Court held the government could discharge its
burden entirely on the basis of statistical disparities. 5 '
Nor did the Court's disposition of the rebuttal burden suggest any
distinction between this disparate treatment case and the Griggs disparate
impact analysis. In particular, the Court's disposition of the employer's
"articulation" of the reasons for the under-representation of blacks in
its work-force reflected a construction of the word "articulate" readily
harmonized with the approach in Griggs, and at odds with the Court's
subsequent approach in disparate treatment cases. 5 6 Thus, the evaluation
of the employer's rebuttal burden centered on a factual inquiry into
whether the statistical disparity was the result of industry-wide poor
business conditions and an attendant slow-down in hiring, or reflected
some bias or indifference by the employer in the racial consequences of
its conduct.5 7 In neither event did the Court require a showing of an
affirmative intent to discriminate by the employer.
It is evident then, that the burden imposed on the defendant in this
"disparate treatment" case was not simply one of stating some plausible
explanation for the statistical disparity, but one of carrying or sustaining
that explanation in the same manner as would proof of an affirmative
defense.'

155. Id. at 335-39. The statistical disparities marshalled by the government were significant.
Although blacks and Spanish surnamed Americans made up 9% of the defendant employer's
workforce, less than 1% of the prized "line driver" positions were held by persons of such ancestries.
Moreover, with one exception, all of the black line drivers were hired after litigation had commenced.
By contrast, 83% of the blacks and 78% of the Spanish surnamed employees held the lower paying
"city operations" and "serviceman" jobs, as compared with only 39% of the white employees.
See id. at 337-38.
Of course, the outcome in Teamsters, no more than the outcome in Griggs can be viewed purely
in terms of raw statistical data. Collateral evidence suggested the figures were not the accident of
history, but rather its fulfillment. As the Court noted (in a now famous passage), "[in any event,
fine tuning of statistics could not have obscured the glaring absence of minority line drivers ....
'Jt]he Company's inability to rebut the inference of discrimination came not from a misuse of
statistics, but from the inexorable zero."' Id. at 342 n.23 (quoting United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C.
517 F.2d 299, 315 (5th Cir. 1978)).
156. See discussion infra part A(3).
157. The Court observed that despite the slow-down, the employer did engage in some hiring of
line drivers, and these were disproportionately white. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 341-42.
158. The approach in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Agency, 424 U.S. 747 (1976) is to the same
effect. See, e.g., id. at 773 n.32; cf. id. at 777-78. In Franks, the Court stated that:
the result we reach today which, standing alone, establishes that a sharing of the
burden of the past discrimination is presumptively necessary is entirely consistent
with any fair characterization of equity jurisdiction, particularly when considered
in light of our traditional view that '[ajttainment of a great national policy . ..
must not be confined within narrow canons . . . deemed suitable by chancellors in
ordinary private controversies.'
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188 (1941)).
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In sum, although Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 51 9 and McDonnell Douglas
v. Green'60 are cited as paradigms of two distinct analytical approaches
to evaluation of claims under Title VII, this position is not justified by
the contemporaneous record. The two cases, far from representing two
separate lines of Title VII inquiry, reinforced each other to portray a
jurisprudence that emphasized the need to do away with race-based
structural inequalities over systematic demonstration of cause and effect.
The Court thus treated McDonnell Douglas simply as an elaboration of
Griggs.'6 1 Furthermore, despite being classified a disparate impact case,
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 62 liberally drew on the analytical scheme
of McDonnell Douglas. Finally, the approach adopted in Teamsters v.
United States 63 confirmed that the Court viewed Title VII litigation not
in terms of disparate theories of causation and injury, but as a distinctive
tool in the broader strategy of doing away with those conventional
obstacles to equal participation by blacks in the economic life of the
nation.
This failure to draw hard distinctions between the various theories of
Title VII (as was subsequently to become the case) was not an oversight.
The Court recognized and accepted Title VII litigation as being about
classifications. The action, whether maintained as an individual or a class
action, a single event or a pattern and practice case, could only be
understood in the context of a societal ill: a tendency, sometimes conscious, frequently unconscious, to treat blacks alike and distinct from
whites. Moreover, the distinction in the treatment could not be uncovered
merely by examining the specific conduct of persons, but frequently
required examination of the institutions and practices through which
society operated. "Burden of proof," as a tool for demonstrating causation, had to be shaped around these factors. In that sense, the use of
"presumptions" and the definition of the "burden" reflected the Court's
policy orientation.
As class litigation, the presumption that the status quo should be the
norm, and that the complaining party constitutes an aberration who must
be put to stringent tests in order to establish the basis for liability, were
inapposite. Rather, the applicable rules put the status quo on the defensive.
A norm whose effect was to exclude so many had to be justified not
in terms of itself, but of some broader vision. It had to be justified in
the context of the broadly remedial approach. The allocation of the
burden of proof and the determination of the scope and relevance of
statistical evidence were not viewed as self-contained dispositive procedural
devices, but instrumentalist avenues to the realization of the broadly
remedial vision of Title VII litigation. Hence, the Court did not seek to

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

401
411
See
422
431

U.S. 424 (1971).
U.S. 792 (1973).
supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
U.S. 405 (1975).
U.S. 324 (1977).
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explain its allocation of the burdens of proof in the traditional language
of probabilities or fairness to the parties.' 4
Likewise, the evaluation of statistical evidence, far from following any
predetermined "scientific" formula, was eminently flexible and nonmechanistic. In short, while the language of these four cases created the
basic framework that would subsequently circumscribe Title VII analysis
into very narrow procedural inquiries, the presumptions they embodied
reflected a clear-cut skepticism of the determinism of the purported
objective validity of the yardsticks used to measure employment qualifications.
2. Peering Into the Chasm: Local Governments As Defendants
The significance of the radical interpretation of "equal opportunities"
embodied in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.

65

and institutionalized through

the nontraditional use of burden allocation came under challenge in Title
VII cases brought against local governments. 66 In the 1972 amendments
to the Civil Rights Act, Congress, following the Supreme Court's lead,
embraced the broadly remedial conception of the statute. 67 In particular,
it authorized suits against local government bodies and federal agencies.' s
The first such case to reach the Supreme Court was Washington v.
Davis, 69 and the Court's disposition of the case foreshadowed judicial
reappraisal of the substantive interpretation of Title VII.
First, however, the Court was compelled to address explicitly the
underlying skepticism implicit in its treatment of "facially neutral selection
criteria." Its response was to retreat from such skepticism. Second, shorn
of that skepticism, the procedural structure erected in Griggs and its
progeny proved too radical for the new jurisprudence. Third, emerging
concerns about the reach of equal protection analysis and its reconciliation
with Title VII doctrine led the Court to focus on the motivation for the
defendant's conduct rather than relief to the plaintiff. This in turn resulted
in a shift of societal focus to the costs of removing disparities rather
than the structural concerns. Taken with the second development above,
the consequence was the realignment of the burdens of proof that favored
the status quo and put the plaintiff challenging it on the defensive.
Similarly, the scrutiny of statistical evidence took as a starting hypothesis
the absence of discrimination-in direct contrast to Griggs and its immediate progeny.

164. See supra note 106.
165. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
166. Five such cases heard by the Court between 1976-80 were: Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321 (1977); Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); New York
Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
167. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 n.l (1975).
168. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 n.10 (1976).
169. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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This subpart explores these developments in the setting of actions against
local governments, and shows how these actions were precursors providing
the intellectual underpinning for the rethinking of burden allocation in
actions against private actors.
Davis grew out of the disproportionate effects of a long-used screening
device, "Test 21," on the recruitment of blacks into the Washington,
D.C. police force.110 In challenging the use of the test, the plaintiffs
argued that it had a highly discriminatory impact on blacks since a
disproportionately high number of blacks failed to obtain the threshold
score.' 7' Moreover, the plaintiffs contended that performance on the test
bore no relationship to the effective performance of a police officer's
duties. 172
Both the district court and the court of appeals found the claims of
disparity sufficient to shift the burden to the defendant.'"7 Consistent
with Griggs, McDonnell-Douglas, and their elaborations, these Courts
differed only as to whether the defendant had successfully discharged
the burden. While 75 the district court held that it had,' 7 4 the court of
appeals disagreed.

170. Id. at 234. The test, purportedly designed to measure verbal ability and reading comprehension
of the English language had been widely used for recruitment into the federal service since 1883.
To qualify for a place in the program, the applicant had to score at least 40 points out of a
maximum possible 80 points, possess a high school diploma (or equivalent), and meet "certain
physical standards."
171. Id. at 235. The exact scope of the disproportionality is not entirely clear. The court of
appeals stated that four times as many blacks as whites failed to obtain the requisite minimum
score on the test. Id. at 237 (citing Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). The
district court, from the evidence, concluded that three inferences could be drawn from the record:
(1) black representation in the police officer corps of the District of Columbia was proportionately
below the composition of blacks in the population of the District of Columbia; (2) blacks failed
Test 21 at a disproportionately higher ratio to whites; (3) Test 21 had not been validated pursuant
to EEOC guidelines to establish its reliability as a measure of job performance on the police force.
Id. at 235 (citing Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 960 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
172. Id. at 235.
173. Because the action had been filed prior to the effective date of the 1972 Amendments, the
plaintiffs' claims had been grounded on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment which
the Supreme Court had held embodied the equal protection component of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Boiling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Both the district court and the court of appeals assumed
that the analytical framework under the Equal Protection Clause was identical to that under Title
VII. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 258 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174. Davis, 426 U.S. at 258 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The district court found, on the basis of
the following considerations, that the defendant had satisfied the burden, whatever its scope: (1)
the percentage of new recruits since 1969 into the police force who were black (44%) was proportional
to 20-29-year-old blacks residing within a fifty-mile radius of the District of Columbia; (2) the
police department had engaged in systematic and affirmative efforts to enroll in the program blacks
who passed the test but had failed to report for duty; (3) Test 21 was not "culturally slanted,"
and it was not designed (and it did not operate) to discriminate against otherwise qualified blacks;
and (4) the test was reasonably and directly related to the requirements of the training program,
and failure to validate it for on-the-job performance was, therefore, not fatal.
175. The court of appeals rejected the "bootstrap" approach of the district court, and, adhering
rigidly to prior formulaic pronouncements, held that the defendant had not satisfied the rebuttal
burden since it had not shown that Test 21 was an adequate measure of job performance. See
Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Specifically, the defendant had failed
to meet the Albemarle Paper validation standard requiring that the test be a predictor of how a
recruit would perform as a police officer, or at least that the test was a reliable indicator of
probable success in the training program.
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The Supreme Court, however, adopted an entirely distinctive framework. First, ruling on an issue not presented in the petition for certiorari,
it held that "the Court of Appeals erroneously applied the legal standards
applicable
to Title VII cases in resolving the constitutional issue before
'
it. 1176

Specifically, the Court rejected the Title VII doctrine that dispro-

portionate impact alone might suffice to establish a violation.' 77 Rather,
the Court held that equal protection analysis required the plaintiff to
show that the official
conduct was motivated by the intent or purpose
78
to discriminate.
The break with existing jurisprudence, 179 however, was not limited to
the creation of a dichotomy between equal protection and Title VII
analysis. Rather, in addressing the issue squarely presented by the petition
for certiorari-whether the court of appeals had misapplied the Griggs
standard to the facts of the case-the Court essentially reinterpreted and
restructured Title VII analysis, adopting what at least one commentator
has termed a "commonsensical" approach.1W Seemingly eschewing the
centrality of burden allocation and of statistically defined impact m8 ' the
Court found it difficult to credit the claim that an examination that
merely tested verbal skills and that had been in federal use since 1883
82
should be struck down as discriminatory, with or without validation.'

176. As the Court pointed out, however, none of the parties contended that such was error by
the court of appeals. Certiorari had been sought on the ground that the court of appeals had
misapplied the Griggs standard. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 238.
177. Id. at 238-39.
178. Id. at 239. The Court held that "our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law
or other official conduct without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose is
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact." Id. The Court nonetheless
observed that there are "some indications to the contrary in our cases." Id. at 242 (citing Palmer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972)).
179. As the Court readily conceded, lower courts that had analyzed constitutionally based claims
of discrimination in public employment had adopted the disproportionate impact approach of Griggs.
Id. at 244 n.12. "The cases impressively demonstrate that there is another side to the issue." Id.
at 245; see also id. at 254 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REv. 1297, 1318 n.89 (1987). Similarly, the Davis Court stated that:
[a]s an initial matter, we have difficulty understanding how a law establishing a
racially neutral qualification for employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory,
and denies "any person . .. equal protection of the laws" simply because a greater
proportion of Negroes fail to qualify than members of other racial or ethnic groups.
Davis, 426 U.S. at 245.
181. Recall that in the lower courts a central focus was on the different statistical proofs put
on by the parties. The plaintiffs, in making their Title VII claim, relied essentially on the disproportionately low number of blacks on the Washington, D.C. police force, and particularly on the
number of blacks who failed Test 21. By contrast, the defendants and the trial court focused on
the seeming parity in the number of blacks recruited into the police force since 1969 despite their
failure rate on Test 21, and the correlation of this number to 20-29-year-old males within a fifty
mile radius of Washington, D.C. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 235. The Supreme Court made virtually
no attempt to address the relevance of these distinct approaches to the use of statistics.
182. See id. at 245. Yet, the logic of Griggs and its subsequent development compelled precisely
the opposite approach. Griggs, after all, had been based on the assertion that "basic intelligence
must have the means of articulation to manifest itself fairly in a testing process," and that in the
case of nonvalidated aptitude tests with disproportionate impact on blacks, this might not be the
case since "because they are negroes, petitioners have long received inferior education in segregated
schools ....
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,. 430 (1971).
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For the Court, this was putting form over substance. Requiring that the
government cease using Test 21 in the recruitment of police officers until
the test had gone through the chimera of validation brought home to
the Court as clearly as could any situation the cost to society and to
the defendant (both of which in this case were represented by the government) of the broadly remedial approach.' 83 It also indicated just how
closely and decisively the procedural device of burden allocation and
reliance on statistical evidence had become intertwined with and dispositive
of the substantive view of Griggs. It was impossible to reject that world
view by adhering to prior application of the contents of the Griggs
procedure. To create a new orthodoxy thus required a new architecture.

Although the Court employed the same mortar and brick in erecting that
new orthodoxy by using the same tripartite procedural facade, its specifications, contours, and arches were quite distinct from what had preceded.
The new project began in earnest with Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States. s4 Relying on the pattern and practice theory that the
Supreme Court had adverted to in Teamsters v. United States,85 the
United States Department of Justice, in Hazelwood, sought to make out
a claim of discrimination against a local school district on the basis of
statistical evidence showing substantial disparity between the representation
1 86
of blacks and whites in the district's employment of teachers.
Although Hazelwood offered no rebuttal evidence, 8 7 the Court held
that it did not have to since the government had not discharged its prima
facie burden. In an approach virtually irreconcilable with Teamsters, the
Court, while accepting that the "[statistical] differences were on their

183. The Court pointedly observed that invalidating the use of the test would "raise serious
questions and perhaps invalidate a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory and
licensing statutes." Davis, 426 U.S. at 248. The picture looked even more bleak when the test being
invalidated was administered by an entity that had taken affirmative steps to ensure that blacks
who passed the test were enrolled in the program. If Washington, D.C. did not measure up, what
would?
184. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
185. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
186. For example, the Hazelwood School District did not hire its first black teacher until 1969.
In 1970, of the 957 teachers hired, only 6 were black; in 1972, of 1,107, 16 were black; and in
1973, 22 out of 1,231 were black. By contrast, according to the 1970 census figures, of the 19,000
teachers in the St. Louis metropolitan area (which included Hazelwood), 15.4% were black. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 303.
The United States did not rest, however, on statistics alone. It pointed to a past history suggestive
of discrimination against blacks. As late as the 1962-63 school year, the application forms used by
the school district to fill vacancies required the applicant to state his/her race. Id. at 302 n.2.
Recruiters visited predominantly white schools, while ignoring predominantly black schools. Applicants
with student or substitute teaching experience in the predominantly white suburban Hazelwood school
system were generally given preference, and school principals had virtually unfettered discretion in
deciding who to hire. Finally, the United States cited instances of alleged discrimination against 55
individual black applicants. Id. at 302-03.
187. Id. at 303. Hazelwood challenged the sufficiency of the government's evidence, and pointed
to its formal policy that all teachers be hired on the basis of "training, preparation and recommendations regardless of race, color and creed." Id. at 303-04.
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held that the requirement of purposeful discrimination

in a pattern or practice disparate treatment case required something more.
The statistical disparity must be "probative"; that is, the disproportionality must arise from meaningful comparisons-apples to apples, oranges

to oranges. 18 9 Moreover, the burden of demonstrating probativeness was
the plaintiff's, and had to be discharged as part of the prima facie

case. ,90
The Court's most radical departure from precedent in Hazelwood related
to its willingness to subject the statistical disparity put forward as the
basis of the plaintiff's prima facie case to stringent technical analysis.
The Court suggested that lawyers and judges, in evaluating statistical
disparities, should roll up their sleeves and conduct a professionally sound
analysis to determine whether the disparity is significant.191

188. Id. at 308-09.
189. The Court explained that only by such a requirement would statistical disparity conform to
the requirement that the plaintiff prove discriminatory conduct, not simply suggest its existence.
Id. at 308-09.
190. Using language reminiscent of antitrust law, the Court faulted the statistical evidence adduced
by the United States on the ground that it was not sufficiently tied to the relevant "labor market
area." Id. at 310-12.
With regard to the labor market, the Court said that the disparity in Teamsters could be relied
on as probative of discrimination because the job-skills involved there-the ability to drive a truckis one that many persons possess or can fairly readily acquire. Id. at 308 n.13.
By contrast, according to the Court, school teaching requires specialized skills, and the proper
pool for determining the appropriate representation of blacks is not with the general population,
but some narrower subgroup such as those who hold teacher certification papers. Id. at 308. In
drawing this contrast, however, the Court ignored the fact that the determinative comparison in
Teamsters was not between "drivers" (or even truck-drivers) and the general population, but between
"line drivers" (i.e., those who drove trucks in inter-city runs) and the general population.
The Court also found faulty the definition of the relevant geographical market. Again, while the
Court in Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337-38 n.17 (1977), had brushed aside the
employer's contention on this point and paid it limited attention in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 241 (1976), the distinction took on seminal importance in Hazelwood. Thus, the Court emphasized
that if the proper geographical market was defined to exclude the City of St. Louis, black representation in the qualified pool of employable teachers fell from 15.4% to 5.7%, thereby reducing
the level of the disparity. See Hazelwood 433 U.S. at 308-10.
It should be noted that while in Davis the Court relied on a broader geographical market than
that contended for by the plaintiff, it found a narrower geographical market relevant in Hazelwood.
That these corresponded to the existing patterns of hiring surely should not have been decisive.
Whatever weight existing patterns ought to be given must be balanced against the possibility that
absent prior discrimination, those patterns would not have emerged. See id. at 316 n.3 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
191. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 309 n.14 ("A precise method of measuring the significance of such
statistical disparities was explained in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-497 n.17.").
A plaintiff seeking to rely on statistical evidence must first clearly state the theory in support of
which the evidence is being offered; i.e., the hypothesis. Next, she must identify the category of
evidence as to which disparity is claimed; e.g., the racial or gender composition of the work-force.
The relevant statistical data must then be systematically gathered. This may be done through a
process of "sampling" or "random selection." The sampled data then is compared to a professionally
determined norm. Four such norms are in common usage. The match of the sampled data to (or
its deviation from) the norm is then computed; or, as the Court states in Hazelwood, the process
involves the "calculation of the 'standard deviation' as a measure of predicted fluctuations from
the expected value of a sample." See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 309 n.17. Legal importance is then
attached to the deviation. Such deviation is said to reflect the likelihood or otherwise that the
disparity exhibited by the sampled data was the result of chance occurrence, or of systematically
exclusionary practice by an employer.
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The attempt to divorce statistical evidence from a normative vision of
society, and to present the inquiry within a narrowly circumscribed description of statistics as a science, is glaringly portrayed by the Court's
insistence that this closer scrutiny must take into account the extent to
which any comparative disparity reflects the success of neighboring communities in attracting blacks to their employment. Thus, Hazelwood's
relative failure should not be penalized because of the City of St. Louis's
relative success in hiring blacks. 192 In short, the Court questioned the
starting hypothesis which assigned a strong a priori probability of the
prevalence of discrimination in the St. Louis/Hazelwood area. The methodology employed to sift through the statistics, and the inference to be
drawn from the figures,1 9 marked a significant shift from the prior use
and interpretation of statistics. 194
New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer'95 provided a further demonstration of the emerging change in the Court's interpretation of Title
VII, at least when employed against local government bodies. Readily
affirming that "[a] prima facie violation of [Title VII] may be established
by statistical evidence showing that an employment practice has the effect
of denying the members of one race equal access to employment opportunities,"' 96and that such a showing shifts the burden to the defendant,

the Court nonetheless found that the statistical showing here was not

sufficient to discharge the plaintiff's prima facie burden. 97 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court combed through the statistical evidence with
greater depth than had been customary, demanding demonstration of the
approximation of statistical with specific (if not knowing) wrongful conduct by the defendant. 198

192. See id. at 310-11 (suggesting that the statistical disparity would be less probative if somehow
it could be shown that blacks preferred working in St. Louis rather than Hazelwood, or that the
City of St. Louis' effort to attract blacks resulted in a smaller pool of black applicants from which
Hazelwood could draw black teachers).
193. Again illustrative of the Court's seeming willingness to discount the relevance of the pasta willingness that clearly distinguishes Hazelwood from Teamsters, Albemarle and Griggs-was the
Court's insistence that only such statistical evidence that flowed from post-1972 conduct by Hazelwood
had probative value. See id.at 311-12 n.17.
194. As previously explained, anyihing approximating stringent statistical analysis had been employed only in reviewing the defendant's discharge of her burden. See discussion supra part A(l).
The stringency of the standard, and the selection of the party to bear the cost of sustaining it,
said volumes, of course, on the Court's perception of a starting assumption as to the prevalence
of discrimination in society.
Moreover, the Court had always considered past conduct as providing at least part of the explanation
for any observed disparities. To focus on the bare numbers in a discrete time-frame reflected an
ahistorical approach to the use of statistics.
195. 440 U.S. 568 (1979). The critical issue boiled down to the effect to be given statistics showing
that the exclusion of methadone users from employment may have had disproportionate effect on
blacks and hispanics. To the extent invocation of the disparate treatment theory is dependent on
an invidiously discriminatory animus by the employer, the theory was foreclosed by the time the
case reached the Supreme Court. The district court had found (and the plaintiffs did not challenge)
that the Transit Authority's preclusion of the employment of persons on methadone was not based
on prejudice or other purposefully discriminatory biases against such persons. Id. at 584 n.25.
196. Id. at 584.
197. Id.
198. Thus, the Court found as nonprobative the showing that 81076 of narcotics users referred
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Moreover, although the Court found that the plaintiffs did not make
out a prima facie case, it went on to rule that any prima facie case
would have been rebutted by the Transit Authority's "demonstration that
its narcotics rule (and the rule's application to methadone users) is job
related."' 99 The explanation of this conclusion, based as it was on the
cost to society at large of insisting that the defendant prove the incapacity
of the plaintiffs to perform the task, echoed the Davis Court's concerns.
The consequence of these concerns necessarily was a shift of focus from
a sympathetic hearing of the plaintiff's challenge to a concern that an
innocent defendant not be penalized for the past sins of society.2°°
Davis and the subsequent Title VII cases thus marked a significant
reassessment of the role of burden allocation .and statistical evidence in
the establishment of a Title VII violation.20 1 Critically, the Court shifted

to the Transit Authority's medical offices were black or hispanic. Rather than simply inferring that
81% of the methadone users would also be black or hispanic, the Court insisted on a closer
demonstration of the correlation. Id. at 584-85 n.25.
Similarly, the Court dismissed reliance on the racial and national origin composition of methadone
users receiving treatment in publicly funded institutions on the ground that it did not present direct
evidence of who was actually denied employment by the transit authority. Id. at 585-86. The Court
also questioned whether the disproportionate representation of blacks and hispanics in publicly funded
methadone treatment centers necessarily implied a disproportionate representation of blacks and
hispanics among methadone users in New York. It postulated that it is conceivable that black and
hispanic usage of methadone may simply reflect their proportion in the general population of New
York City. Id. at 586 n.30.
199. Id. at 587.
200. The successful rebuttal of the prima facie case apparently consisted of the Transit Authority's
proof to and finding by the district court (a finding apparently also conceded by the plaintiffs)
that for the well-being of its general ridership, there are security related jobs from which narcotics
users including persons in methadone treatment may lawfully be excluded. This ruling was based
in part on a further finding by the district court that at least one-third "and probably a good
many more" of those on methadone would be classified as unemployable for such and other jobs.
Finally, covering all of the bases, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs would be unable to
discharge their burden of showing pretext because of the finding by the district court that the
exclusion of methadone users was not motivated by racial animus. Id. at 587. Omitted from the
discussion of this issue was the statement in Albemarle Paper that pretext may be demonstrated
where a plaintiff shows the existence of alternative means of achieving the defendant's business
needs that have less disparate impact on the plaintiff's class. Of course, given the court's blanket
insulation of the employer's interest by reference to its security needs, one might question whether
any level of statistical gymnastics would have satisfied the Court.
201. On its face, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), would appear to be an exception
to this claim. Dothard represented the first attempt by the Court to apply Griggs and its elaboration
to Title VII claims by women. The application of norms developed in the race discrimination area
to gender-based discrimination has frequently tested the Court's analytical mettle. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); cf. Frontiero v. Richardson,
458 U.S. 718 (1982); Mississippi College for Women v. Hogan, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See generally
Assoc. Gen. Contr. of California, Inc. v. City and County of San Franscisco, 813 F.2d 922 (9th
Cir. 1991).
Dothard may be understood, therefore, as an early attempt by the Court to stick to reasonably
familiar grounds in the absence of any experience with which to gauge the viability of the Griggs
approach to gender-based claims. It may also be significant that the selection criteria at stake in
Dothard-height and weight limitations-epitomized the classic case of stereotyping based on physical
characteristics. Virtually no other set of selection criteria are likely to arouse skepticism as such
criteria.
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the focus of inquiry from the defendant's rebuttal evidence to the plain-

tiff's prima facie case. Contemporaneously, the Court invariably found
the plaintiff's evidence to lack probative value, a result not unlike that
which prevailed when the scrutiny of statistical evidence focused on the

defendant's rebuttal showing. 20 2
As the above demonstration suggests, the transformation was neither
accidental nor compelled by any internally consistent neutral operation
of the procedural devices invoked by the Court. The change reflected,
no less than the Griggs decision, the Court's reassessment of substantive
policies implicated in Title VII.
That shift embodied judicial concerns about imposing liability on governmental bodies. The explanation for the concern-the cost to institutional integrity-foreshadowed the change in judicial climate about the
appropriateness of committing the nation and national resources to a
broadly remedial program. Whatever the subjective motivation, as a
practical matter the cases involving governmental agencies demanded a
movement away from concern over the availability of redress to "protected
groups" to a dominating concern over the cost of granting such redress.
That the defendants were governmental agencies engaged in providing
services to the public made vividly logical and irrefutable the equation
of that cost to the reduction of public welfare. The outcome could be
rationalized on the entirely substantive notion that a plaintiff seeking
redress, the grant of which would result in an overall decrease of societal
welfare, ought to be put to the task of demonstrating that she indeed
was injured by the conduct of the governmental agency being sued.
Transferring this rearrangement of concerns to suits involving entirely
private litigants was undertaken by elaboration of the disparate treatment
theory.

202. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1974).
This is hardly surprising. Although courts have tended to treat statistical evidence as if it is the
product of a scientific process that operates, independent of personal values or ideology, this is far
from being the case. Challenges to the accuracy of the statistical evidence focus on its shortcoming
as a social (not a natural or physical) science. The starting hypothesis is derived not from disinterested
observation or controlled experimentation, but simply states some objective or policy. It is this
subjective hypothesis that then shapes the gathering and use of data. This process itself is not
controlled by any well-established professional rules or guidelines, but by the exigencies of the
adversarial process. The litigant freely ignores information that detracts from the hypothesis, and
magnifies the importance of helpful information. Nor is this self-serving collection of data likely
to be corrected (as it is in the physical sciences) by insistence on replication of the data in other
settings and over time. To the contrary, because the statistical evidence is relevant only for the
particular litigation (and, indeed, causation requirements may limit its probative value to such
litigation), there is no incentive for such replication. The sole test of accuracy, then, lies in the
ability of the opposing party to challenge effectively the statistical result. Often, the only effective
way to do so is by challenging the hypothesis, and by mounting a counter statistical demonstration
using quite different data and assumptions. The result is a war of statistics with victory predicated
not on the underlying accuracy of the conflicting data, but judicial acceptance of underlying
assumptions. The use of statistics merely gives the appearance of scientific validity to a fight about
assumptions.
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3. Maturation of the Disparate Treatment/Disparate Impact Divide
The most ballyhooed distinction in Title VII litigation is that between
disparate treatment and disparate impact. Lacking functional, instrumental, or operational significance, the theory of the distinction nonetheless postulates that disparate treatment demands establishing an intent
to discriminate, while disparate impact permits a showing of Title VII
violation without demonstrating the existence of such an intent. 2 3 The
distinction, however, masks a good deal more than it reveals. It fails to
delineate such crucial considerations as when one ought to use either
analytical framework to the exclusion of the other, or the consequence
to the available remedy of employing either theory of liability.
This subpart demonstrates how and why the allocations of the burdens
of proof and statistical evidence have been pressed into the service of
the claimed distinction. The central argument is that although the distinction lacks any practical significance, it has offered an intellectual
basis for obtaining some consensus on a substantively divided Court.
This allowed the Court some modicum of coherence as it moved from
the broadly remedial vision to the narrowly antidiscriminatory. For the
members of the Court who retained the broadly remedial viewpoint, the
basic structure of burden allocation and the significance of statistical
evidence appeared relatively undisturbed. The core of Title VII analysis
would remain that embodied in disparate impact, with disparate treatment
analysis readily distinguished and cabined to an insignificant quibble about
whether the particular plaintiff had put on evidence of discriminatory
conduct perpetrated against her as an individual, not whether the group
to which she belonged had been the victim of discrimination. 204 For those
with the narrowly antidiscriminatory perspective, disparate treatment analysis constitutes the essence of Title VII. Rigorous use of the procedural
device of burden allocation coupled with an insistence on the demonstration of causation independent of statistical evidence offered a judicial
mechanism of returning Title VII litigation to an essentially individualized
fault-based tort claim responsive to concerns over the cost to a defendant
of defending broad-based imposition of liability. Successfully enshrining
disparate treatment analysis, furthermore, would offer the possibility of
returning the genie of disparate impact analysis into the bottle. 20 5
The opinion in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,206 rendered the°7
same term as the Supreme Court's first affirmative action decision,
illustrates the point. The Furnco opinion, without directly challenging

203. The statutory basis for the dichotomy purportedly lies in section 703(a)(1) (disparate treatment),
and section 703(a)(2) (disparate impact). See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1983); cf.
International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (disparate treatment constitutes
the stereotypical Title VII claim).
204. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1980); United States
Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 717 (1983) (Blackmun, J. concurring).
205. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
206. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
207. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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maintenance of the broadly remedial principle as a substantive norm,
attempted to limit the scope of its applicability. The instrument the Court
employed to achieve this objective was that of purporting to enunciate
a procedurally-based
distinction between disparate impact and disparate
2

treatment .

08

In Furnco, black bricklayers, as plaintiffs, argued that a selection
process under which the employer hired "only bricklayers he knew were
experienced and competent," or "[who were] recommended to him as
similarly skilled," while declining to hire persons at the job-site regardless
of their qualifications, 2°9 contravened Title VII inasmuch as the result
210
was the under-representation of blacks in the employer's workforce.
The plaintiffs argued their case under both the Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. 21 '

and McDonnell Douglas v. Green21 2 theories. The lower courts

appear not to have conceptualized any practical or legally meaningful
distinction between the approaches. In keeping with the substantive approach of prior Supreme Court cases, the fundamental question for both
the district court and the court of appeals was whether the facts, taken
as a whole, supported a belief that Furnco, and more particularly its
practice of employing only those persons known to the decision-maker
or recommended to him by friends, together with available statistical
data, dictated that Furnco be made to open up its hiring process. 21 3 The

208. The Court had adverted to such a distinction in Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335 (1977), but had otherwise applied essentially the same evidentiary standard in Teamsters (purportedly a disparate treatment case) as it did in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975) (purportedly a disparate impact case).
209. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 570. Two plaintiffs who were "fully qualified" applied for jobs by
appearing at the job site gate.
210. Subtly, there is a shift of focus in the analysis of the statistics from an evaluation of the
defendant's longterm conduct to the defendant's conduct in the particular case. Thus, the Court
justifies the statistics to which it resorts by noting that Furnco did not maintain a "permanent
force of bricklayers." Meaningful statistical evidence had to do, therefore, not with Furnco's bricklayer
work force, but the composition of persons hired for the specific job. See id. at 569.
The evidence indicated that between August 26 and September 8, of six bricklayers hired, all
were white. The first black was hired on September 9. Of eight bricklayers hired between September
9-13, one was black. Between September 13-23, two of the twenty-four persons hired were black.
Between October 12-18, six bricklayers, all black, were hired. The result appears to have been that
despite the bunching together of the hiring of blacks to the tail end of the process, Furnco apparently
exceeded its "self-imposed" goal (apparently motivated by prior disputes) of hiring 16 blacks by
ultimately employing 20. Id. at 572. Moreover, of the 1,819 "man days" on the job, 242, or
13.3%, were by black bricklayers. Id. at 570.
211. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
212. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
213. See Griggs, 438 U.S. at 572-73. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' Griggs claim on
the ground that refusal to hire at the gate was a facially neutral practice with no showing of
disproportionate effect on blacks. Id. at 572. The ground for the rejection of the McDonnell Douglas
claim is unclear. Id. As the Supreme Court observed, the touchstone of the district court's findings,
whether under Griggs or under McDonnell Douglas, was the business justification for Furnco's use
of the people-you-know network. "The [District] Court left no doubt that it thought Furnco's hiring
practices were justified as a business necessity in that they were required for the safe and efficient
operation of Furnco's business, and were 'not used as a pretext to exclude negroes."' Id. at 572
(quoting Appeal for Cert. at A20-21).
In reversing the district court and finding for the plaintiffs, the court of appeals, while purportedly
applying McDonnell Douglas, relied on the sort of historical evidence typified by Griggs. It pointed
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lower courts thus treated the incantation of the allocation of burdens of
proof as a ritualistic wand that explained a conclusion reached on other
grounds.
The Supreme Court viewed the matter quite differently. First, the Court
made it clear that its primary focus was not on any alleged injury sustained
by the plaintiffs, but on the injury to the defendant in being haled into

court. 1 4 Second, the Court, for the first time, strongly intimated that
there were fundamental differences between the Griggs disparate impact
and the McDonnell Douglas disparate treatment approaches 1 5 In this
regard, the Court significantly departed from prior formulation in its
statement of the nature of the rebuttal burden shifted onto the employer
as defendant. The burden means that the employer "need only 'articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.' ",216 Thus, the burden was not one of "proving" but merely one
of "articulating ' 21 7 a nondiscriminatory reason for the hiring practice.
To discharge this burden:
the employer must be allowed some latitude to introduce evidence
which bears on his motive. Proof that his work force was racially
balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of
minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent
when that issue is yet to be decided.21 s
In explaining the reassignment of burdens, the Court relied on substantive as well as procedural justifications. Observing that the allocation
of the burdens of proof "is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate
the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical
question of discrimination, ' 21 9 the Court stated the rules should not be
to "the historical inequality in the treatment of black workers." See id. at 573-74. It explicitly
discounted the importance of selecting people whose capabilities had been demonstrated through
the people-you-know network. Id.
214. The Court framed the issue for which it granted certiorari as "whether the Court of Appeals
had gone too far in substituting its own judgment as to proper hiring practices in the case of an
employer which claims the practices it had chosen did not violate Title vI." Id. at 574.
215. Id. at 575 n.7. While distinguishing Griggs on the ground that the case involved "examinations," the Court did not explain why this distinction was meaningful in the context of the
allocation of the burdens of proof. Cf. id. at 582 (Marshall, J.,concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
The Court's carving out of a special niche for "disparate treatment" analysis appeared particularly
ominous given its warning that the McDonnell Douglas four-part inquiry into a plaintiff's prima
facie case would "differ from case to case," and that the standard might be different from that
employed in Teamsters, which the Court characterized as a "pattern and practice" case. Id. at 575
n.8.
216. Id. at 578.
217. While the Court in Furnco appeared to use the words "prove" and "articulate" interchangeably, it made it unmistakably clear in Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney,
439 U.S. 24 (1978), that "articulate" imposes a less heavy burden, requiring no more than the
"production" of some evidence. Compare Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577-78 with Sweeney, 439 U.S. at
25 n.2 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
218. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 578-79. But cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1983).
219. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577. The Court candidly acknowledged that the substantive issue at
stake was whether in combatting discrimination the employer, in its hiring procedure, should use
that method which allows the employer to consider the qualification of the largest number of
"minority applicants." It acknowledged that the formulation and allocation of the burden of proof
had a direct bearing on this choice. Id. at 576.
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"rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. ' 220 It held that the prima facie case
under the "disparate impact" analysis shifts the burden to the defendant

by "rais[ing] an inference of discrimination only because we presume
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on

the consideration of impermissible factors. 2 121 For the Court, this imposed
a duty on the defendant only of putting forward some legitimate expla-

nation for its conduct, and the articulation of such an explanation shifts
the burden back to the plaintiff to persuade the Court that the defendant's
conduct was motivated by an impermissible consideration of race or other

forbidden factor. Moreover, the Court invoked substantive concerns, such
to explain this procedural structure for
as the cost to the employer,
222
prosecuting Title VII cases.
Following Furnco, the Court sought to institutionalize its new ideology
223
by employing (as had the Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
and despite the explicit warning in Furnco) a highly formulaic approach
to the allocation of the burdens of proof. In each case, however, the
substantive underpinning of the formalism was obvious. It was clear that
the focus of the Court's concern was not in assuring that parties discharged
their burdens seriatim, but that the elements of the burden protect the
status quo. Discrimination was to be presumed as a rare exception, with
an attendant burden on those claiming it to prove its existence. 224 This
deference to the status quo was explained and enshrined in the notion
that Title VII litigation was essentially individual in character, the judicial

220. Id. at 577.
221. Id. The Court went on to explain that the inference would be appropriate when all legitimate
reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions.
Yet, the Court's adoption of the sufficiency of the prima facie case as articulated in McDonnell
Douglas cannot be reconciled with this explanation; for that standard did not require the plaintiff
to advance any specific reasons for the employer's conduct, but was based solely on the identity
of the plaintiff, plus the defendant's conduct following the rejection of the plaintiff. Id. at 575.
222. As-the Court stated:
Title VII prohibits [the employer] from having as a goal a work force selected by
any proscribed discriminatory practice, but it does not impose a duty to adopt a
hiring procedure that maximizes hiring of minority employees.
438 U.S. at 577-78.
223. 422 U.S. 405 (1975); see also supra notes 130-43 and accompanying text.
224. In Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978), for example,
the Court, per curiam, restated that successful discharge of the prima facie burden creates only an
"inference of discriminatory conduct," and that to dispel such inference, the employer need only
"articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." the Court added:
[w]hile words such as 'articulate', 'show' and 'prove,' may have more or less similar
meanings depending upon the context in which they are used, we think that there
is a significant distinction between merely 'articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason,' and 'prov[ingl' absence of discriminatory motive. By reaffirming
and emphasizing the McDonnell Douglas analysis in Furnco Construction Corp. v.
Waters, . , . we made it clear that the former will suffice to meet the employee's
prima facie case of discrimination.
Id. at 25. Further emphasizing the substantive difference of Furnco and the Court's new line from
prior precedent, the Court explicitly rejected the notion (adopted by the Court in Teamsters) that
the allocation and definition of the burdens of proof should bear some relationship to a party's
access to relevant information. Id.; see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989).
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function being to vindicate the right of individuals, not to protect a
class. Allocation of the burdens of proof under the disparate treatment
theory was a conveniently malleable procedure for the formal application

of this new approach.

Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,221 which with McDonnell Douglas is frequently cited as enunciating the disparate treatment
theory, provided the fullest articulation and attempt at coherent justification of the new orthodoxy. Burdine was an opportune vehicle. Like
McDonnell Douglas, the facts of the case were essentially sui generis,
depicting the foibles of individualized office politics, not the classic yarn
of group-based discrimination. 226 Like McDonnell Douglas, the Court
employed the decision as the basis for a highly formalistic statement of
the role of the burden of proof.
In Burdine, the court of appeals, notwithstanding Furnco, had placed
on the defendant the "burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence the existence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" for its
employment decision. 227 In reversing this holding, the Supreme Court
placed a good deal of emphasis on the distinction between disparate
treatment and disparate impact. 228 Because disparate treatment purportedly
focused on the discriminatory motivation of the employer, the Court
stated that the defendant's rebuttal burden is satisfied by the defendant
"producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was
preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." 2 29
Assuming that the defendant meets this burden, "the presumption
raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds
to a new level of specificity. ' 230 The plaintiff then assumes the role of

225. 450 U.S. 248 (1978).
226. Burdine, an employee of the Texas Department of Community Affairs, alleged that the
denial to her of a particular job assignment had been motivated by gender-based discrimination.
At the time the case reached the Supreme Court, she was still an employee of the Department
(albeit in a different division), having "kept her salary and . . . responsibility commensurate with
what she would have received" in the absence of the alleged discriminatory conduct. Id. at 251.
It should be noted that since the facts are grounded in the unique circumstance of the plaintiff,
and as they are easily distinguishable from the general perception of what ails society, a disposition
of the case sounding entirely in terms of individual treatment does not immediately arouse the sort
of unease that allegations of group-based discrimination tend to elicit.
227. Id. at 252. Notably, the Fifth Circuit, clearly influenced by the broadly remedial character
of pre-Furnco decisions, also required that the defendant "prove by objective evidence that those
hired or promoted were better qualified than the plaintiff." Id. The Supreme Court unanimously
rejected this condition.
228. Id. at 253 n.5 ("We have recognized that the factual issues, and therefore the character of
the evidence presented, differ when the plaintiff claims that a facially neutral employment policy
has a discriminatory impact on protected classes.").
229. Id. at 254. That production burden demands that the defendant's evidence "raises a genuine
issue of fact as to whether [defendant] discriminated against the plaintiff." Id. And, '"[t]o accomplish
this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the
reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify
a judgment for the defendant." Id. at 255. The Court does not articulate what evidence would,
as a substantive matter, justify judgment for the defendant. Presumably, however, such evidence
need not be either job-related nor need it meet the business necessity requirement of Griggs.
230. Id. at 255.
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showing that the defendant's submitted reasons are pretextual . 21 If the
plaintiff can satisfy this pretext burden, she would have succeeded in
discharging both her intermediate and ultimate burden of persuasion.
The Court offered functional and policy explanations for this distribution of burdens. The defendant's burden must be understood in light
of the plaintiff's ever present, continuing, and ultimate burden to demonstrate that the defendant engaged in intentional discrimination. 232 The
allocation of burdens of proof in turn function not to realign the plaintiff's
responsibility, but merely as an intermediate mechanism to facilitate the
presentation of evidence. Viewed in this light, the purpose of shifting
the burden to the defendant by a successful prima facie showing is entirely
logistical: it enables the defendant to demonstrate that the case should
233
proceed beyond the prima facie stage.
Explaining its rationale for this arrangement, the Court harkened back
to precedent for the claim that the plaintiff's prima facie burden must

231. Id. at 255-56.
232. Id. at 253 ("The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of facts that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." (citing Board
of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2 (1978)); see also 9 JoIN H.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2489 (James H. Chadbourn rev., 1970).
The Court again provides little guidance on why this or any other Title VII case should be viewed
as a "disparate treatment" (i.e., with the focus on intentional discrimination) rather than a "disparate
impact" case. It does suggest that the determination is entirely dependent on the plaintiff's theory
of the pleading, and whether the allegation is one against a "facially neutral" employment practice.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53. But the line is hardly ever clear-cut. Indeed, rarely can any rational
decision in the employment setting be based exclusively on so-called "facially neutral" or on
"subjective" decision-making. The requirement of validation in the context of standardized tests
calls into question the very concept of "neutrality," and of course, it has long been argued that
most standardized tests evaluate subjective attributes such as culture. A recent study suggests that
such skepticism over the "objectivity" of aptitude tests is widespread among the general population,
blacks and whites alike. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE A1D EDUCATION FUND, THE UNFINISHED
AGENDA ON RACE IN AMERICA 29 and table 63 (1989).
233. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 ("The McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary
burdens serves to bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to this ultimate question
[of whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff].").
The Court's defense of this assertion is, at best, convoluted. On the one hand, it asserts that:
[e]stablishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the
employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact believes
the plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption,
the Court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains
in the case.
Id. at 254.
One page later, the Court states that:
[tihe word 'presumption' properly used refers only to a device used [to allocate]
the production burden. In a Title VII case, the allocation of burdens, and the
creation of presumptions by establishment of a prima facie case is intended to
sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.
Id. at 255 n.8 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
Yet a third formulation reads:
[t1he phrase 'prima facie case' not only may denote the establishment of a legally
mandatory, rebuttable presumption, but also may be used by courts to describe
the plaintiff's burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to
infer the fact at issue .... McDonnell Douglas should have made it apparent that
in the Title VII context we use 'prima facie case' in the former sense.
Id. at 254 n.7.
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be light. 234 Far from embracing the rationale underlying the precedents-

the pervasiveness of race-based discrimination in the allotment of economic
opportunities 235-the Burdine Court's explanation for limiting the defendant's burden to that of articulating some legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason undercuts it. 236
Although the functional basis of the Court's allocation and definition
of the burdens may have been imprecise, its substantive concerns were
clearly articulated. The Court made plain its changed vision of Title VII.
In an ironic twist, the disparate treatment theory's focus on the individual
was seen to be essential to the realization of Title VII's "overriding
through
interest . . . [in] efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured
237 Out of
fair and . . . neutral employment and personnel decisions.
this claim, the Court underscored two negative propositions: first, the
Act should not be read "to require the employer to restructure his
employment practices to maximize the number of women and minorities
hired;" and second, the Act "does not demand'23that an employer give
preferential treatment to minorities or women. 1
Thus, despite the claim that disparate treatment is about individual
liability, the Court's discussion is quite explicit in demonstrating the

234. It explains this requirement in part by citing to prior precedent. Id. at 254 (citing McDonnell
Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44
(1977)). But, as explained earlier, that precedent is best understood as the product of judicial distrust
of the claimed racial neutrality of traditional selection criteria, and the accompanying judicial
philosophy that favored a broadly remedial construction of Title VII.
235. As the Court framed it, effective discharge of the burden "eliminates the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection." Id. at 253.
236. While the Court is clear that the articulate standard does not require the defendant to
persuade the trier of facts that its actions were not motivated by discriminatory animus, id. at 254,
the scope of the burden as defined in Burdine is imprecise. On the one hand, the verb "articulate"
and its distinction from the "burden of persuasion" suggests that the burden is simply that of
adducing any legally cognizable nondiscriminatory explanation.
On the other hand, the Court's definition of the burden as demanding that "[tlhe explanation
. must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant" suggests the burden might
carry some weight; i.e., something greater than mere presentation of a legally cognizable rational
explanation. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 257-58. The Court has yet to delimit the scope of this
burden.
237. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258 (quoting McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
238. Id. at 259 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)).
The significance of these policy concerns to the Court's statement and allocation of the burdens
of proof is highlighted by contrasting the Furnco and Burdine opinions with that in United States
Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1984), a disparate treatment case the facts
of which conformed so much to the stereotype of unvarnished racial discrimination that the application
to it of the standard rhetoric of burden allocation shrills as a mimicry of procedural justice. There,
the Court's opinion suggested that the shifting of burdens terminated with the defendant's rebuttal
burden, thereby eliminating the pretext phase. As the Court put it:
[blut when the defendant . . . responds to the plaintiff's evidence by offering proof
of the reason for the plaintiff's rejection, the factfinder must then decide whether
the rejection was discriminatory within the meaning of Title VII.
Id. at 714-15. But see id. at 717 (Blackmun, J., concurring specially to observe that the plaintiff
continues to have the opportunity following the defendant's rebuttal to show that the defendant's
proffered reasons were pretextual). Thus, in a case strongly representative of the archetypal variety
of unexamined prejudice, the Court confined its inquiry to an approach whose structure resembles
the essentially housekeeping function of burden allocation.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

inexorable linkage between individual treatment and social costs. The
insistence on reducing to a minimum the potential for an erroneous
determination of a finding of wrongful conduct by the defendant, no
less than the desire to avoid incorrectly denying a deserving plaintiff
redress, expressed social preferences that embodied structural visions not
simply of the community in which one lives, but, more vitally, of the
community in which one ought to live. It is thus not coincidental that
in explaining the decisive concerns under the disparate treatment theory,
the Court addressed precisely the issues that had become dominant in
the discussion of affirmative action and the concomitant issue of group
representation.
One last case, Connecticut v. Teal 3 9 deserves attention. Although the
Court characterized Teal as a disparate impact case, and although the
reasoning of the closely divided Court appears on its face to embrace
the broadly remedial approach of the pre-Washington v. Davis240 Court,

the decision is quite consistent with the personalized focus of Title VII
suits suggested in Burdine.
In Teal, four black employees sued the State of Connecticut under
Title VII because a written examination had disparate impact on black
aspirants for promotion. 24' More than a year after the lawsuit was filed,
and about one month before trial, Connecticut made promotions from
the eligibility list generated by the examination. Having taken other factors
into account, 242 Connecticut ended up promoting a significantly higher
proportion of blacks who took the examination than of whites.3I
The Court stated the issue presented was as whether an employer could
be found in violation of Title VII when it uses, as part of its selection
procedure, an examination having disparate impact on blacks where the
"bottom line" result of the process as a whole was an appropriate racial
balance. 2" Adhering to a very formalistic presentation of the burden
allocation, the Court framed the response entirely in terms of the rebuttal

239. 457 U.S. 440 (1983).
240. 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also supra notes 169-83 and accompanying text.
241. Data for the examination in 1978-which the plaintiffs had taken and failed - showed that
of 329 exam takers, 48 identified themselves as blacks, and 259 as whites. The average score for
all 329 candidates was 70.2; that for blacks was 63.7. The pass-rate was set at 65-apparently in
part to offset the disparate consequences of the examination. This resulted in 54.17% of the blacks
achieving passing scores, and 79.5% of whites doing so. Teal, 457 U.S. at 443-44 nn.3-4.
242. In addition to the consideration of the examination results, Connecticut apparently also
considered past work performance, the recommendations of the candidate's supervisors, and the
candidate's seniority. There was also some indication that Connecticut factored in the race of the
candidate in order to increase the number of blacks receiving permanent promotion. Id.
243. Of forty-six persons receiving promotion, eleven were black and thirty-five white. Thus,
22.9% of the exam takers identifying themselves as black received promotion, while 13.506 of those
identifying themselves as white were promoted. As the Court noted, the actual promotion rate of
blacks who took the written examination was about 170% that of whites. Id.
244. Id. at 457. This issue presented the Court with the opportunity to elaborate on and take
account of the possible differences between a defendant's rebuttal burden, and that of an affirmative
defense. The defendant's contention appeared to suggest that the "bottom line" result should be
evaluated as an affirmative defense. Id.
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burden,2 45 and sought to justify this approach by emphasizing the individualistic framework of Title VII.
Treated as an affirmative defense, the issue would be whether, despite
the accepted discriminatory consequences of the examination, the State
of Connecticut could nonetheless avoid liability by taking particularized
steps to assure that members of the group suffering from the discrimination were adequately represented in the final selection. In other words,
Connecticut would be taking a broadly remedial approach which would
assure fairness to the group, but not necessarily fairness to any particular
individual. In rejecting such a justification under Title VII, the Court
did not rely on such considerations as the efficacy of the remedy or its
cost to society, but on a highly individualistic conception of Title VII.
The Court held that:
[tihe fact remains that ... irrespective of the form taken by the
discriminatory practice, an employer's treatment of other members of
the plaintiff's group can be of little comfort to the victims of ...
discrimination .... Title VII does not permit the victim of a facially
discriminatory policy to be told that he has not been wronged because
other persons of his or her race or sex were hired. That answer is
of a policy that is
no more satisfactory when it is given to victims
246
facially neutral but practically discriminatory.
In summary, starting with Washington v. Davis,247 the Court substan-48
tively commenced the reappraisal of the Griggs v. Duke Power Company
Title VII jurisprudence. The animating vision changed from the broadly
remedial to a much narrower conception of Title VII as a limited antidiscriminatory statute. The Court communicated the switch in three
ways. The first, which was articulated in Davis and which framed the
issues in purely substantive terms, was short-lived and was abandoned
in favor of two procedural approaches. In Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States249 and New York Transit Authority v. Beazer,2 50 the Court
resorted to the device of requiring the plaintiff to put on a tightly woven
25
statistical prima facie case. In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters '

245. Id. at 454. The Court rejected the bottom line defense apparently because, literally read,
the defense says nothing about the job-relatedness of the source of the racially disparate impact
result-the written examination. Viewed as a presumption, the prima facie case was thus unrebutted,
although if conceded, the "bottom line" figures may have provided a sufficient affirmative defense.
246. Id. at 455.
The members of the Court making up the majority in Teal were on the liberal wing of the Court;
i.e., those who had viewed Title VII essentially in terms of its function as a tool for blacks as a
group to participate in the mainstream of the national economy. Acceptance of the bottom line
defense (even as an affirmative defense) may have been antithetical to this view, but the individualistic
rationale advanced by the Court surely threatened the group conception just as effectively. Id.
247. 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also supra notes 169-83 and accompanying text.
248. 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also supra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
249. 433 U.S. 299 (1977); see also supra notes 184-94 and accompanying text.
250. 440 U.S. 568 (1979); see also supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
251. 438 U.S. 567 (1978); see also supra notes 206-22 and accompanying text.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,2 2 the Court adopted
the alternative approach of imposing on the defendant a very light rebuttal
burden. In all three instances, the substantive effect was to favor the
narrowly antidiscriminatory philosophy by taking judicial cognizance of
the impact of the broader Griggs reading on the defendant, whose interests
were identified as generally being synonymous with those of society.
While one can only speculate as to the reasons for the Court's quick
retreat from the explicit invocation of substantive concerns in Davis,253
it is clear that the procedural substitutes it embraced were unstable. While
seemingly retaining the format for burden allocation first articulated in
the broadly remedial, the Court made significant changes to the discharge
of the burdens. In so doing, however, the Court maintained, despite the
obvious distributive effects, that it was adhering to prior precedents.
Contrary to the Court's claim, the newly fashioned statistical demonstration of the prima facie case could not readily be pegged to the preexisting formula, nor was there a consistent explanation for the complex
methodological proofs to which the plaintiff was now put. Similarly, the
restatement of the evidentiary weight for satisfaction of burden allocation
25 4
under the so-called disparate treatment theory lacked internal consistency
and appeared designed more to explain an end-result rather than to be
a neutral directive for arriving at a principled conclusion. Finally, the
Court's dichotomy between disparate impact and disparate treatment fails
because the dichotomy was, at best, one of exigency. The Court provided
no guidelines as to when either theory should be invoked. Yet, by the
distribution of the elements among the parties, it gave decisive significance
to the a priori invocation of the proper theory.
What unified these disparate and inconsistent approaches was the Court's
rethinking of the substantive concerns of Title VII. The Court moved
from a view of this legislation as presumptively anti-status quo to a view
overwhelmingly concerned with the costs of a broad reading of Title VII.
Reliance on superficially similar procedural mechanisms to achieve these
disparate interpretations stretched the fabric of procedural coherence. The
resolution of the tension was what the Court undertook in the controversial
cases it decided in 1988 and 1989. The next section explores these attempts.
4. Harmonization And Its Results
By 1988, the unsatisfactory character of masking substantive disagreements in a procedural veil had become glaringly evident. The Court's
252. 450 U.S. 248 (1978); see also supra notes 225-38 and accompanying text.
253. Further development of the Title VII analysis in Davis would have obliged the Court to
choose between the Griggs "effects" test and the Davis "intent" requirement at a much earlier
stage in the development of Title VII law. As suggested by the dissents in Davis, the choice would
not have been an easy one. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 256-70 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
254. Interestingly, the Court explicitly eschewed reliance on the traditional objective explanation
for burden allocations such as that the burden should be imposed on the party with the better
access to the information. Rather, it focused on the notion that as a policy matter, the burden
should be imposed on the basis of some a priori sense of the probability of wrongdoing. See Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1978). But see Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 369 n.53 (1977).
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decision in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust Co. 255 provided a
start for addressing some of the more obvious shortcomings of the mask.
Appropriately enough, the starting point was the elemental question of
when a party may properly invoke the various theories of Title VII that
had sprung up. This issue had become critical since the Court had
effectively carved out different causes of action under Title VII through
its dispositive use of burden allocation.
The Court faced the issue in the context of an individualized claim
by a black female employee that the denial to her of promotions by a
bank in which she had worked for an extended period of time were
made on the basis of race and gender discrimination.2 5 6 Having failed
both in her attempt to maintain the claim as a class action and to satisfy
the disparate treatment standards of McDonnell Douglas v. Green2 7 and
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,258 she argued to
the Court that she ought to be able to invoke the Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. 259 statistical disparity analysis to support her individual claim. The
lower courts rejected her position on the ground that the disparate impact
prima facie case's reliance on statistical evidence made sense only because
disparate impact theory was aimed at combatting the group-based effects
of the application of objective selection criteria such as standardized tests.
Because the plaintiff's claim of discrimination was based on subjective
considerations that were peculiarly individual in character-i.e., the recommendations 6 of supervisors-it had to be subjected to disparate treat2
ment analysis. 0
The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed. In ruling that disparate
impact analysis, with its concomitant emphasis on statistical disparities,
was not restricted to generic class claims such as those mounted under
challenges to objective or facially neutral evaluation criteria, it effectively
rendered meaningless the long-fought-for distinction between disparate
impact and disparate treatment. 26' Having agreed that disparate impact

255. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
256. Mrs. Watson's claims and history are reminiscent of those in Burdine, in which the Court
had attempted to rationalize the procedural structure for proving disparate treatment claims. See
supra notes 225-38 and accompanying text.
257. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also supra notes 107-29 and accompanying text.
258. 450 U.S. 248 (1978); see also supra notes 225-38 and accompanying text.
259. 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also supra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
260. Watson, 487 U.S. at 988. Although, as the Supreme Court's opinion points out, it had
never ruled on this question previously, the application of disparate treatment analysis to class
actions involving the use of "subjective" selection criteria (e.g., Hazelwood, Teamsters, and Furnco)
certainly provided a not insubstantial legal basis for the lower courts' rulings.
261. Id. at 1002 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Yet, the conclusion that a plaintiff making a claim of individualized discriminatory treatment
should be able to rely on statistical evidence of the disproportionate underrepresentation of her
group in the relevant economic activity hardly should be surprising. By prohibiting race or gender
as classificatory grounds in the employment arena, Congress, as a substantive matter, surely gave
an employee the right to demonstrate that the statute was being violated by pointing-at least as
an element of her claim-to the underrepresentation in the workforce of persons who share similar
attributes. That much is self-evident. The issue it poses is: how, and at what stage in the proceeding,
should such evidence come in? The Court's reliance on shifting burdens had resulted in the adoption
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analysis is applicable alike to subjective and objective selection criteria,
four members of the Court embarked on a redefinition of disparate
impact in a manner that rendered its reach no broader than that of
disparate treatment.26 2 Such a redefinition was perhaps overdue, because
with one exception, the narrowly antidiscriminatory vision of the Court
had been played out in the context of its analysis of disparate treatment.263
That reappraisal, which in Watson commanded only four votes, constituted the majority opinion in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.2
As already observed, the Court's formulation of the prima facie case
in Griggs and its immediate successors was always hypothetical.2 65 In each
instance, despite the assertion that statistical imbalances might in and of
themselves suffice to carry the burden, the cases confronted by the Court
invariably contained anecdotal and other evidence sufficient to indicate
discriminatory conduct by the employer. 26 In Wards Cove, the Court
declined to look to such background evidence of discriminatory conduct.
Rather, it insisted on strict proof of the existence of disparate impact
as it had been theoretically defined by prior court cases. This application
of the prima 2 facie
definition marked a departure, but one foreshadowed
67
by precedent.

The plaintiffs in Wards Cove, in making out their prima facie case,
relied on substantial disparities in the distribution of jobs readily correlatable along racial lines. These racial disparities corresponded to employment in high-paying "skilled noncannery" jobs, and much lowerpaying "nonskilled cannery jobs. ' ' 26 The Supreme Court found this
evidence insufficient to meet the plaintiff's prima facie case. While maintaining the doctrine that statistical disparities may in and of themselves
be sufficient to satisfy a plaintiff's burden, the Court insisted that the
focus should be not on the existence of statistical disparities, but rather

of a rigid formula that made the timing of the introduction of such evidence determinative of the
outcome of the case. Under disparate impact theory, such evidence alone-at least in theory-was
sufficient to shift the burden to the defendant. Under disparate treatment theory, such evidence,
whatever its significance, became relevant only as part of the plaintiff's pretext case. Clearly, nothing
in the wording of Title VII, nor any conceivable purpose that it was intended to serve, imposes
such an outcome-determinative consequence for the procedural rule. Rather, the outcome showed
the shortcomings of employing procedural rules to effectuate the Court's differing views as to the
substantive norms of Title VII.
262. Id. at 977-1000.
263. But see Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1983).
264. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
265. See discussion supra subpart (1).
266. Compare, however, the holding in Watson, in which the Court stated that:
[tihis Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that some facially neutral
employment practices may violate Title VII even in the absence of a demonstrated
discriminatory intent. We have not limited this principle to cases in which the
challenged practice served to perpetuate the effects of pre-Act intentional discrimination. Each of our subsequent decisions, however, like Griggs itself, involved
standardized employment tests or criteria.
Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977, 988 (1988).
267. See discussion supra subpart (2).
268. Buttressing the statistical evidence were such other indicia of differential treatment based on
race as segregated dining, sleeping, and meeting facilities. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 643, 648.
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on the relationship of the disparity to the particular employer's conduct. 26 9
This relationship took the form of requiring the plaintiff to establish:
(1) the specific practice by the employer that is responsible for the
statistical disparity; (2) the relevant pools from which the employer draws
its work force; (3) the availability of qualified members of the plaintiff's
group in the relevant pool; (4) the existence of some actual barrier to
the ability of members of the plaintiff's group to move from the relevant
pool into the employer's work-force;
and (5) the employer's responsibility
20
for the existence of the barrier.
The Court characterized the first element of the plaintiff's prima facie
burden as that of causation. Picking up on Justice O'Connor's plurality
opinion in Watson, the Court held that a plaintiff does not make out
a prima facie case simply by showing racial imbalance in the employer's
work force. Rather, the plaintiff must "demonstrate" that it is the
application of a "specific or particular
employment practice" that has
27
created the statistical imbalance. 1
Wards Cove did not confine itself to the old practice of engaging in
formulaic incantations and of forestalling criticism by clothing decisions
in the garb of procedure. Rather, while relying on the plurality's opinion
in Watson, the Court explicitly articulated its broader substantive concerns,
and urged acceptance of its procedural approach as a means of dealing
with those concerns.
Thus, the explanation given for the Court's insistence that unless the
particular challenged practice is shown to be responsible for the significant

269. Moreover, the relevant conduct must be narrowly focused to determine whether it is responsible
for the statistical disparity. Other evidence of improper conduct, such as segregated social facilities,
are irrelevant to the question of economic discrimination in employment.
270. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 651-52 ("If the absence of minorities holding such skilled
positions is due to a dearth of qualified nonwhite applicants (for reasons that are not petitioners'
fault), petitioners' selection methods or employment practices cannot be said to have had a 'disparate
impact' on nonwhites.").
The net effect of these requirements is to equate the disparate impact theory to a search for
culpable conduct by the defendant; a purpose in direct derogation of the purpose hitherto advanced
for disparate impact analysis. Indeed, it was on the distinction between the inquiry into the "effects"
of "unintended discrimination," and that of "intentional discrimination" that the classic line dividing
"disparate impact" from "disparate treatment" had been drawn. See Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977); Watson, 487 U.S. at 1000-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
271. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657. On its face, the requirement is not new. Prior cases had
assumed that the plaintiff would point to practices that she claimed to be responsible for the
disparate impact. See, e.g:, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (use of high school
diplomas and intelligence tests); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (same); Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (refusal to take applications at the gates). Indeed,
even the dissent in Furnco appeared to accept the proposition. See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 581 (Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The more substantial burden implicated by this requirement lies in the failure of the opinion to
elucidate the contours of plaintiff's duty-e.g., the meaning of "demonstrate," or the degree of
particularity required in identifying the complained-of employment practice. The insistence that the
plaintiff "demonstrate," not "plead" or "articulate," the particular employment practice suggests
a more substantial burden than that imposed on the defendant. That, at any rate, appears to be
Congress's reading, as illustrated by its definition of "demonstrate" in the Civil Rights Act of 1991
as meaning both the "burden of production and of persuasion." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (1992).
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statistical disparity, the plaintiff's prima facie case fails, is not simply
that of being bound by prior precedents. Nor does the Court find support
for its views by harkening to the nuances of the proper interpretation
of procedure. Rather, it straightforwardly advances substantive grounds
for its approach. As the Court states, "[tlo hold otherwise would result
in employers being potentially liable for 'the myriad of innocent causes
that may lead to statistical imbalances in the composition of their work

forces'. '272
Similarly, the Court characterized as insufficient the plaintiff's allegation
that the statistical imbalance grew out of such hiring practices as nepotism
and lack of promotion from within the existing work force. 7 The Court
demanded not simply that the plaintiff show some link between the
attacked employment practice and the statistical imbalance, but that the
employment practice itself be illegitimate. In short, the Court viewed
statistical imbalance as lacking independent force, and as useful only to
strengthen a case of differential treatment already made out on the basis
of an employer's use of illegitimate selection criteria.274 So understood,
Wards Cove is no different from cases such as Burdine or Washington
v. Davis, 275 which require the plaintiff to demonstrate overt racial animus
by the defendant as a prerequisite for obtaining relief. Wards Cove was
simply more explicit in stating the substantive underpinning of the requirement.
In one sense, however, the Court's departure from the use of statistical
evidence was quite radical. Prior decisions considered the probative value
of statistical disparity offered in support of a prima facie case as hinging
on the extent to which the dearth of minorities in the workforce contrasted
with the availability of a pool of qualified minority applicants. 6 In
Wards Cove, however, the Court did not limit its rejection of the proffered
statistical evidence to this ground. Rather, the opinion appeared to reject
2 77
as a matter of law any use of an "intra-firm" labor market comparison.

272. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657 (quoting Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S.

977, 992 (1988)).
This is not to argue, of course, that the Court's substantive analysis is correct. Indeed, I think
the contrary more likely the case. For example, it is not evident why the presumption, going into
litigation, should be that racially unbalanced work forces are more likely the result of "innocent"
employment practices than the reverse. The Court certainly provides no particular support for this
belief, other than its own intuition.
273. See, e.g., id. at 647; id. at 677 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
274. Similarly, in requiring that a plaintiff identify the relevant labor markets at issue-the
relationship of the pool in which discrimination is claimed to exist to the pool from which eligible
employees could be drawn-the Court was not, at least on its face, treading new ground, or imposing
some new requirement on the plaintiff. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299
(1977); New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); cf. Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
275. 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also supra notes 169-83 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568 (1979); Teamsters v. United States; 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
277. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 651; cf. id. at 661 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting); id. at 662 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Compare Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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The Court explained this rejection not in terms of the traditional concern
for substantive procedural fairness-an institutional objection to punishing
a defendant for a state of affairs beyond its control-but primarily in
terms of the cost to nonminorities and the litigation cost to the defendant. 278 Specifically, the Court expressed concern that accepting intracompany statistical disparity as the relevant comparison would result in
''any employer who had a segment of his work force that was-for some
reason-racially imbalanced [being] haled into court and forced to engage
in the expensive and time-consuming task of defending the 'business
necessity' of the methods used to select the other members of his work
force.' '279 According to the Court, the resulting burden on the defendant
would be so great that the employer would have no choice but to "adopt
Court's view, Congress has mandated
racial quotas," an evil that, in2 the
0
should be avoided at all

cost.

In the long-run, of more significance than the definition of the relevant
market for statistical comparison purposes may be the Court's unwillingness to adhere to the often asserted claim that statistics alone may
be sufficient to meet the prima facie burden. The Court's opinion in
Wards Cove strongly suggests that, whatever the rhetoric, statistical evidence alone is unlikely to be found sufficient as the basis for corrective
action. Rather, "[a]s long as there are no barriers or practices deterring
qualified nonwhites from applying for noncannery positions, . . . the
employer's selection mechanism probably does not operate with a disparate
impact on minorities." 281 This statement effectively capsulizes the central

278. The Court could have rejected the intra-firm comparison in Wards Cove on the ground that
minority group over-representation in the nonskilled jobs and under-representation in the skilled
jobs was not probative of discrimination because employees were not drawn from the same pool
of applicants. It did not limit itself to this sort of internally consistent argument, but looked further
to the substantive social and economic impact and concerns of accepting the intra-firm comparison.
279. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 652. This argument has relevance, of course, only if the defendant's
rebuttal burden extends beyond the mere articulation of the reason for the statistical disparity.
280. See id. at 652 (citing 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(j)). Of course, this argument would make sense
if the defendant's rebuttal evidence was a meaningless formality; that is, if defendants never
successfully discharged this burden or, alternatively, if the cost of discharging the burden-such as
that incurred in conducting and using a validation exercise-always exceeded the economic cost of
employing unqualified minority group members. Neither the Court's prior precedents nor economic
logic supports either alternative. In short, the Court's claim must be seen simply as overly exaggerated;
a parade of horribles unlikely to be realized.
281. Id. at 653. Like the other two elements of the prima facie burden advanced in Wards Cove,
it is unclear why these elements should be discharged by the plaintiff. The Court's explanation lies
in its assumption that if the burdens are imposed on the defendant, rather than discharging them,
the defendant would simply "hire by the numbers." The Court does not explain why hiring by
numbers would be the logical step, nor does it provide extrinsic evidence that this has been the
case. Intrinsic in the Court's response, however, is the assumption that the cost of discharging these
burdens exceeds the cost of hiring by numbers. This suggests either that the cost of discharging
the burden is exceptionally high, or that the cost of hiring by the numbers is low. If the former,
the Court's choice of placing the burden on the plaintiff is a clear statement that it prefers the
status quo. For, if the cost of discharging the burden is truly high, it is unlikely that the plaintiff
is in any better position to incur that cost than is the defendant. This claim is not vitiated by the
Court's assertion that the plaintiff's burden is lessened by her ability to obtain relevant information
under the discovery rules of federal trial courts. The defendant enjoys the same access rights, and
indeed is itself in possession of much of the relevant evidence.
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shift of antidiscrimination doctrine from concern over the symbolism of
a racially stratified society to concerns over the economic costs of reducing
the stratification. The Court framed this latter concern by arguing that
to focus on statistical disparities, rather than on culpable conduct, would
mean that defendants would hire by the numbers. The underlying assumption-that the cost to the defendant of hiring by the numbers may
well be lower than the cost of employing legally valid selection yardsticksironically echoes the judicial skepticism that characterized the imposition
of the rebuttal burden on the defendant in the early 1970s. As previously
demonstrated, that skepticism reflected judicial discounting, based on
in Title VII cases, of the economic validity of prevalent
anecdotal evidence
282

selection criteria.

The Court's unwillingness to prescribe a precise statistical model is

thus not surprising. As in the 1970s, reference to statistics served an
essentially rhetorical role: that of seeming to provide orderly neutrality
to an essentially political and necessarily value-oriented adjudication.
B.

Affirmative Action and Burdens of Proof

The Court's harnessing of the burdens of proof framework in cases
challenging "voluntary

' 28

affirmative action programs provides illumi-

nating corroboration for the arguments made in part A. This part examines
the Court's treatment of burden allocation and the relevance of statistics

to that burden in two contexts. First, there is an examination of burden
allocation in cases alleging reverse discrimination under Title VII. Second,
there is a brief exploration of the application of the doctrine to equal
protection claims brought against local governments. Examination of this

latter situation makes vivid the relationship of burden allocation and
substantive norms.

282. The prevalence of set-asides by government procurement bodies reinforced this conclusion.
See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 489 U.S. 469 (1989). Both submissions to the Court
and newspaper reports indicated that over 200 local authorities, and perhaps an even greater number
of private entities, had such programs in effect in 1989. See e.g., Brief of the National League of
Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, National Association of Counties, and International City Management Association As Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant No. 87-998 (Jan. 15, 1989); Joel
Kurtzman, Prospects; Affirmative Action's Future, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1989, § 3, at 1.
283. Challenges to court ordered affirmative action programs present a set of analytically separate
issues. Rarely do these cases question the defendant's liability-and, therefore, obligation-to provide
relief, but ordinarily challenge the appropriateness or scope of the ordered relief. See, e.g., Sheet
Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
While challenges to affirmative actions promulgated pursuant to judicially approved "consent
decrees" present thorny problems, especially since such stipulations are usually entered into prior
to trial, the analytical construct for their evaluation on review share many of the characteristics of
voluntary affirmative action programs. The inquiry would simply have to be hypothetical: could
the plaintiff have provided sufficient statistical (or other) evidence to discharge the prima facie
burden? If so, could the defendant have effectively rebutted the evidence? Could the fact-finder
have found the rebuttal to be pretextual? See Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); Firefighters
v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); cf. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); see
also Marshall J. Walthew, Comment, Affirmative Action And The Remedial Scope of Title VII:
ProceduralAnswers to Substantive Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (1987).
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In United Steelworkers v. Weber,2 the Court's first affirmative action
case under Title VII, the Court disposed of the white plaintiff's claim
of reverse discrimination without any reference to the burden allocation
framework that had grown up in the context of Title VII challenges by
blacks. 2 5 Rather, as in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,186 the Court focused
first on the factual setting of the litigation, and second on the substantive
implications for American society of a literal reading of the statute.
Statistical disparities supplied much of the factual context of the case.
Weber, a white male, challenged under Title VII a "master labor collective
bargaining" agreement between his union and his employer. The agreement
contained a hiring goal for black craft workers for each of the employer's
plants equal to the "percentage of blacks in the local labor force" for
the area in which the plant was sited. "To enable plants to meet these
goals, on-the-job training programs were established to teach unskilled
production workers-black and white-the skills necessary to become
of the openings
craftworkers. The plan reserved for black employees 250076
7
in these newly created in-plant training programs.

In rejecting the challenge to the fifty percent set-aside, the Court took
notice of the following. Prior to the collective agreement, Kaiser, the
employer, employed only craft workers with experience in the field. Prior
to 1974 only 1.8300 (5 out of 273) of the skilled craftworkers at the
Kaiser plant in question were black, even though the work force in the
area was approximately 390o black. The Court further noted that there
was a long history of the exclusion of blacks from craft unions nationally,
an exclusion that it observed was not unrelated to the inability of black
workers to satisfy Kaiser's pre-1974 hiring requirements.2 8
The Court thus recognized four plausibly relevant sets of statistics
against which black participation could be evaluated: unionized employees
at Kaiser; craftworkers at the local Kaiser plant; craftworkers nationally;
and the composition of the local general workforce. The Court made
no attempt, however, to distinguish among these various categories to
determine the relevant market. 219 Consistent with the spirit that animated
Griggs, the Court's focus was on the collective portrait presented by the
statistics. Taken together, the picture was one of significant societal
disparities. The relevance of these disparities could not be contained in

284. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
285. The Court did so even though it observed that its prior precedent made it clear that whites,
no less than blacks, can sue under Title VII. Id. at 200-01 (citing McDonald v. Same Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 281 n.8 (1977)).
286. 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also supra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
287. Weber, 443 U.S. at 198.
288. Id. at 198-99.
289. Thus, the Court's analysis did not go off on whether the 50% set-aside would be permissible
if applied to the training program, but whether it would be impermissible if used to recruit craft
workers. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Court also did not address whether
the statistical imbalance relied on by the union and Kaiser was relevant since it compared the
absence of black representation in a skilled craft with black representation in the general workforce. Cf. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
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narrowly drawn confines such as that between unskilled and skilled craft
jobs. These disparities instead spoke to and reflected the broader issue
of black participation in the economy. What the figures said about the
particular conduct of the particular defendant was, at most, instructional.
The Court was explicit in explaining that its methodology derived from
a conception of law broader than simple adherence to precedent or literal
translation of statutory wordings. Conceding that both gave force to the
plaintiff's arguments, 290 the Court nonetheless rejected his claim for relief. 91
The dominant concern of Title VII, the Court pointed out, was "with
the plight of the Negro in our economy.12

92

That plight was evinced by

national statistics not unfamiliar to a contemporary ear. Black unemployment rates in 1964 were high (and had been getting higher) vis-avis those of whites. Blacks were disproportionately employed in unskilled
and semi-skilled jobs. Such jobs were quickly becoming extinct in a world
of rapidly increasing technological automation. One way to deal with the
social consequences of the resulting disproportionate disadvantaging of
blacks was to assure their integration into the mainstream of the national
economy .293
These were continuing threats in 1979, as they are today, and voluntary
affirmative action was a means not inconsistent with Title VII for addressing them. As the Court said:
[ilt would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern
over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of
those who had 'been excluded from the American dream for so long'
. ..constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private,
to abolish traditional patterns of racial segrerace-conscious efforts 294
gation and hierarchy.

Thus, Weber actualized an analytical approach that Griggs had hypothesized. It relied on the animating vision of Title VII as an effort
to create a society in which the economic place of any particular individual
drawn at random could not, with a high degree of certainty, be told on
the basis of the individual's race. It eschewed reliance on statistics that
were unrelated to this dominant concern. Most straightforwardly, it did
not invoke the procedural device of the allocation and definition of
burdens of proof as a mechanistic ritual to avoid the need for a direct
confrontation with the inadequacy of language alone to transcend timebound compromises and contemporary disagreements. In retrospect, one
finds it remarkable that this contextual approach to the interpretation
of Title VII was taking place at a time when the Court had fully embraced
the use of ritualistic formulae to clothe its decisions in Title VII suits

290. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201.
291. It invoked the maxim that "[ilt is a 'familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter
of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention
of its makers,"' Id. (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
292. Id.
293. Id.at 202-03.
294. Id. at 204.

Winter 1 993]

DELINKING DISPROPORTIONALITY

FROM DISCRIMINATION

by black plaintiffs. It was perhaps inevitable that, as the schism over
affirmative action grew wider in society at large in the 1980's, the Court
would call on the mask of process on which it had relied to minimize
judicial dissention in claims by blacks and other direct discrimination
was the case in Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa
cases. 29This
5
Clara.
Johnson arose out of a challenge by a white male to an affirmative
action program by a local government body which resulted in a white
female with a somewhat lower evaluation score than the plaintiff being
promoted over the plaintiff. 29 In dealing with the Title VII claim, the
Court invoked the now familiar formulaic incantation of burden allocation. 297 As a preliminary matter, the Court asserted (despite the entirely
statistical grounding of the defense) that the approach fitted "readily
within the analytical framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas v.
Green. ' 298 According to the Court, under this approach the prima facie
case is satisfied by the plaintiff showing that "race or sex has been taken
into account.''2 99 The burden then shifts to the defendant "to articulate
a nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision." This burden may be
effectively discharged by reference to the affirmative action plan. The
Court held that "[ijf such a plan is articulated as the basis for the
employer's decision, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the
employer's justification is pretextual and the plan is invalid." 3 °°
Thus, at least until the pretext stage, the allocation of the burdens of
proof appears to be entirely pro forma-amounting to no more than an
invitation to recite in sequence a set of pre-programmed chants. In an
affirmative action setting, the plaintiff will invariably be able to show
that the employer's decision was tainted by considerations of race or
gender. Similarly, the employer's rebuttal burden appears to be no more
than the simple statement of the existence of an affirmative action
program. 30° It is only at the pretext stage that any meaningful burden
is imposed on the parties. Although the burden is nominally on the
plaintiff-required as she is to prove the invalidity of the affirmative
action program-the standard as defined in Johnson amounts to a judicial
inquiry into available statistical evidence without regard to the source of
such evidence; that is, it is of little or no consequence that the evidence

295. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
296. Id. at 620-26. For some inexplicable reason, the claim was prosecuted solely under Title VII
rather than in conjunction with an equal protection claim. Id. at 620 n.2.
297. The plaintiff's ultimate burden of proving the invalidity of an affirmative action plan could
be discharged by (1) the plaintiff satisfying the prima facie case, and thereby (2) shifting the rebuttal
burden to the defendant, which, if successfully met, (3) shifts the burden back to the plaintiff to
show that the rebuttal by the defendant was merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 620.
298. Id. at 626.
299. Id. In an affirmative action case, this is always bound to be the situation.
300. Id.
301. While the Court observed that, as a practical matter, an employer is likely to advance
evidence to support the appropriateness of the affirmative action program, the Court also made it
clear that the employer has no burden to do so. Specifically, the Court rejected the argument that
the employer's rebuttal burden should take the form of an affirmative defense. Id. at 626-27.
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is provided by the plaintiff or the defendent. Indeed, chances are that
it is the defendant who is more likely to provide the relevant statistics.
To understand Johnson, one has to reach behind the legal formula
and examine the evidence adduced in the case .30° That examination discloses that the use of burdens of proof in and of itself sheds very little
light on the Court's legal analysis. The recitation of the formula amounted
to little more than a ritualized incantation with no bearing on the definition
of the obligations of the parties. Thus, the Court's endorsement of Santa
Clara's affirmative action program did not depend on the definition of
the prima facie case. The Court could just as easily have reached its
conclusion, as it did in Weber, by a straightforward evaluation on their
merits of the facts before it, without the mediation of the allocation of

evidentiary burdens .301

As justification for affirmative action programs, statistical disparities
are significant. Their importance, however, does not lie in the mathematical precision with which they can be correlated to cause and effect,
but to the portrait of society that they paint. Thus, in explaining the
significance of the statistical imbalances found in Santa Clara's work
force, the Court, although acknowledging that some of its prior decisions
required that comparisons be made in relevant labor markets,"" paid little
attention to such specificity of details. In evaluating the plaintiff's claim
of discrimination in the failure to promote him to a road dispatcher
position, the Santa Clara Court did not limit itself to consideration of
statistical imbalance in this discrete labor market even though the statistical
imbalance there was glaring. 05 The Court instead presented and discussed
the issue in terms of statistical evidence justifying Santa Clara's promulgation of an affirmative action plan.s°6 Such evidence was relevant
because, as Santa Clara argued and the Court agreed, the under-representation of women in the skilled positions reflected a societal tradition
of excluding them from such positions and, given such limited oppor-

302. Cf. id. at 657 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
303. Although not explicitly stating this point, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Johnson is an
illustration of the point.
304. See 480 U.S. at 631-32; see also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (to determine existence of statistical imbalance in
unskilled and semiskilled job positions, the appropriate comparison is the percentage of women or
minorities in the employer's work force with their percentage in the area work force or general
population); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (where the job at issue
requires training, the appropriate comparison should be the composition of women or minorities
in the employer's service with their counterparts in the workforce who possess the relevant qualifications).
305. Of the 238 persons employed in that position, only one (whose promotion caused the lawsuit)
was female. See Santa Clara, 480 U.S. at 621-22.
306. Such relevant statistics included the following: while making up 36.4% of the Santa Clara
area labor force, women constituted 22.4% of the county's Department of Transportation work
force; and the women working for the agency were concentrated in "EEOC job categories traditionally
held by women." Id. at 621. For example, they made up 76% of clerical and office workers, but
only 7.1%0 of agency officials and administrators, 8.6% of professionals, 9.7% of techniciarls, and
220 of service and maintenance workers. Id.
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lack of motivation for them to seek employment
tunities, a consequent
30 7
in the skilled fields.

Finally, while the Court was willing to take advantage of the empty
formalism of burden allocation by asserting that the case could be analyzed
within the framework of McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green,30 it was
explicit in stating the quite different substantive concerns embodied in
review of challenges to affirmative action programs. As it pointed out,
those differing concerns must be reflected in the conduct of the relevant
statistical analysis. 0 9 In the Court's view, statistical disparity sufficient
to demonstrate manifest imbalance in an employer's work force need not
be as profound as statistical disparity necessary to make out a prima
facie case. The Court explained the distinction between these analytical
approaches by emphasizing Congress' intent to310encourage voluntary efforts
to rectify the effects of past discrimination.
Examination of the role of burden allocation in the articulation of
changing views on the relationship of disparities to the appropriate structure of the community would be incomplete without reference to the
Court's decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co..31 Categorized
as an equal protection case, the decision is significant because it illustrates
the flexible use of concepts and theories in the service of substantive
objectives. In holding that state and local government affirmative action
programs when challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment must pass "strict judicial scrutiny" (thereby calling into question what had become the dominant approach to increasing
black participation in the economy), 312 the Court employed the wellworn

307. Id. This is, of course, a telling criticism of cases such as Hazelwood and Wards Cove,
which narrowly define the relevant labor market to encompass only those with the qualified skills.
308. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Santa Clara, 480 U.S. at 626.
309. Santa Clara, 480 U.S. at 632-33.
310. Id. at 628 n.7.
311. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Few other recent decisions of the Supreme Court have generated as much controversy. Illustrative
of the controversy are the exchanges among scholars in the pages of the Yale Law Journal. See
Judith C. Areen et al., Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711 (1989); Charles Fried, Affirmative Action After
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.: A Response to the Scholars' Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155
(1989); Judith C. Areen et al., Scholars' Reply to Professor Fried, 99 YALE L.J. 163 (1989). Despite
these erudite comments, the case actually broke little new doctrinal ground. Aside from its practical
effects, the decision is worth noting primarily because it confirmed the ascendancy of a conservative
majority on the Court that was more willing to take on directly the substantive distributional issues
raised by affirmative action policies, and to reject the world view that enshrined such policies as
necessary for contemporary American society.
312. There were, for example, well over 200 such programs extant in 1989, including 36 state
programs. See Brief of the National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, National
Association of Counties, and International City Management Association As Amici Curiae in Support
of Appellant (Jan. 15, 1988); Lauren Schenone, New Efforts Made to Help Minority Firms, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 1991, § 12, at 1.
The effect of the Croson decision was to force local communities either to abandon such programs,
see, e.g., Ohio Contractors Association v. City of Columbus, 733 F. Supp. 1156 (S.D. Oh. 1990),
seek to envelope them in parallel federal programs, see, e.g., Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v.
Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1990), or commission backward-looking studies at significant cost
on the basis of which new programs were then enacted, see, e.g., Coral Constr. Co., v. King
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framework of burden allocation.313 However, the Court, in a now equally
familiar step, applied to the defendant's discharge of this burden not
the articulation standard of McDonnell Douglas v. Green that was suggested in Johnson, but a standard more akin to that imposed on the
plaintiff's prima facie case in Hazelwood School District v. United States.3" 4
The Court considered insufficient to discharge this burden the showing
that over a five-year period only 0.670 of contracts awarded by the
City of Richmond went to blacks, despite the fact that blacks made up
fifty percent of the population of the city during that period. Similarly,
the inclusion of other evidence of disparities, such as the substantial
underrepresentation of blacks in trade associations," 5 or ownership of
construction companies,31' 6 added little to the discharge of the burden.
Such data were simply inapposite because they did not demonstrate past
wrongdoing by the city. Moreover, said the Court, where culpable conduct
could be demonstrated, sufficient evidence of direct linkage between cause
and effect was lacking." 7 Appropriate procedure, the Court held, de-

County, 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991). The fate of these new generation statutes is very much open
to doubt. In some cases, the doctrines of standing or mootness have been ingenuously employed
to avoid an outright determination of the issue. See, e.g., Northeastern Florida Chapter of the
Ass'n of Gen. Contr. of America v. City of Jacksonville, 951 F.2d 1217 (lth Cir. 1992); Cone
Corp. v. Florida Dept. of Transportation, 921 F.2d 1190 (11th Cir. 1991); Maryland Highways
Contractors Ass'n v. State of Maryland, 933 F.2d 1246 (4th Cir. 1991); Contractors Ass'n of Eastern
Pennsylvania, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 1260 (3rd Cir. 1991). In other cases, courts
have struck down the statutes, or expressed strong reservations as to their constitutionality. See,
e.g., O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Associated
General Contractors of Connecticut v. City of New Haven, 791 F. Supp. 941 (D. Conn. 1992);
Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pennsylvania v. City of Philadelphia, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18298
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 1991).
313. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-95; id. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 520 (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgement). Strict scrutiny imposes on the defendant the duty to demonstrate
that its affirmative action policy serves a compelling state interest. To meet this burden, a defendant
is required to show that the policy is intended to correct the lingering effects of past discrimination
attributable to the defendant's past conduct or acquiescence, and that the policy is narrowly tailored
to achieve this limited purpose. Statistical evidence may be probative in the discharge of both prongs
of the burden. In the former case, statistical disparities must be shown to be the result of prior
discriminatory conduct by the defendant. In the latter situation, the reduction of statistical disparities
must proceed at no greater pace than that permitted by the existence of "available qualified"
members of the victim class within the jurisdiction of the defendant. The burden of demonstrating
such availability apparently falls on the defendant.
314. 433 U.S. 299 (1977). The rigor with which this standard was applied to the City of Richmond,
as a defendant, contrasts sharply with the burden imposed on the defendants in Davis, Hazelwood
and Furnco, and may be compared to the burden imposed on the plaintiffs in Hazelwood and
Beazer. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-506.
315. For example, of the 600 members of the local construction trade association, only two were
black. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 480.
316. National data indicated that minorities owned 4.7% of construction firms nationwide. See
id. at 481.
317. A history of past discrimination in such areas as the exercise of one's voting rights or access
to educational opportunities-even though ordinarily their effective (as distinct from theoretical)
regulation fall within the purview of the local government-could not thus be employed to discharge
the defendant's burden. It appears that since such discriminatory conduct had been pervasive, only
a direct (rather than inferential) showing of causal link between the local community's past conduct
and current underrepresentation of blacks would suffice. See id. at 505. As in Wards Cove, it
takes a good amount of suspension of rationality to argue that the standard is not tantamount to
a requirement of the showing of "intentional discrimination" in the field being sued on.

Winter 1993]

DELINKING DISPROPORTIONALITY FROM DISCRIMINATION

153

manded fractionating the inquiry and insisting that each element of the
test be satisfied as a prerequisite to establishing a violation, even where
an aggregate examination might have suggested the existence of such a
violation.38
While the result of the Croson Court's approach is undoubtedly the
reverse of that employed by the Court in Griggs, the procedure was like
Griggs in that it embodied a substantive vision of what disparities say
about the structure of society, both as a consequence of past conduct
and its acceptability in the future. The operating assumption, far from
questioning the neutral consequences of traditional selection criteria, accepted even clearly subjective selection practices 1 9 and insisted that those
who claimed that disparities were the result of discrimination prove it.320
Similarly, looking to the future, the society envisaged by the Court is
one in which the concept of color-blindness operates solely in the symbolic
environment of process, not in the substantive structure of the society.
Under that vision, disparities that correlate along racial lines are not the
evils of primary concern; rather, it is the asymmetrical use of process
that must be avoided.
In Croson, then, as in Johnson, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,3 2l
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,3 22 and Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody,3 23 burden allocation is a tool called on after the fact to lend a
sense of detached objectivity and procedural regularity to an outcome
otherwise determined by substantive concerns. This function of the use
of burden allocation directs the examination, in the next part, of congressional efforts to reverse the Court's recent decisions, and in particular
Wards Cove.
III.

THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

The proper distribution and statement of the elements of the burden
of proof were issues of central focus in the discussion and passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("Act"). 24 With the purpose of codifying
necessity and job related concepts of Griggs v. Duke Power
the 3business
Co. 25 and other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing

318. See Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond, 87 MIcH. L. Rv. 1729 (1989).
319. Thus, in Croson, the Court paid scant attention to the significant role played by "old boy
networks" in determining the availability of subcontracting opportunities, despite ample evidence
on the record. See generally City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). The
Court suggests such evidence would be relevant only if the City of Richmond could demonstrate
that it had acquiesced in the discriminatory use of such subjective criteria.
320. See, e.g., id. at 507-08 (arguing that it is irrational to presume mathematical relationship
of a group in the population and its representation in an occupation).
321. 490 U.S. 642 (1989); see also supra notes 264-82 and accompanying text.
322. 438 U.S. 567 (1978); see also supra notes 206-22 and accompanying text.
323. 422 U.S. 405 (1975); see also supra notes 130-43 and accompanying text.
324. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1992).
325. 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also supra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
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Co. v. Atonio, 326 the Act, following two years of highly acrimonious
debate and a presidential veto, settled on the following framework.
Disparate impact is established only when a plaintiff demonstrates that
the defendant uses a "particular employment practice that causes disparate
impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,"
and the defendant "fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is
job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity. 3 27 Although tautological in formulation, the provision appears
to envisage a two, rather than three, tier framework. At one level the
plaintiff pleads, produces evidence, and persuades the trier of fact by
the preponderance of such evidence of the existence of a causal link
between some particularized employment practice and the disproportional
representation of her group in the employer's work-force. At the other
level, the employer fails to demonstrate - by producing evidence and
persuading the trier of fact through the preponderance of such evidence
- that the employment practice is job-related and justified by business
necessity.
This formula makes explicit three declarations. First, the plaintiff and
the defendant carry alike the burden of demonstrating the elements of
their respective claims or defenses. Second, the plaintiff is required to
produce evidence and persuade the trier of fact of the existence of a
particular employment practice, the underrepresentation of members of
her group in the work-force, and a causal link between the two sets of
affairs. Third, the defendant has the burden of producing evidence and
of persuading the trier of fact that the employment practice was jobrelated "for the position in question" and required by business necessity.
In other words, this framework suggests that successful litigation of a
disparate impact claim under the Act should not depend on a party's
ability to meet the "intermediate" allocation of the burdens, but should
proceed along the line of a plaintiff satisfying the ultimate burden without
reference to the prima facie case. Meanwhile, the defendant is required
to discharge the burden of pleading and proving an affirmative defense.
Because much of the disagreement on the Supreme Court has centered
on the dispositive consequences to be assigned the placement and satisfaction of the intermediate burdens, legislative silence as to the availability, if any, of interim allocational burdens within this framework does
little to provide the Act's claimed "guidelines." Does any element of
the defendant's burden come into play before the plaintiff has persuaded
the trier of fact of all of the three elements of her burden?
The answer to the question is far from clear in part because the Act
defines the word "demonstrate" to mean both the burden of production

326. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
327. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (emphasis added). The legislation provides an alternative
formula for disparate impact: the complaining party demonstrates "in accordance with the law as
it existed on June 4, 1989," an alternative employment practice, and the defendant refuses to adopt
such alternative employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(C). This is apparently the codification
of the alternative statement of the pretext burden in Albemarle Paper as an independent basis for
possible liability under the disparate impact theory.
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and of persuasion. A logical, although by no means exclusive, reading
of the allocation of burdens would be that the plaintiff must meet all
of her burdens before the defendant should be required to introduce any
evidence to rebut the plaintiff's claim. If such is the nature of the
plaintiff's burden, one may fairly question the precedential value of prior
uses of statistical evidence. Further, this reading would be in derogation
of the asserted findings of Congress that made the Act necessary; namely,
the need to reverse the burden allocation formula of Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio,3 28 and to grant additional protection against unlawful
discrimination in the workplace. 2 9
If, on the other hand, one reads the statute as not altering burden
allocation at the intermediate level (or the sufficiency of evidence required
to satisfy such burdens) and as only affecting substantive law definitions
such as what constitutes "disparate impact," "job-relatedness," and
"business necessity," then the efficacy of the Act is equally called into
question. As demonstrated in part II, the definition of the "intermediate"
allocation of burdens of proof was an integral aspect of the statement
of the Court's substantive vision of the role of Title VII in contemporary
society. Thus, although clothed in procedural garb, the definition of
discrimination on the basis of disparate impact and how it can be proved
was at the core of the Court's manipulation of substantive law. Disparate
impact in Griggs, as interpreted by Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,330
directly addressed the Court's dissatisfaction with the underrepresentation
of members of a protected group in treasured positions and their overrepresentation in low-paying jobs. By contrast, from Washington v.
Davis3 ' to Wards Cove, the Court sought to move the theory of disparate
impact away from its anchor in statistical representation to one of causation, requiring the plaintiff not only. to establish statistical disparity
but to demonstrate the responsibility of the employer for that disparity.
Amendments of Title VII that leave unaddressed the allocation of burdens
in that it would have failed
of proof at that level would be incomplete
32
to challenge that substantive vision.1

328. 490 U.S. 642 (1989); see also supra notes 264-82 and accompanying text.
329. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
330. 422 U.S. 405 (1975); see also supra notes 130-43 and accompanying text.
331. 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also supra notes 169-83 and accompanying text.
332. Because of the tautological definition of disparate impact in the 1991 Act, it may readily
be construed as straddling both substantive definitions of discrimination embodied in the Supreme
Court opinions. Disparate impact is used to refer both to disproportionality of representation, and
to the establishment of a causal link between the disparity and an unjustified employment practice.
Rather than choosing between these contending approaches, the legislation, in what surely will prove
to be a futile effort, provides for the marriage of both. It is true that the Act, unlike Wards Cove,
requires the plaintiff to prove no more than a causal link between a particular employment practice
and the underrepresentation of her group in the workforce, but it says absolutely nothing about
how such a link might be established. For example, it is not clear whether a plaintiff who produces
evidence of disparity in skilled positions within her place of employment would have successfully
met the statutory definition of "disparate impact," by identifying as the cause her employer's
practice of hiring from outside the firm rather than from among the abundant unskilled female
employees of which she is one. Does the Act's requirement that she "demonstrate" (that is, persuade)
the trier of fact of the causal link require more? If more is required, what is it, and how different
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Much of the polarization of the debate surrounding passage of the
1991 Act-particularly following the successful veto of the earlier 1990
version of the Bill-centered on the meaning of the defense of "job
relatedness" and "business necessity." That debate revolved around the
effect of the Wards Cove decision's requirement that the plaintiff, as
part of her prima facie case, show both that the cause of an imbalance
in an employer's workforce was the use of a particular selection criterion
and that such a selection criterion was illegitimate. Those who sought
the overrule of Wards Cove contended that the cumulative effect of this
aspect of the decision was to place on the plaintiff, contrary to earlier
Supreme Court precedents, the burden of proving job-relatedness and
business necessity. It placed the burden of proving job-relatedness on the
plaintiff because it required her to identify specific practices injurious to
her selection. It placed on her the burden of proving business necessity
by virtue of the fact that she was required to prove that the practice
thus identified was itself illegitimate. This last burden was seen to be
particularly onerous because it approximated in practice, if not in rhetoric,
proving intentional discrimination)"
Opponents of legislative action, while never directly challenging the
concept of disparate impact as a statistically-based analytical tool, contended that any other allocation rule would result in employers, deterred
by the economic cost of justifying their employment practices, hiring
instead by the numbers. For them, the terms "job related" and "business
necessity" simply required that the plaintiff, having proved her case, shift
a nominal duty to the defendant to justify the challenged selection practice
by showing the relevance of the practice to the position or job, or by
the particular job, the practice was
showing that even if unrelated to 334
compelled by "business necessity.
By providing that the job-related defense is to be measured in terms
of the "position in question," it would appear that Congress intended
an overruling of the Davis and Wards Cove standard, which endorsed
a much broader definition of job-relatedness.33 5 This overruling, however,
should not lead one to conclude that, as a substantive matter, proponents

is it from the requirement that the defendant produce evidence of "job-relatedness," or "business
necessity?" Thus, in the absence of the use of intermediate burden allocation, and applying the
Act's definition of "demonstrate," getting to the "job related" and "business necessity" defenses
may be mere surplusage because the plaintiff is likely to lose the case before the burden gets shifted
to the defendant.
It might be argued that Congress surely did not intend to put so heavy a burden on the plaintiff.
Yet, the Act explicitly instructs that aside from the words employed in the Act, legislative intent
may be ascertained only by reference to a very abbreviated legislative history; one that is entirely
devoid of helpful information on the point. See 137 Cong. Rec. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Danforth).
333. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 661-62 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
334. For example, some queried whether under this formulation, a showing of preference by air
travellers for female air hostesses would meet the business necessity defense even though there is
no correlation between gender and the ability to serve as an air attendant.
335. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250-51 (1976); see also Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
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of the narrow definition of job-relatedness have won out. The absence
of any statutory definition of the terms, coupled with the explicit statutory
abjuring of the use of much of the legislative history of the Act, not
only leaves the interpretive function fraught with difficulties but strongly
argues for an interpretation that relies heavily on judicial precedence.
One may question the significance of the seeming reassignment of the
Wards Cove statement of the burden in two respects. First, because the
plaintiff must prove that a particular employment practice causes disparity
in the structure of the employer's workforce, the reference to "position
in question" applied to the defendant would be no different from the
work-force, the structure of which the plaintiff argues and is required
to prove to be out of balance. Thus, what might first appear to be a
defendant's burden, is, as held by the Court in Wards Cove, actually
the plaintiff's burden.
More crucially, the enacted formulation papers over important differences that emerged during discussion of the job relatedness and business
necessity elements of the defense. A prior formulation had required that
the defendant demonstrate that the challenged selection criterion 3"bears
6 Opa significant relationship" to effective performance of the job.
ponents, including representatives of the President, argued that any showing of relevance between the job and the selection criterion would be
sufficient.337 Thus, while the requirement is that the job relatedness of
the employment practice is to the position in question, the absence of
any qualification as to the nature of the relationship leaves open an
important area of controversy. 3 8
It is in the definition, or more accurately the absence of definition,
of "business necessity" that the insufficiency of legislative action is most

336. The precise phrasing of what the defendant must show was the cause of much controversy,
and the formulation varied from one enactment to another, as proponents attempted to find a
formula that would be acceptable to the President.
The compromise which requires the defendant "to demonstrate that the challenged practice is
job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity," simply repeats the
popular refrain without providing any guidance. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). This formula
certainly does not resolve the controversy about whether the permissible defense is restricted to
evaluating correspondence of the criteria to performance on the job, narrowly defined, or whether
the defense permits weighing other business interests. For one evaluation of how pre-Wards Cove
decisions came out on the issue, see Memorandum from Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson
to NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (July 26, 1991).
337. The most celebrated of these arguments was that of the Secretary of the Department of
Education, in which he contended that the "significant relationship" standard would restrict employers' use of "high school diplomas" to screen out employees, and that the administration was
opposed to such a measure because, notwithstanding Griggs, an employer ought to be able to insist
on high school diplomas in all circumstances. To take any other position, he said, would threaten
this country's drive for an internationally competitive workforce. See Adam Clymer, President Rejects
Senate Agreement on Rights Measure, N.Y. TnMEs, Aug. 2, 1991, at Al.
338. That controversy of course revolves around whether the identified practice must be shown
to be "essential" or "significant" to satisfactory discharge of the responsibilities of the position,
or whether it is enough that it bears some relationship to the job in question. Compare Wards
Cove, 490 U.S. at 659 with id. at 672-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Despite the vigorous debate
surrounding the controversy, the Bill as enacted is silent on these disagreements.
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evident. The Supreme Court has been remarkably cryptic in defining
what constitutes "business necessity." In large measure, the focus has
been shaped by extrajudicial yardsticks such as professional validation
34
339
or amorphous concerns about public safety. 1
studies of employment tests,
The absence of judicial consensus is compounded by the equally fractious
exposition of the meaning of "business necessity" that characterized the
legislative debate on the point. The diversity of views on what might
constitute "business necessity" ranged from the position purportedly
advanced by members of the executive branch that satisfaction of customer
preferences may suffice,3 4' to the insistence of strict professional validation
of the necessity of the skill to "essential job performance." The Act,
as passed, fails not only to choose from among these positions, but
positions in the determination
explicitly instructs the courts to ignore these
3 42
of what constitutes "business necessity.

In summary, finding that the Wards Cove decision "has weakened the
scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections," and that
"legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful
discrimination in employment," Congress's response was one of tinkering
with the formulae that had emerged from twenty years of Supreme Court
litigation. The tinkering, taking as it does the route of attempting to
express substantive concerns in procedural terms, accords with Supreme
Court practice. Not surprisingly, it suffers from the same shortcomings.
Past history and the 1991 Act itself are testimonials to the confusion of
the Supreme Court's approach. Much time and energy was and promises
to be spent on highly technical atomistic decisions with very little guidance
either for the particular litigator, or for the community's vision of the
relationships of members inter se. Given the vast amount of moral and
political capital that has been expended in the fight to reverse Wards
Cove, the end-result appears rather paltry. The next section explores
whether tenable alternatives exist, or whether the law and politics of
disparate impact analysis must inextricably be mired in the limited framework of employing procedural burdens as proxies for substantive goals.
IV.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

The discussion, thus far, suggests that the transformative use of procedure in the form of the continuing reliance on formulaic distribution
of burdens of proof to realize controversial policy goals carries at least

339. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1974). It should be noted, however,
that the Court termed such tests "impermissible" unless based on criteria that are significantly
correlated with, or predictive of, relevant elements of work behavior. Id. at 431.
340. E.g., New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); cf. Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321 (1977).
341. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, Compromise on Civil Rights Bill Skirts Controversial Definition,
WASH. PosT, Oct. 26, 1991, at A6. In a directive issued contemporaneously with the signing of
the legislation, the President reportedly instructed executive agencies to adopt the less stringent
relationship between the challenged business practice and the needs of the employer. See Stephanie
Saul, The Directive in Dispute, NEWSDAY, Nov. 22, 1991, at 7.
342. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b) (1991).
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three significant costs. First, achieving the desired substantive ends may
require such modification of the process that it loses coherence. Second,
the poorly adapted procedure may fail to realize the substantive end for
which it is invoked. This failure increases the cost of corrective action
because it becomes unclear whether the failure is due to the practical
unsuitability of the modified process, or to some intrinsic flaw in the
sought-for object. Third, the use of procedure may obscure the substantive
nature of the problem, hindering inquiry into possible political resolution
of underlying bottlenecks.
Set off against these costs is the value of the purported principled
neutrality that the systematized regime of procedure brings to bear on
the resolution of conflicts. Although this paper has thus far argued that
this purported benefit is at best illusory, the trade-off might be acceptable
if the law regulated discrete or static relationships. Discrimination, or at
least that much of it which attributes significance to substantial disproportionalities correlatable to well-defined social cleavages such as race or
gender, is too central an aspect of contemporary life to be disposed 3of43
by arcane rules. As the various Supreme Court opinions demonstrate,
and the debate over the 1991 Civil -Rights Act 3 " puts beyond cavil,
nothing short of re-examination of underlying concepts and their relevance
to the dynamic environment of current society will suffice.
The Wards Cove Court and proponents of the reversal of the decision
alike agree that unlawful discrimination may exist by virtue of statistical
disproportionalities and in the absence of demonstrable specific intent by
the employer to prefer members of one group over the other. There
appears also to be some consensus that not all statistical disproportionalities are unlawful. How then is lawful and socially acceptable statistical
disparity to be distinguished from the societally unacceptable? This is
the same old dilemma that the Supreme Court faced in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co..35 The post-Griggs decisions offered reliance on burden allocation as the solution. Portrayed as a process that worked because the
contents of the illness of discrimination could be segmented into their
various component parts and systematically analyzed, burden allocation
had the ring of scientific rigor and legal objectivity. Presented as an
efficient means of adducing relevant information, the content of the
burden, as applied, nonetheless reflected substantive norms that varied
from the broadly remedial to the narrowly antidiscriminatory. Mechanistic
application of burden allocation could be transferred from one to the
other because the basic distinction among these norms revolved around

343. As illustrated by the discussion in part 1I, above, the Court has frequently reversed the
lower courts, not because they misstated or misapplied accepted doctrine, but because they chose
the wrong test or burden of proof. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971);
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976);
Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
344. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1992).
345. 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also supra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

the extent to which the rules of causation should be dispositive. Missing
from this framework, however, was any attempt to understand or present
statistical differences as a generalized statement of society's sense of
community, whether in terms of the way it is understood or in terms
of the way it should be constructed. Under both the broadly remedial
and the narrowly antidiscriminatory approaches, the Supreme Court's
decisions offered up an image of th6 law as no more than a plumber's
tool for fixing the immediate leak in the pipe.
The core failing of the legislative response that wholeheartedly embraces
this judicial conception of the role of law lies in its unwillingness or
inability to come to grips with the relevance of theories of causation to
a vision of society that embraces color-blindness not simply with regard
to inputs and processes, but to its revolving and permanent structures
as well. Without a resolution-or at a minimum an understanding-of
the link between causation and concepts of unlawful discrimination
grounded in the presence of statistical disparities, procedural instruments
such as burden allocation will continue to be highly malleable and lacking
in integrity.
The central teaching of Griggs was the unease with which the Court,
and by proxy society, viewed the significant economic disparities that
could be readily correlated with well-worn societal categories such as
race. The belief that these disparities represented the results of discriminatory conduct rather than open-ended impersonal competitive forces
was buttressed not only by generalized historical experience, but also by
the broad outlines of the facts in Griggs.3 46 Legal experience-notably
in the context of school desegregation cases147-had demonstrated the
frustrations of tackling the systemic problem of racial discrimination
within the confines of liability determinations characteristic of the caseby-case methodology of individual tort claims. 48 The construction and
application of burden allocation in the broadly remedial phase gave voice
to these judicial concerns.
The concept of discrimination in American society, however, has not
been static. The claim that statistical disparities reflect the consequences
of unlawful discriminatory conduct had lost many of its adherents by
1976.149 It is today by no means uniformly accepted and is certainly a
minority position on the current Supreme Court. 5 0 In this environment,
burden allocation became an instrument for de-emphasizing the significance of statistical disparities. The Court, however, did not overrule
Griggs, nor the post-Griggs decisions that gave broad interpretive sig-

346. See supra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
347. E.g., Green v. School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
348. Compare Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of the Cause-in-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 881 (1982).
349. E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
350. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 506-07 (there are a myriad of innocent causes for black underrepresentation in government contracting opportunities); see also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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nificance to statistical disparities. 5' Instead, it employed burden allocation
to make these decisions virtually inconsequential.
Thus, even as Congress contended that the Act is intended to "confirm
statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication
3 52 it
of disparate impact suits" by codifying pre-Wards Cove decisions,
failed to take account of the reality that those decisions embodied two
quite distinct conceptions of the relevance of statistical disparities to
claims of unlawful discrimination. It is simply not the case, as congressional rhetoric would suggest, that Wards Cove was sui generis and
marked a complete break with the past.
American society's ambivalence toward dispensing with statistical imbalances as an element in the equation of discrimination is understandable.
The relevance of statistical disparities was forged in the crucible of history.
Whatever may be the status of current skepticism, either as to the
prevalence of discrimination in daily practice 35 3 or as to the persistence
of the effects of past discrimination,3 5 4 not even the most ardent proponents of a color-blind society contend that contemporary black underrepresentation in the economic arena bears no relationship to
discrimination. Burden allocation, like strict scrutiny, thus functions as
a means of teasing out the precise nature of the relationship. If the
relationship cannot be teased out, then the cost is made to remain on
where it falls; that is, on the unidentified victims of past discrimination.
This choice may be justified on three grounds. The first is that it
comports with the limited role of a court in a constitutional democracy.

351. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 (1977); see also notes 130-43, 148-58 and accompanying text.
352. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3 (1991).
353. The use of "paired testers" in which persons with essentially identical credentials are placed
in the same situation (e.g., interviewing for the same job or seeking to purchase the same house)
calls into question the accuracy of the increasing belief that discrimination, to the extent it persists,
is not manifested by failure to hire qualified blacks. Thus, in a recent study employing black and
white paired testers with college educations for publicy advertised clerical and blue collar positions
in Washington, D.C. and Chicago, researchers found discrimination against black males "widespread"
and "the existence of discrimination against blacks at the ninety-nine percent significance level."
See MARGERY TURNER ET AL., OPPORTUNITES DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISRIMINATION IN HIRING xi-xii, 63 (1991).
354. Statistical evidence of persisting significant economic disparities across racial lines abound.
For recent data, see David Swinton, The Economic Status of African Americans: Limited Ownership
and Persistent Inequality, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1992, 63-67 (1992); ANDREW HACKER,
Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,

HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 93-133, 232-33 (1992).

Nonetheless, some have questioned the relevance of past or contemporary discrimination for the
most egregious forms of black poverty, notably that of unemployed blacks-especially males-in
central city neighborhoods. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 109-11 (1987)
(downplaying the significance of overall statistical data since some blacks-notably those in the
administrative and professional classes-have benefitted disproportionately than other blacks from
programs supposedly aimed at eradicating discrimination); cf. John J. Donohue, II & Peter Siegelman,
The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991)
(reporting that trend in antidiscrimination lawsuits focus on promotion and dismissals rather than
hiring). But see MARGERY TURNER ET AL., OPPORTUNITES DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL
DISRIMINATION IN HIRING (1991) (reporting significant statistical differences in the treatment of blacks

and whites with regard to hiring for entry-level positions across occupational lines, although more
pronounced in white collar as contrasted with blue-collar positions).

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23

It is up to the person who claims injury and who seeks judicial intervention
to demonstrate cause for such intervention. Second, the consequences of
litigation are necessarily distributive. The outcome of any litigation must
total zero. Parties will always be aligned as victims or victimizers. By
definition, the plaintiff claiming injury starts out as a victim. If causation
rules are rigidly adhered to when the source of the plantiff's injury is
speculative, chances are that she will remain a victim throughout the
process because those rules will force her to bear the cost of her injury.
If, on the other hand, the rules are more flexibly applied, the defendant,
believing itself entitled to a presumption of the regularity of the status
quo, becomes the victim of any departure from established process. 55 It
is not the role of the courts, absent legislative enactments, to assign a
priori victim/victimizer positions. Finally, causation rules protect institutional structures that have claims to legitimacy by virtue of the fact
that they have survived and successfully emerged through the competitive
selection processes of the market and the democratic processes. Such
selection criteria as educational qualifications, seniority, and similar badges
are, by this definition, efficient and meritocratic.
If these justifications sound appealing to a court conscious of its
circumscribed role in a constitutional democracy, the basis for their
embrace by the legislative branch is more equivocal. Transactional cost
of the legislating process (i.e., the give-and-take of practical politicking),
ambivalence as to the merit of the substantive law, and lack of comprehension of the highly technical judicial rules may be resorted to as
explanations. As suggested by the maneuverings over the enactment of
the Act, the preponderant influence of the presidential veto, even in the
presence of overwhelming contrary legislative impulses, may be a significant factor in the process. This is particularly the case where the
views are no less intense for being held by a minority.35 6 Moreover, it
would be an error to overlook the prevalence of significant opposition
in the polity at large to a statistically-based definition of discrimination.
Whether anchored to the dominant judicial and executive branches' hostility to that epitome of statistically-based inquiry, affirmative action,
temporal distance from overt and/or de jure discrimination, or by fears
of what the climate of economic uncertainties hold for them, much of
the white population question the propriety of basing claims of discrimination in statistical analysis.
There remains, however, much discomfort in abandoning statistical
imbalances as relevant aspects of the discrimination inquiry. That discomfort lies in the realization not only that, as cases like Griggsrecognized,
statistical imbalances may reflect systemic discrimination in a variety of

355. One might argue that repeated departures from the status quo should create no expectation
of adherence to any particular procedure, and hence no sense of victimization. Such an argument,
however, runs counter to the implied view of law as a predictably regularized process.
356. Attempts to override presidential vetoes fell short by very narrow margins. The Senate avoided
an override of S2104 by a single vote, and House passage of HR1 fell short of a veto-proof
majority by about fifteen votes.
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ways. There is of course the easily understood causal link between past
discrimination and current effects that might be measured in terms of
denial to identifiable blacks and their children of the opportunity for
self-enrichment. Here, numbers measure the continuing effects of past
discrimination. Statistical imbalances may be, in addition, a measure of
the contemporary incidence and effects of discrimination in a quite
different sense. Institutional mechanisms developed with the best of in-

tents, and even with neutral goals, may subtly perpetuate discrimination
either because those institutions were developed at a time when it was
customary to ignore their application to blacks, or because they do not
reflect the residual effects of past discrimination on blacks.
A third approach, which has been accepted to an extent in more recent
decisions, is that removal of statistical imbalances may well be a laudable
goal in itself. 57 This is so because, whatever their causes, statistical
imbalances run counter to the vision of society organized as a community
of interdependent persons serving goals and interests that are mutually
beneficial to all.3"' A stratification readily correlatable to race or other
long-practiced distinctions among groups 5 9 detracts from this view of the
community. In short, the striving for color-blindness should not be limited
to the processes under which interaction is regulated, but should also be
reflected in the concern shown for the end-result.
This approach to statistical imbalances is generally presented as being
forward-looking and in contradistinction to the retrospective character of
causation-based analysis. 60 Aside from its practical and political utility,3 6

357. Judicial discussions of the legality of basing social and economic policies on the goal of
numerical parity have generally arisen in the context of equal protection challenges to specific
legislative acts. See, for example, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 526 (1989),
where there was not a single objection to Justice Scalia's suggestion that, had the City of Richmond
enacted the same program with the class of beneficiaries identified on grounds other than raceeven where blacks would benefit disproportionately-the statute would have survived the Court's
strict scrutiny. It is unclear whether a classification based on gender would have received a different
treatment. Cf. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Associated Gen.
Contractors of California v. City and County of San Francisco, 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1670 (1992) (indicating affirmative aetion programs favoring women are to
be subjected to less stringent scrutiny than those favoring blacks). But see Michigan Roadbuilders
Ass'n, Inc. v. Milliken, 834 F. 2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987), aff'd 489 U.S. 1061 (1989) (stating strict
scrutiny applies to preferences favoring women).
358. Cf. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492 (conceding that the government cannot be a passive bystander
to private action that results in statistical disparities).
359. My purpose here is not to present any detailed prescriptive scheme, but to sketch in broad
relief the outlines of a possible alternative that would require focusing on the substantive distributive
questions at issue, rather than procedure. For the purpose of this project, Professor Fiss's definition
of an identifiable group will suffice. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,
5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 148-49 (1976) (groups "have an identity and exist wholly apart from the
[Such a group] has two other characteristics. (1) It is an
challenged state statute or practice ....
(2) There is a condition of interentity having a distinct existence apart from its members ....
dependence" between the identity of members of the group and the identity and wellbeing of the
entity) (emphasis in original). Id. It is sufficient, then, that disparity can be established as to a
conceptual entity whose members view themselves and are viewed by others as linked to one another
by shared experiences, and distinguishable from others by those experiences.
360. See WILLIAM J. WILSON, THEa TRULY DISADVANTAGED 118 (1987).
361. Because, on its face, such a program is potentially open to everyone in society, it has been
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the claim purports to provide a morally acceptable and functionally
effective alternative to the divisive use of race-conscious measures. It is
morally acceptable because it avoids the stigmatizing consequences of
benefitting or burdening individuals on account of group identification,

notably race.362 For such criteria, it substitutes a much more meaningful

concept that is directly related to the cause for concern: the relative
inaccessibility of economic resources to the underprivileged members of
the community. It is said to be functionally effective because, while
perhaps disproportionately benefitting members of a particular racial
group such as blacks, it would not be overinclusive since only those who
are truly needy would be benefitted, while deserving members of other
groups would not be excluded.3 63 Moreover, resort to this approach should
lead to a clarification of what current society finds acceptable or disturbing
about the use of proven statistical evidence. If the facts that blacks
proportionately would be favored under such a program, that some whites
who would have benefitted under the traditional standard would necessarily be burdened under the new statute, and that some hitherto builtup expectations would be disappointed are not viewed as grounds for
invalidation, then the discussion may be rescued from the race-bound
rhetoric in which it is currently trapped.
The delinking of causation from effects has significant implications for
the generally accepted remedial conception of programs with significant
disparate racial impact. If causation is unrelated to effects in the form
of the distributive consequences of a facially race-neutral policy, legislative
bodies may well have a good deal of latitude in developing the criteria-3 64
other than race-for the distribution of economic goods in society.
argued that it could form the basis for a progressive coalition that would include, among others,
blacks, women, populists, liberals, and conservatives alike. See, e.g., id. at 115, 117-20. The support
of such conservative republicans as Senator Simms of Idaho for disadvantaged business enterprise
programs in highway construction lends some credibility to this claim. See, e.g., The Disadvantaged
Business Enterprise Program of the Federal Highway Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Transportation of the Committee on the Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1985) (statement of Senator Simms, R. Idaho).
362. For a discussion of the multiplicity of concerns that the Court has advanced for disfavoring
race-based classifications, see David Chang" DiscriminatoryImpact, Affirmative Action and Innocent
Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices, 1991 COLuM. L. Rav. 790; David Strauss,
Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 935 (1989).
363. See, e.g., JmAs S. FisHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE FAMLY (1983); cf. City
of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
But see David Chang Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action and Innocent Victims: Judicial
Conservatism or Conservative Justices, 1991 CoLuss. L. REV. 790, 804 n.42 (questioning the underlying
ideology involved in acceptance of purportedly race-neutral programs aimed at benefiting small
businesses).
Although Congress in recent years has adopted the concept of an all-race-inclusive program that
creates preferences or set-asides favoring "Disadvantaged Business Enterprises," the resulting enactments have not been entirely race-neutral. They have included a presumption (albeit rebuttable)
that membership in a racial or ethnic group or the status of being female is tantamount to being
disadvantaged. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 637(d) (1990); National Defense Procurement Act, Pub. L.
100-656 (1988); Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act, Pub. L. 100-17,
§ 106(c) (1987); Surface Transportation and Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-424 (1982).
364. A test of the Court's commitment to the invalidation of those programs that are only
superficially nonrace classificatory would depend on the standards it develops for ferreting out the
existence of an illicit motive behind a seemingly race-neutral measure.
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Such latitude may include the ability to fashion selection criteria that
will assure reduction in the level of disparity between black and white
participation in the national economy.3 65 Furthermore, a severing of disparate effects from the underlying remedial conception is bound to have
substantial impact on the rhetoric of burden allocation in Title VII
lawsuits, as well as the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on affirmative
action. For example, the Court in Wards Cove insisted that Congress,
in enacting Title VII, required the plaintiff, as part of the prima facie
case, to demonstrate a causal link between a specifically identified employment practice and a proven statistical disparity in the representation
of members of the plaintiff's class in the work-force. Although this
holding has generally been understood as expressing the Court's concern
that a contrary rule would create an incentive for hiring by the numbers,
an additional aspect was judicial sentiment that whatever the theory
employed, a finding of violation of Title VII branded the defendant with
the unsavory reputation of being a discriminator. 366 With acceptance of
statistical disparities as worthy of attention on the basis of the future
structure of the community, the inquiry would shift from assigning blames
for past conduct to means of reconciling the demands for structuring a
community that integrates normative concerns to available resources. This
will not be a friction-free endeavor, but it would avoid the stigma of
the defendant being branded a discriminator and the attendant judicial
disinclination to permit such branding without substantial evidence in its
support.
Adoption of a facially race-neutral model to tackle incidents of statistical
disparities will, of course, not be without controversy. For one thing,
like the causation-based approach, it is not value-free. It explicitly identifies some form of economic parity as a societal end worth striving for.
Many will disagree with this goal, but the ensuing debate has the potential
of focusing explicitly on the merit of the goal. The debate should result
in the introduction of new terminology with force independent of wornout cliches. It would most likely recognize and take cognizance of the
fact that the forces that militate for and against economic disparity today
are not identical to those that compelled legislative action in 1964.367
Concededly, the debate will not be tidy. It is bound to involve, among
other things, defining the scale of economic parity demanded by the
365. There is no lack of suggestions. They range from the use of directed efforts such as advertising
in media likely to be read by blacks, technical assistance in the form of training programs, and
waiver of difficult-to-comply-with requirements (such as bonding), to the use of market forces such
as the creation of rating programs or tax credits. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-10; Robert
E. Suggs, Rethinking Minority Business Development Strategies, HARv. CR.-CL. L. REV. 101 (1990)
(advocating use of market forces to promote broader business ownership by minorities).
366. Compare Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 436 (1986) (noting application of special pleading rules
to claims asserting civil rights laws).
367. Such debate would be different from the essentially undefined and indeterminate concepts
currently at the heart of antidiscrimination discussions.
On the dynamic nature of conceptions of "discrimination" and "antidiscrimination," see John
J. Donohue, III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment DiscriminationLitigation,
43 STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991).
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renewed vision of the community, the spheres in which it is laudable to
have it and those from which it should be excluded, the difficulties of
gathering and interpreting data, and the 3fit6 of concepts of "parity" to
economic, political, and social ideologies. 1
Moreover, dispensing with the fault-based underpinning of Title VII
and affirmative action law in those instances where the system currently
relies on disparate impact analysis would require society to wean itself
away from a prevailing conception of morality that equates entitlement
to social concern with victimization of some sort. While contemporary
debate suggests that much of the moral force of this justification has
been largely spent, its formal abandonment might be difficult to explain
and justify-at least until alternative conceptions gain greater support 69
Finally, an approach oriented toward economic parity will require the
creation or evolution of new mechanisms and institutions for adjudicating
and enforcing applicable rights and interests. It may well result in the
creation of new formulae and yardsticks, and of processes and means
that may generate as much distortion and obfuscation as is currently the
case.
The potential for these and other difficulties exist. On the other hand,
with the experience of burden allocation as guide, there are means of
resisting such entrenchment of procedure. We can call for constant reexamination and readjustment not just of means, but of ends as well.
Rather than using the legislative process as a means of reversing the
occasional controversial decision, a process of periodic re-examination
could be institutionalized. In short, what the proposal offers is the need
to re-examine explicitly fundamental notions at the heart of the current
procedures employed to enforce Title VII and like claims. The rigidities
of the current processes, the ritualized incantation with which they are
presented, and the seeming scientific precision of the calibration of the
yardsticks all mask substantive policies that should be openly examined.
The procedural terminology and accompanying judicial constructions that
have been so confusingly employed by the Supreme Court do not allow
for the searching and candid discussion these questions deserve.
Ultimately, the strongest reason for examining statistical imbalance in
terms other than causation is the need to free the discussion from the

368. Notions of "parity" (sometimes derogatorily characterized as "quotas") have been severely
criticized in the racial and gender contexts. See Morris B. Abrams, Affirmative Action: FairShakers
and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312 (1986). It has never been clear whether the criticism
is of parity in general or simply its application to a particular class of persons. For one attempt
to defend parity as a goal, see Julianne Malvaux, The Parity Imperative: Civil Rights, Economic
Justice, and the New American Dilemma, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1992, 281 (1992).
369. The classic example is requiring blacks, despite a history of past discrimination, either to
forego or to derive no greater benefit from societal programs than nonblacks who are statistically
shown to be in a similar position. Thus, for example, justifying to an enterprising black the legality
of denying her relief-even where she can demonstrate (say under current burden allocation formulae)
the probability of past discrimination because she and other blacks in her position fail to meet
some required measure of statistical disparity while granting relief to a recent Asian immigrantmight appear inequitable. Chances are that she is no more likely to find the system morally more
acceptable than white males who charge "reverse discrimination" under current law.
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procedural barnacles with which the search for color/gender-blind economic equality has become encrusted over the last twenty years. The

interdependence of the various theories for relief would become more
evident. Chances are that society's real concern over cost will emerge to

the forefront,370 and that such costs can be measured against not merely

the efficacy of the processes used, but the end-results sought. The variety
of responses bound to be generated should make the undertaking of a
new enterprise worthwhile.37 1
V.

CONCLUSION

The commands of laws are most sacrosanct when they are trumpeted
as and clothed in the garb of procedure. These internal rules epitomize
the classical legitimation of law as enshrining neutral principles. Expressing
values embodied in the rules in neutral terms, society attempts to resolve
demonstrated shortcomings in the rules by fine-tuning their use to meet
particularized and discrete circumstances. Society is reluctant to consider
that harmony lies not in reconciliation, but in reconceptualization of the
problem, and perhaps even the jettisoning of established answers. No
inherently compelling rationale exists for burdens of proof to have taken
on the decisive role they have come to play in Title VII and equal

protection analysis. The original framework reflected a broadly remedial
vision of Title VII that was the hallmark of the Supreme Court's civil
rights cases in the first half of the 1970s. Stare decisis maintained the
shell of appearances even as the Court's substantive vision changed. The
extent of the change in content, and the weakness of the shell, was
demonstrated in Wards Cove.
Congress, in its recent efforts to respond to the Wards Cove decision
while demonstrating recognition of the substantive character of the debate,
failed to come to grips with it, and instead took umbrage in the discredited

370. 1 do not minimize the substantial hurdles that will be raised by the need to deal with costs:
personal and institutional, economic or social. It is also quite possible that obfuscating procedure
might develop. Prior experience suggests, however, that courts are less likely to mask their underlying
policy concerns when addressing issues of remedy than when attempting to ascertain liability. See,
in the Title VII context, Memphis Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 583-89 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Corp., 431 U.S. 747, 774-78 (1976) (confronting the claim
that the award of retroactive seniority should be impermissible because it would be at the expense
of "innocent majority" employees).
371. For example, plausible responses might include reexamination of adjudicatory litigation as
a primary means for reducing inequality of access to economic resources. In this context, the
Department of Labor's "Glass Ceiling Project" - under which a special section of the department
has an ongoing task of (1) identifying systematic barriers to career advancement by women and
"minorities," (2) working with employers to eliminate these problems, and (3) devising procedures
and channels for ongoing communication and monitoring between the department and private
employers - may be suggestive of future trends. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 1024166, § 201 (1991). Likewise, appropriate structures for providing relief to the underrepresented
might include discussion of public funding versus mandated private accommodations. See, e.g.,
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. As to the issue of reliance
on specific quantifiable relief (i.e., numerical goals, timetables, quotas, etc.) versus technical assistance,
see City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Local 28 Sheet Metalworkers v.
E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421 (1986); United States v. Paradise, 478 U.S. 149 (1986).
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ritual of burden allocation.3 72 Given the complete dependence of the
statutory formula on judicial precedents, and the inability of Congress
to marshall any other independent sources of ideas, congressional effort
is likely to yield very limited results. This need not be the outcome,
however. An important consequence of highly controversial decisions such
as Wards Cove is that they ought to prompt a thoroughgoing and
systematic appraisal of how and why the allocation of burdens of proof
have come to play the dominant role in Title VII litigation. These decisions
also lead to fresh looks at alternative mechanisms for realizing the
substantive visions at stake. Proponents of the status quo ought to be
required to justify it in terms of current objectives, not simply by pointing
to tradition or even longevity. Similarly, proponents of a new substantive
vision ought to be forced to develop and justify the contours of the
vision. They ought to be made to take account of the transactional costs
involved in creating the necessary political coalitions to transform the
3 73
vision into legislation and to contemplate possible trimming or revision.
In short, the Wards Cove decision, read against the backdrop of Griggs,
offered up a route not taken. The explicit unmasking in the decision of
the shroud of process over substantive choices suggested, at a minimum,
the preceptoral value of re-examining the place of statistical disparities
in the understanding and definition of the community. At the end of
the day, Congress returned this important issue unexplored back into the
cocoon of judicial process.

372. As explained in subpart IIA(4), supra, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank and Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977 (1988), and the Court majority in Wards Cove,
make the case for replacing procedural formalism with substantive content.
373. Compare, however, the switch in the congressional selling of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
following the successful presidential veto of the 1990 amendments, from emphasis on the passage
of provisions relating to the business necessity defense, to provisions involving monetary damage
awards in gender discrimination cases. See J. Jennings Moss, Civil Rights Bill Keys on Women,
WASH. TsmEs, Mar. 13, 1991, at Al. But see Joan Biskupic, Democrats Scramble for Cover Under
GOP 'Quota' Attacks, CoNG. QUART., May 25, 1991, at 1378 (explaining softening of bill to accept
cap on monetary damages recoverable by women as necesitated by the need to reach a veto-proof
consensus in the legislature).

